Brian McAndrew
The Toronto Star
August 16, 1997

 

Over the years, troubles were short-circuiting the utility’s nuclear stations. Now, the fuse has blown and critics are asking, `where was the watchdog ?’

ONTARIO HYDRO HAS stuck its finger in an electric socket and given itself a shock. Amazingly, the biggest producer of electricity in North America was surprised by the jolt.

An eight-month internal investigation to find out what’s been going on inside Ontario Hydro’s troubled nuclear sector spelled out the shocking story – its nuclear plants have been horribly mismanaged.

The report paints a picture of an aging, rundown system held together with band-aid patches.

It portrays those running it as mistake-prone buffoons whose only interest has been to make sure the transmission lines are filled with electric current rather than safeguarding the public from the inherently hazardous operation of nuclear reactors.

An eight-member American group of nuclear industry experts recruited to conduct the investigation into Ontario Hydro Nuclear issued the Report To Management this week to the crown corporation’s board of directors.

The Hydro hierachy – indeed, the entire nuclear industry in Canada – was stunned by the findings despite years of persistent warnings from government regulators and environmental groups.

The slim report, which described the privileged members of the nuclear sector as a “cult,” cost Hydro president Allan Kupcis his job.

Kupcis – who actually initiated the investigation – resigned after the 64-page report landed in the board room Monday.

Hydro executives and directors had never looked too closely at those running the nuclear “cult,” the prima donna specialists responsible for producing 60 per cent of Ontario’s electricity.

They were knocked cold by the report even though the nuclear division had come up with an $8 billion contingency plan.

Seven of the utility’s 20 nuclear reactors will be shut down at the Pickering and Bruce plants over the next few years – for “upgrading,” but possibly forever – while generation at one oil-fuelled and two coal-powered plants will be boosted to take up the slack.

How could Ontario Hydro get itself in such a mess?

“This came as a very big surprise to them because Hydro is such a huge organization and they chose for a long time not to probe the nuclear `cult,’ ” says Norm Rubin, director of nuclear research at Energy Probe, a watch dog group.

“They (the nuclear industry) have been so busy being cheerleaders to the government and the Canadian public that they became cheerleaders among themselves,” Rubin adds.

Still, Ontario Hydro is one of the most carefully watched outfits in the country.

Nuclear energy production is one of the most highly regulated industries in Canada.

It is subject to licensing and daily on-site examination by the Atomic Energy Control Board, the independent federal government regulator that has the authority to turn the lights out on any nuclear reactor operation gone bad.

But the board has never gone that far.

“The threat of being shut down is usually enough to convince a nuclear operation to take some action,” says control board spokesperson Bob Potvin.

“We have inspectors on site and there is good communication with plant operators so action is taken before it gets to the point where a plant would be told to shut down.”

Ontario Hydro has always brushed aside – like flies around a bull’s head – the criticisms from small anti-nuclear watchdogs such as Energy Probe and Durham Nuclear Awareness.

While most of the responsibility for the failures of its nuclear operation sits with Ontario Hydro itself, the energy control board compounds the problem by primarily looking out for the well-being of the industry, Rubin says.

“They are not working on behalf of the public,” Rubin says of the board.

The board, he adds, is incapable of ensuring that Ontario Hydro runs its nuclear division properly because it works as an oversight agency that allows nuclear plants to operate at minimal safety levels in order to retain their licences.

“The board sees its role as conducting audits and responsibility for safety is left up to the licensee.”

It was the control board that alerted Ontario Hydro to the seriousness of the problems within the nuclear division, Potvin responds.

“For the past several years, we have raised a number of yellow flags (at Pickering). We have made them make several changes and significant improvements,” Potvin goes on.

Pickering didn’t move fast enough on its improvements and the board “tightened the leash” by renewing its operating licence in June for just nine months rather than the standard two years, he says.

The response of managers at Pickering to the board’s concerns was too sluggish. And pressure to get problems fixed wasn’t coming from the utility’s downtown headquarters – a monolithic building across from Queen’s Park with mirror-coated windows that could symbolize the difficulty the public has getting an inside look at how the utility is run.

The latest review of Pickering published in June reveals how the control board was attempting to fix problems at the plant and trying to alert senior management to the ongoing deterioration in the operation.

According to the report on Pickering:

“In 1996, as in 1995, the number of times Ontario Hydro failed to comply with conditions of the stations’ operating licences and the Atomic Energy Control Regulations was unsatisfactory.”

“As reported in 1994 and 1995, Ontario Hydro needs to improve on the contamination control aspects of its radiation protection program.”

“Ontario Hydro needs to pay more attention to nuclear safety, supervision and managements issues.”

“Ontario Hydro needs to devote more attention to resolving issues related to inadequate human performance.”

“In 1996, we noted some improvements but progress is slow and much remains to be done.”

Says Potvin: “They were making progress but not quickly enough. The plans looked good but the proof is in the pudding, not in the recipe.”

Pickering has a history plagued by operating glitches that should have alerted Ontario Hydro management to the persistent problems there. But if it did notice, it didn’t take much action.

The Bruce plant, on the shore of Lake Huron, has also had a troubled history. One of its reactors was shut down because of a heavy water leak just last month. One other aging unit was closed last year because it needed costly repairs, and there are doubts it will ever be restarted.

Now, the nuclear system is doomed, according to Dave Martin, research director of Durham Nuclear Awareness.

“This is a permanent shutdown,” Martin says of the Pickering and Bruce reactors, “and the beginning of the end of nuclear energy in Canada.”

A list of 10 major problems at Pickering compiled by Martin includes:

A ruptured pressure tube caused a loss of coolant in August, 1983, that shut a part of the plant and led to the $1 billion retubing of the Pickering `A’ facility that originally cost $716 million to build.

An operating error in November, 1988, damaged 36 radioactive fuel bundles, an accident Ontario Hydro did not think could happen and forced it to revise operating procedures.

A broken pipe spilled 185 tonnes of heavy water triggering a core cooling system for the first time in any Candu reactor to prevent a meltdown.

All eight reactors were shut down in April, 1996, to repair a backup valve on the core cooling system.

The internal Hydro report focuses on the management failings of the Pickering and Bruce plants.

It points out how small emergencies are resolved by “jumpers” – temporary repairs – that are never completed with fully-acceptable maintenance.

It slams management of the plants for being willing to cut corners but showing a reluctance to “make waves” by pointing out more serious problems.

“You don’t get promoted by pointing out problems,” Rubin observes, adding many of the management deficiencies at the nuclear plants are common to any other industry.

The trouble is there is little room for error at a nuclear plant. Since people are incapable of working to perfection, the nuclear system will never be a totally safe operation, Rubin says.

“They are in an industry where a 99 per cent success rate is a failing grade,” he says.

Rubin and other environmentalists have been touting that line for years and hope someone in authority will finally pay attention.

Rubin is a Boston native and graduate of the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with an arts and science degree in English literature, music and physics.

Rubin joined the then four-year-old Energy Probe in 1978. He testified at public hearings into the safety of Ontario nuclear power plants called in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in 1979 and revelations that Ontario ‘s nuclear plants had their own problems.

The 1980 MacDonald Report – written by a commission headed by former CCF/NDP leader Donald C. MacDonald – made some insightful recommendations about nuclear safety that went ignored by the industry but “gave us something to roll up and use as a club,” he says.

Either indifference or fear on the part of the provincial government allowed the Ontario Hydro giant to get itself into such disastrous shape.

Even this week, Premier Mike Harris and Environment and Energy Minister Norm Sterling paid lip service without fully entering the fray.

“It’s a people problem,” said Sterling, shrugging off the $8 billion upgrading and energy replacement costs the utility envisages to resolve its problems on top of its $33 billion debt.

“The government needs to be making major surgery (on Hydro) but the government is in hiding,” Rubin says.

Now it could be time for the Progressive Conservative government to take a look at the way Ontario Hydro is run and to determine whether it should continue its pursuit of producing nuclear power.

The Legislature resumes Monday – and it’s expected the opposition Liberals and New Democrats will quickly raise the nuclear plant problems as an issue.

A white paper on the over-all operation of Ontario Hydro is expected to be presented to the government within a few weeks.

After nearly 20 years of chronicling every mismanaged move made by Ontario Hydro, Rubin feels guilty about finding some pleasure in being able to say: “I told you so.”

“I’m a human being and it always feels good to be right,” he says.

But it’s an unsatisfying feeling, he adds – a feeling an anti-tobacco advocate could experience “when he discovers someone else has developed lung cancer.”