Question on Flannery's assurance that Australia likely to meet Kyoto target and "patience has worn thin" with Canada

by Aldyen Donnelly

With respect to Australia’s ability to comply with its Kyoto commitment, I am not sure who is briefing Tim Flannery, but he appears, to me anyway, to harbour a number of misconceptions — about both Canada and his home land, Australia.

The Aussie facts are a little bizarre. In 2004, the Howard government decided to introduce an unusual, uniquely Australian GHG inventory accounting practice that is not recognized anywhere else in the world or by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The newer Rudd government has maintained the Howard government inventory accounting method for purposes of reporting to and communicating with the Australian people.. The Aussie target of "8% above 1990 levels" is likely within reach using the unique, bizarre Aussie GHG inventory method. But Australia’s Kyoto target is impossible to reach. While all of the official national GHG inventories that appear at the Australia Greenhouse Office incorporate the bizarre, unique GHG accounting method, Australia still complies with IPCC/UNFCCC guidelines for all of their official GHG inventory submissions to the UNFCCC/COP.

Using the bizarre Howard/Rudd Austrlia GHG inventory method, Australia’s GHG itotalled 546,328,000 in 1990 and 597,197,000 in 2007. (source http://www.ageis.greenhouse.gov.au/). If you elect to recognize these GHG inventory estimate, an Australian commitment to cap GHGs at 8% above 1990 levels for 2008-2012 is very much within reach.

But according to Australia’s official inventory submissions to the UNFCCC–and for purposes of determining Kyoto Protocol compliance–Australia’s GHGs (including land use change) totalled 453,794,000 in 1990 and 825,888,000 in 2007 (see Australia’s official GHG
inventory submissions to the UNFCCC, below, source):

http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/4771.php

Below, I should tell you both the Aussie UNFCCC inventory excluding and including land use change and forestry ("LULUCF") You may recall that all parties were invited to elect to report target progress in reference to either UNFCCC inventory option — with or without LULUCF. Canada elected to report progress without LUCLUCF (which means that under Kyoto we are not permitted to count forestry and land use change credits towards our Kyoto target) and Australia elected to report with LUCLUCF (which means that Australia can use forestry and land use change credits when they report progress towards their Kyoto target).

Yes, you are reading this correctly. With its much smaller population, Australia’s total reportable GHGs (including land use change) exceeded Canada’s by roughly 30,000,000 TCO2e in 2007. Australia’s 1990 to 2007 GHG growth rate has also been significantly higher than
Canada’s when the reference is the internationally sanctioned IPCC/UNFCCC Inventory method.

In fact, both inventories are posted at the Australia Greenhouse website (http://www.ageis.greenhouse.gov.au/). The first inventory is labelled "National Greenhouse Gas Inventory", while the inventory that is used to determine Kyoto compliance is labelled "UNFCCC Inventory". Because of their election to include LUCLUCF in their progress reporting, the Aussie government shows only the GHG inventory that was at 825,888,000 TCO2e in 2007 as the UNFCCC Inventory at the AGO website.

It is, therefore, inconceivable that Australia can comply with its Kyoto target, which compliance — by definition–must be achieved using the IPCC/UNFCCC GHG inventory accounting methods.

Of course, this Australian government inventory game-playing is highly confusing for the Australian people. I would have thought that Tim Flannery, of all people, would have been above playing this game.

Annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for Australia, in Gg CO₂ equivalent

Query results for Party: Australia – Years: All years – Category: Total
GHG emissions excluding LULUCF/LUCF – Gas: Aggregate GHGs

Category	Base Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Last Inventory Year(2007)
1 Energy	286,433.06	286,433.06	288,301.58	294,536.63	298,927.27	301,172.86	312,795.28	318,702.89	328,977.53	342,863.55	349,717.30	358,623.05	365,123.66	368,640.12	381,635.46	387,039.68	392,830.15	400,103.83	408,162.69
2 Industrial Processes	24,141.44	24,141.44	23,411.06	24,039.63	23,882.18	24,069.93	24,268.94	24,079.50	24,165.23	25,442.53	25,690.74	25,731.17	26,381.40	26,831.19	27,936.86	29,018.65	27,792.74	29,386.59	30,342.89
3 Solvent and Other Product Use	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
4 Agriculture	86,832.12	86,832.12	87,000.54	85,328.50	84,845.84	85,374.57	86,332.68	86,628.17	87,848.27	88,048.65	91,225.69	94,676.97	98,236.03	95,646.16	91,230.08	91,286.62	89,571.32	90,798.01	88,106.04
6 Waste	18,807.32	18,807.32	18,787.06	18,580.34	18,507.59	17,998.98	18,039.86	16,649.98	16,440.74	15,799.14	15,958.64	15,823.60	15,996.48	16,072.35	15,125.52	14,739.68	14,441.26	14,182.29	14,567.10
7 Other	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Total	416,213.94	416,213.94	417,500.24	422,485.10	426,162.88	428,616.33	441,436.75	446,060.54	457,431.77	472,153.87	482,592.36	494,854.79	505,737.57	507,189.82	515,927.91	522,084.63	524,635.47	534,470.72	541,178.73

Note 1: The reporting and review requirements for GHG inventories are different for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.
The definition format of data for emissions/removals from the forestry
sector is different for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties (see details).

Note 2: Base year data in the data interface relate to the base year under the Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC).
The base year under the Convention is defined slightly different than the base year under the Kyoto Protocol.

Note 3: — means "No data available"; * means "Emissions were reported with notation keys"; n.a. means "not applicable".

Annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for Australia, in Gg CO₂ equivalent

Query results for Party: Australia – Years: All years – Category: Total
GHG emissions including LULUCF/LUCF – Gas: Aggregate GHGs

Category	Base Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Last Inventory Year(2007)
1 Energy	286,433.06	286,433.06	288,301.58	294,536.63	298,927.27	301,172.86	312,795.28	318,702.89	328,977.53	342,863.55	349,717.30	358,623.05	365,123.66	368,640.12	381,635.46	387,039.68	392,830.15	400,103.83	408,162.69
2 Industrial Processes	24,141.44	24,141.44	23,411.06	24,039.63	23,882.18	24,069.93	24,268.94	24,079.50	24,165.23	25,442.53	25,690.74	25,731.17	26,381.40	26,831.19	27,936.86	29,018.65	27,792.74	29,386.59	30,342.89
3 Solvent and Other Product Use	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
4 Agriculture	86,832.12	86,832.12	87,000.54	85,328.50	84,845.84	85,374.57	86,332.68	86,628.17	87,848.27	88,048.65	91,225.69	94,676.97	98,236.03	95,646.16	91,230.08	91,286.62	89,571.32	90,798.01	88,106.04
5 LULUCF	37,579.65	37,579.65	133,227.28	60,564.39	-2,559.59	-43,356.47	101,010.49	-15,260.84	-56,971.07	129,938.70	-46,012.73	-90,462.68	-78,658.29	283,885.46	114,111.83	-193,623.41	71,603.29	16,587.76	284,709.69
6 Waste	18,807.32	18,807.32	18,787.06	18,580.34	18,507.59	17,998.98	18,039.86	16,649.98	16,440.74	15,799.14	15,958.64	15,823.60	15,996.48	16,072.35	15,125.52	14,739.68	14,441.26	14,182.29	14,567.10
7 Other	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Total	453,793.59	453,793.59	550,727.52	483,049.49	423,603.29	385,259.86	542,447.24	430,799.70	400,460.70	602,092.57	436,579.63	404,392.10	427,079.28	791,075.28	630,039.74	328,461.22	596,238.75	551,058.48	825,888.42

Note 3: — means "No data available"; * means "Emissions were reported with notation keys"; n.a. means "not applicable".

Why Canada failed on Kyoto and how to make amends

by Tim Flannery, Toronto Star, November 22, 2009

Whatever you may think of the climate problem or the upcoming Copenhagen meeting, it’s indisputable that Canada, by virtue of its history of engagement with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, finds itself facing a profound dilemma. More than anything else, reducing carbon emissions requires bold policies that guide the responsible production and use of energy, and examining Canada’s federal structure and history on this issue helps to frame the realistic options available to the country at this critical juncture.

Canada’s problem with Kyoto goes to the very heart of its system of government, for Canada is a federation with a weak centre. While the federal government has the authority to negotiate multilateral agreements and enact legislation to respect their terms, in the case of climate change the brunt of this legislation affects energy, which is of provincial jurisdiction.

The debate surrounding Kyoto and its implementation raised spectres that had, in the early 1980s, nearly torn the country apart. So from the very beginning it was clear that only the strongest, most resolute federal leadership had a hope of honouring the promises it had made. One only need mention the words National Energy Program in the province of Alberta to experience an echo of that crisis. The sense that the province was being unfairly targeted is still so raw that no federal government since has been brave enough to forge a new energy policy. And without such a policy, how can Canadians deliver on international obligations that involve fossil fuels?

Canada was an early and strong promoter of a global climate treaty, reflective of its longstanding commitment to international environmental and development agendas. At the Kyoto meeting in 1997, Prime Minister Jean ChrÃ©tien negotiated an obligation to cut Canada’s annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 6 per cent below their 1990 levels from 2008-2012.

This was in line with the reduction targets accepted by other developed countries but contrasted sharply with the position of Australia, an economy markedly similar to Canada’s and heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Australia negotiated an 8 per cent increase on 1990 levels, a target it is likely to honour, and which is the starting point for a new drive to finally reduce emissions which will commence in 2012.

So from the outset it was clear that Canada had set itself a difficult task. When the United States abandoned Kyoto in 2001, Canada was left as the only nation in the Americas considering the adoption of a binding emissions-reduction obligation. Canada forged ahead and announced its intention to ratify in late 2002, and when Russia’s ratification in November 2004 resurrected an agreement many had left for dead, it started to become clear that an energy-intensive economy like Canada’s would need to take bold steps to enable responsible economic growth accompanied by a dwindling emissions profile.

While many could empathize with Canada’s difficult position, patience has worn thin as months and years have now passed in the absence of a coherent and detailed climate strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

True it is that attempts at action were made, but differing provincial views as to how (or whether) action should be taken, coupled with federal indecision (under the Liberals) and then deliberate indifference (under Stephen Harper’s Conservatives) to the issue have left Canada adrift.

A NEW ADMINISTRATION in the United States has made clear its intention to take meaningful action, and Canada’s wait-and-see approach has left its provinces to take disparate and largely uncoordinated actions. Federal attempts at harmonizing this basket of approaches, and getting it to add up to a national emissions reduction target, have been slow and secretive, leaving many skeptical of the earnestness of Canada’s attempts to honour its international obligations.

The problem facing Canada is that its commitment to Kyoto is real. Though efforts have been made by the current administration to repudiate the emissions reduction obligation, Canada remains a Party to the Protocol and is expected to honour those obligations. Failure to deliver will have profound economic, political and moral implications. Current best-guess estimates project that Canada will overshoot these targets by some billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent during the Kyoto period, by far the worst breach of any nation.

And that is a real drag on the current negotiations, for given the sizeable penalty (30 per cent on top of a billion-tonne excess) that Canada would most likely be obliged to pay for its Kyoto breach, any target it would be willing to accept under a new agreement is likely to be unacceptable to every other nation around the table.

Every action has its consequences, and right or wrong, Canada will pay for its Kyoto default. In international politics, as among individuals, reputations are our most important asset, and before Kyoto Canada had one of the finest international reputations in the world. One only need think of the Montreal Protocol, where the world agreed to phase out CFCs and other materials that damage the earth’s ozone layer, or the great work done by Canada in international peacekeeping, to get a sense of how outsiders saw Canada prior to its Kyoto debacle.

As Canada seeks to engage with the Copenhagen meeting, it finds itself in the position of a seller on eBay who has pocketed the payment but not forwarded the goods. Such a loss of reputation in business is often irreparable, but in politics amends can be made. Making best efforts to address this issue will serve Canada well, for among nations as among people, goodwill is recognised and rewarded.

WERE I ADVISING the government of Canada, I would urge the Harper government, despite the fact that it didn’t create the problem, to take ownership of it and seek meaningful ways to make recompense. One avenue open to it is to play a leading role in financing adaptation to, and mitigation of, climate change impacts in the world’s poorest countries.

Canada has a proud history of engagement with Africa, which could be built on as a way of restoring the nation’s reputation. Just as importantly, Canada needs a national energy policy which forms the framework for a viable approach to national emissions reductions in future. The only way that this can be achieved is if it becomes the personal crusade of a highly capable Canadian prime minister who is capable of working effectively with provincial leaders. It would cost time, political capital and money, but nothing is more important for Canada’s reputation, nor its place in the world, than this.

In a few weeks I’ll be sitting down, here in Australia, to a very different Christmas from that enjoyed by most Canadians. It’s likely to be at least 35C, with worries about bushfires perhaps putting a damper on the barbecue. But still our fundamental thoughts will be the same. I’ll be thinking about my father, now in his 80s, who battles valiantly on through increasingly frail health, and of my son, aged 26, who will be enjoying his first Christmas away from home, in Europe. My son may well live to see the year 2080, and he will carry with him all his life the love of his grandfather and grandmother. As dispersed as we are, there’s a web of love connecting us all, which spans half a world and 150 years of time.

One thought has recently been much on my mind: what would our world be like today if the climate crisis had emerged in my father’s youth? What if, in the 1930s, scientists had discovered that a rapid increase in temperature brought about by human pollution was threatening the survival of humanity? I’ve no idea how my father and his generation would have risen to the challenge, but whatever their actions, science leaves no doubt that their decisions would by now be having a profound impact upon my world and quality of life. And when I look at my son that is just what I feel. That despite the difficulties and sorry history and scientific uncertainty about details, we need to do our best in dealing with the climate problem; the fate of our children depends upon it, and in the web of human love connecting families, a century is not a long time at all.

Australian scientist Tim Flannery is the author of The Weathermakers and Now or Never, which argue for public policies to reduce carbon emissions that scientists have linked to rising temperatures.