McGuinty touting smart meters use

Gillian Livingston
The London Free Press
March 27, 2004

Smart meters the province hopes to put in Ontario homes would encourage people to run their dishwashers in the middle of the night to save on their energy bills, Premier Dalton McGuinty said yesterday. Though residents have to pay part of the cost to install the meters, they will save money in the long run through a planned revamped billing system that would reward the energy-conscious, McGuinty said.

“If you put your dishwasher on at three o’clock in the morning, although that is good for energy generation in the province of Ontario, we don’t (currently) reward you financially for doing so,” McGuinty said before a cabinet retreat.

“We’re not charging you lesser rates for using electricity at off-peak periods.”

The smart meters, which measure when consumers use their electricity so they can get cheaper rates in off-peak hours such as late at night, are part of the province’s conservation plan to cut power use by five per cent by 2007, McGuinty said.

Every smart meter “will pay for itself,” he added, with the cost covered by a small monthly charge.

“It’s all designed to ensure that you are in fact saving money over the long term.”

But there’s no date for when Ontario will begin installing the meters.

There’s also no decision on what kind of smart meters the province could use.

There are a number of different types of meters that can help consumers cut their electricity use, said Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe.

Woodstock Hydro has a pay-as-you-go system for about 2,600 residential customers.

Consumers use a pre-paid card to buy electricity so they know how much it costs to run appliances. It also helps the utility cut down on bad debts.

It costs about $500 for the utility to put in a meter.

Another technology is an interval meter, which has a microchip in it to count how much electricity is being consumed and when.

But Adams said there’s no point spending money on new meters if the province keeps a cap on electricity prices, because that lessens the financial incentive for consumers to conserve.

“If we’ve got smart meters but dumb prices, we’re not going to get the benefit of these better meters,” he said.

“The real issue here is what are the Liberals going to do with electricity prices,” Adams asked.

The meters most Ontarians have count electricity use, at a cost of about $7 a year ameter. Interval meters cost about $100 a year, Adams said.

An increase in electricity prices comes into effect Thursday. The rate will be 4.7 cents a kilowatt hour for the first 750 units used by a household, and will rise to 5.5 cents after that level. The previous cap was 4.3 cents.

The province’s conservation plan, a topic of discussion at yesterday’s cabinet retreat, will be “progressive, aggressive, bold and ambitious,” McGuinty said.

 

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Cameco bids on nuclear plant

Wendy Stueck
Globe and Mail
March 1, 2004

Vancouver: Uranium producer Cameco Corp. has rolled into the U.S. electricity market by bidding $333-million (U.S.) for a 25.2-per-cent stake in a Texas nuclear power plant, the first step in what it hopes will become a substantial U.S. presence.

“This acquisition will give us a better understanding for the light-water reactors that are common in the United States,” Cameco president and chief executive officer Jerry Grandey said in a conference call on Monday.

“It will also broaden our understanding of the electricity markets in the U.S., providing us with a stronger platform for further expansion south of the border.”

Saskatoon-based Cameco, the world’s biggest uranium supplier, has in the past few years trained its sights on becoming an integrated nuclear energy company, a strategy it kicked off in 2000 when it agreed to buy a 15-per-cent stake in Ontario’s Bruce Power for $100-million (Canadian).

Last year, Cameco increased its stake to 31.6 per cent for an additional $204-million.

As a vertically integrated uranium company, the thinking goes, Cameco has a stake in – and stands to profit from – every aspect of the nuclear energy business, from mining uranium to converting it to fuel for use in nuclear reactors and selling the end product to utilities.

Mr. Grandey said Monday’s proposed deal would give Cameco a foothold in the Texas market where electricity supply is expected to “tighten” in future months.

“Some of the higher-cost gas-fired units will be shut down over the next little while, and it’s a market where the population is growing and the economy is growing,” he said in response to an analyst’s question about market prospects in the region. “So it’s a combination of those things.”

A Cameco subsidiary signed an agreement to buy 25.2 per cent of the South Texas Project (STP) from a unit of American Electric Power Co. Inc. for $333-million (U.S.). STP consists of two 1,250-megawatt nuclear units in Texas on an 11,000-hectare site about 145 kilometres southwest of Houston. Cameco’s stake in STP would amount to 630 megawatts, enough power to supply the daily needs of 504,000 homes.

STP’s other owners are Texas Genco Holdings Inc. (30.8 per cent), San Antonio City Public Service Board (28 per cent) and Austin Energy (16 per cent).

Cameco’s proposed acquisition is subject to a right of first refusal by the other owners for 90 days.

Mr. Grandey said confidentiality agreements that were part of the negotiating process prevented Cameco from talking to the other owners, so he could not speculate on their intentions.

Cameco would consider taking a lesser stake, he said, but would require at least a 13.2-per-cent share in STP to pursue the deal.

Cameco is not interested in becoming a majority owner of STP, he added.

Analysts said the proposed transaction fits in with Cameco’s previously announced intention to become a more integrated company.

“Cameco has decided, and I think rightfully so, that they are not a uranium company, but an energy company,” said Terence Ortslan, a mining consultant with Montreal-based TSO & Associates.

Buying into the Texas reactors is a way for Cameco to generate more profit from its core mining business, Mr. Ortslan said, as well as diversifying geographically.

In the short term, the analyst said, Cameco may face some pressure to increase its dividend – steady dividends have traditionally been a hallmark of utility companies – as it shifts away from being solely a mining company.

Moving toward a utility model could also put downward pressure on Cameco’s earnings multiples, which are typically higher for mining companies.

But that pressure may disappear if the company’s strategy appears to be paying off quickly, Mr. Ortslan added.

“If the company can successfully reinvent itself as a new energy play, with the significant position they have in the uranium business, and critical mass in the utility market, then that multiple adjustment may not take place,” Mr. Ortslan said.

American Electric Power, the largest power producer in the United States, is selling Texas generation assets to recover stranded costs – how much the book value of an asset exceeds its market value – as the Texas electricity market is deregulated.

American Electric said on Monday that the book value of its stake in STP was $1.5-billion at the end of 2001.

“The market is showing us that nuclear plants are not worth very much,” said Tom Adams, executive director of Toronto-based Energy Probe, which has lobbied against government subsidies for the nuclear power industry. “Cameco is betting that if you buy these assets cheaply enough, you can make a business out of these things.”

Mr. Adams said the long-term prospects for nuclear reactors are uncertain, as some countries are phasing them out and advancements in fuel cells and other energy technologies could make investments in nuclear energy less attractive.

Cameco said the transaction would have a positive impact on cash flow and profit, based on current operating performance and market conditions. Cameco said it would not use debt to close the deal but would look at other options, including equity issues, to pay for the deal.

Cameco announced in January that it is spinning off its gold assets into a new public company called Centerra. Analysts have estimated an initial public offering could raise $500-million (Canadian) or more.

Cameco shares rose 87 cents to close at $64.57 on the Toronto Stock Exchange on Monday.

 

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Efficiency priorities for electricity distributors

Tom Adams

February 18, 2004

 

Review of Electric LDC Efficiency Issues

Energy Probe’s Recommendations on

Efficiency Priorities

for Electricity Distributors

 

 

Tom Adams

Executive Director

 

Slide presentation

 

Procedural Concerns

 

Energy Probe has concerns about the process for the OEB’s review of electric Local Distribution Companies (LDC) economic efficiency issues.

 

The OEB has not made clear the origin of its current enquiry. Has the Minister directed or otherwise encouraged the Board to enquire into the electric LDCs issue, particularly consolidation and expanding the scope of LDC responsibility to include contracting for power? Is the Board operating at arm’s length?

 

The OEB could assist the parties participating in this review by explaining its hastiness in pursuing this review. The time allowed for participants to develop their presentations has impaired our ability to participate. The original schedule required written submissions filed with the Board only four business days after the publication of the OEB staff report. Interested parties were not informed in advance that we should be setting aside time during these four days to prepare a reply. The Board should recognize the limitations and inconvenience that it is unilaterally imposing on interested parties. A few days of preparation without prior notice is seriously in adequate to address the complex issues associated with LDC efficiency.

 

Public interest groups have been further disadvantaged by the absence of any means to recover their costs associated with participation in this process. I hope the Board will consider remedying this barrier to entry.

 

As of this morning, submissions received by the Board have not been published on the Board’s web site. This lack of dissemination of received materials has further impaired Energy Probe’s ability to be of assistance to the Board. Energy Probe encourages the Board to publish this submission and all other submissions it receives associated with this process.

 

 

Prioritizing LDC Efficiency Issues

 

Energy Probe’s overarching observation is that the OEB’s review initiative on LDC efficiency appears to have been given undue priority in the OEB’s regulatory program, and the Board staff discussion paper is not scoped to achieve the Board’s stated efficiency enhancement objective.

 

As outlined in Energy Probe’s recommendations on regulatory priority setting, submitted to the Board 2003 December 1,1 Ontario’s electric power system is faced with unprecedented challenges that directly threaten the security of supply of power to consumers. Ontario’s power system is financially unstable due to factors like the continuing commodity rate freeze covering over half the overall market. Governance of the key elements of the power system is chaotic, like OPG operating with only an acting CEO.

 

In contrast to these negative conditions, since the passage of Bill 4 and the prospects for clearing their regulatory assets accounts, Ontario’s LDCs appear to be relatively stable and capable of at least continuing the level of distribution service to consumers now provided.

 

Ontario’s LDCs provide mission-critical services to the overall power system, including a playing a key role in emergency response and undertaking most customer billing. Any proposed changes to the policy environment in which LDCs operate should carefully plan how these critical functions will be maintained. Energy Probe notes that neither of these issues are addressed in the Board staff discussion paper.

 

 

Efficiency Analysis Requires Data

 

The Board staff discussion paper identifies that the Board’s objective “is to consider if further efficiencies are available, and if so, how to achieve them.” However, the Board staff discussion paper presents no quantitative analysis of electricity LDC efficiency.

 

Any effort to enhance regulatory oversight of Ontario’s electricity distributors must recognize that the core requirements for proper regulatory oversight of these LDCs are not currently in place. The LDCs do not have any regulatory approved baseline for their costs of serving their customers. Without such cost of service information, the best available information to compare the efficiency of the LDCs is existing rates. However, existing rates are a poor guide to cost, because many LDC did not have cost-based rates at the time the OEB’s PBR Rate Handbook effectively froze their base rates. For example, at the time selected to index rates using the formula set out on the PBR Rate Handbook, Nepean Hydro had rates deliberately designed to reflect a negative return on equity for a time limited period. Nepean’s rate design was appropriate in the institutional context that prevailed prior to the PBR Rate Handbook decision but the rates were not sustainable.

 

There is no published reliability data or other Service Quality Indicator (SQI) data published that is suitable for comparing the performance of electric LDCs. LDCs are collecting some reliability data, but it is not clear that this data adequately captures the relevant reliability record. Similarly, the current regulatory construct does not encourage rational allocation and management of losses.

 

Energy Probe notes that none of these information deficiencies are mentioned in the Board staff report.

 

 

Efficiency Review Focuses on Options that Would Reduce Efficiency

 

Energy Probe is concerned by inclusion in the staff report of issues that threaten to impair efficiency of LDCs and the overall market or that are of second-order importance in achieving LDC efficiency gains. As indicated by the Board staff paper, the Board’s apparent priorities appear to be first, converting LDCs into load serving entities responsible for procuring the power consumption requirements of consumers, and second, LDC consolidation.

 

The proposals to convert LDCs into load serving entities and to consolidate LDCs have their origin in the report of the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force.

 

Credibility of the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force

 

Supply-side interests overwhelmingly dominated the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force. Most of the members represented generators, transmitters, distributors, and suppliers to these entities. Not surprisingly, the recommendations of the Task Force would transfer most business risk associated with future investment in generation from producers to consumers.

 

There was no representation on the Task Force of the largest customer group, commercial and institutional customers.

 

The CEO of the IMO signed on to the report’s final recommendations, notwithstanding that many of the recommendations promote central planning, directly contrary to the IMO’s legal mandate to promote competition.

 

The Task Force’s dismissal of the market design developed by the Ontario Market Design Committee in 1997-98 did not acknowledge that the international experience with competitive electricity markets has generally vindicated the market design concepts that the Task Force dismisses. For example, the Task Force’s demonization of the spot market flies in the face of demonstrated public interest benefits in other jurisdictions from an active spot market. Indeed, some markets, like Norway, have substantial dependence on spot pricing, including particularly for residential service. The benefits of the spot market have been particularly evident where these markets have been highly “volatile”, such as spot market in Norway, New Zealand, and South Australia.

 

Energy Probe suggests that the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force report is tainted by conflicted interests, ignorant of the international experience, and not a credible source of guidance on how to respond to Ontario’s electricity crisis.

 

LDCs as Load Serving Entities

 

Converting LDCs into load serving entities responsible for entering into long-term contracts with generators on behalf of consumers would be a grave error. As demonstrated by instances as diverse as the nationalization of Central Gas Manitoba in 1999 due to that LDC becoming involved in commodity purchasing activities, to Ontario Hydro’s failed non-utility generation program which developed stranded costs estimated in 1999 at $5.2 billion, to California’s panicked state intervention in the electricity market whereby the government bought an estimated $20 billion (US) worth of power for $40 billion (US) by buying on long term contracts during the 2001 electricity crisis, LDCs would be exposed to substantial risk by entering into contracts on behalf of consumers. If prices drop below the contract price – for example if technological progress leads to the widespread adoption of fuel cells for cogeneration applications – LDCs could be at risk. This risk is not recognized in the Board staff discussion paper.

 

Ontario’s electric LDCs have no experience in power procurement under contract. It is difficult to imagine how LDC management would succeed in contracting for power. The Board staff discussion paper ignores the consequences of failure to appropriately contract for power.

 

Successful utility regulation requires that the regulator have the capacity to impose penalties on shareholders in the event that utility wrongdoing is determined to have happened. Accountability is achieved because penalties imposed on shareholders often results in changes in management. Two levels of government, rather than private shareholders, own most Ontario electric LDCs. This makes effective regulation of Ontario electric LDCs inherently difficult. Penalties imposed by the regulator on the Ontario LDCs are penalties borne by taxpayers, who have very limited means available to force changes in utility management. A governmental regulator overseeing governmental LDCs is already in a conflicted position. Expanding the scope of LDC responsibilities to include long-term power procurement will make the already difficult job of regulating the LDC virtually impossible.

 

LDC Consolidation: Efficiency or Inefficiency?

 

As indicated in our above noted submission to the OEB on priority setting, Energy Probe believes that the benefits and costs of the existing experience with LDC consolidation have not been publicly analyzed and therefore the lessons of this experience remain to be learned. The largest consolidation of LDCs since1998 was Hydro One’s MEU buying spree – a business strategy that appears to have significantly reduced Hydro One’s financial flexibility, reduced shareholder value, and failed to achieve any long term rate benefits for consumers. Energy Probe notes that all of Hydro One’s buyouts were approved by the Ontario Energy Board.

 

Hydro One subsumes two substantially different businesses: transmission and distribution. Although the transmission business earns less revenue than distribution, transmission’s share of Hydro One’s profits is almost three times greater than its distribution business. The benefits of separating Hydro One into separate transmission and distribution companies was subject to scholarly attention by Littlechild and Yatchew, who concluded that continued retention of the two businesses within Hydro One will likely result in increased costs and significant disadvantages relating to price, regulation, and competition in Ontario’s electricity sector.2 There are many instances in Ontario where low cost LDCs, some with non-contiguous service territories, are adjacent to Hydro One distribution territories. On the face of it, there appears to be benefit to consumers of these LDCs taking over some of Hydro One’s service region. We are not aware of any instances were Hydro One has allowed this type of rationalization.

 

The Ontario Energy Board should commission and publish economic research on the potential benefits and costs of separating Hydro One’s transmission and distribution businesses, and allowing other distribution utilities to buy out sections of Hydro One’s distribution territory where such mergers can yield efficiency gains.

 

A major determinant of overall efficiency is labour cost. Anecdotally, there are indications that the labour costs to serve customers served by at least some, perhaps many, utilities bought by Hydro One increased following the buyouts. The Ontario Energy Board should study the relative labour costs of distribution utilities with attention to the factors that contribute to efficiency in this area.

 

Aside from Hydro One, the next largest LDC in Ontario is Toronto Hydro. Toronto Hydro has among the highest distribution rates of any large urban utility in Ontario. There are many reasons why Toronto should be a low cost distributor relative to other LDCs, including high customer density and highly depreciated assets. High labour cost appears to be one driver of Toronto’s relative inefficiency.

 

The experience with Hydro One and Toronto Hydro suggests that size is not an important determinant of efficiency.

 

However, the great range of distribution rates across Ontario suggests that there are substantial efficiencies to be gained. For example, Hamilton Hydro’s residential distribution rate for a customer using 1000 kWh/month is about 17% lower than Guelph Hydro’s rate.

 

The most reliable method of finding efficiencies in electricity distribution is for the regulator to administer rules that reward efficient operators with greater profits and inefficient operators with lesser or no profits. The regulator should also work to eliminate artificial or policy barriers that might prevent efficient operators from buying out inefficient operators. Consolidation should be market driven, not policy driven.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Consumer’s primary interest in electricity distribution is efficiency. Efficient utilities will lead to lower overall costs in the long term. Energy Probe suggests that the OEB assemble appropriate data, analyze quantitatively the factors that drive distribution utility efficiency, and subject these results to public review.

 

Expanding the responsibilities of LDCs to include power procurement on long term contracts would not be in the public interest.

 

As illustrated by the poor financial results resulting from Hydro One’s acquisition activities, non-market, fiat-driven consolidation is unlikely to be in the public interest. Any claim to the contrary must be subjected to thorough public scrutiny.

 

Posted in Reforming Ontario's Local Electrical Distribution Sector | Leave a comment

More delays plague Pickering restart

John Spears
Toronto Star
February 6, 2004

Work on two units of the Pickering A nuclear station has been suspended, according to a message sent to staff of the plant, owned by Ontario Power Generation Inc.

The problem-plagued project to restart Pickering A is already three years behind schedule and billions over budget. Only one of the plant’s four reactors, Unit 4, is producing power.

Work has been under way at Pickering A since 1998. The project received approval from OPG’s board of directors in 1999.

Despite years of work, an internal message to staff yesterday said cost and schedule estimates for Unit 1 – the second unit due to start up – are still not complete. Engineering work on the remaining two units is also incomplete.

OPG also said yesterday it is scaling back its relationship with PowerSource Canada, a hiring agency that has supplied OPG with hundreds of engineers, many of them from the United States.

The company was incorporated in Nova Scotia in 2002 shortly before it began receiving untendered contracts from OPG.

OPG spokesperson John Earl said the company is streamlining, and will cut its engineering and design force at Pickering A by 50 per cent.

“There will be fewer contractors, and some of those contractors were from PowerSource, so our relationship with PowerSource has shrunk,” Earl said.

Yesterday’s internal memo from Bill Robinson, vice-president in charge of Pickering, said the company must focus its efforts on finishing cost estimates and work schedules for Unit 1.

“We are therefore suspending any further engineering work on Units 2 and 3,” the two remaining units, the memo said.

OPG has been struggling to restart the Pickering A plant since OPG’s board approved the project in 1999, at an estimated cost of $1.3 million. The first unit was supposed to be back in service by the end of 2000.

Instead, the first unit, Unit 4, wasn’t back in service until last fall, three years late. And a special panel headed by former federal energy minister Jake Epp now estimates it will cost $3 billion to $4 billion to get all four units back in service.

The cost overruns and delays have prompted Energy Minister Dwight Duncan to ask a committee headed by former finance minister John Manley to review OPG’s prospects, including whether it’s worth completing the Pickering A overhaul. Manley’s deadline is March 15.

Suspending work at Units 2 and 3 will help OPG develop firmer cost and scheduling estimates for Manley’s committee “in a timely fashion,” Robinson’s memo said.

Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe, said it’s hard to believe that five years into a project, OPG still hasn’t completed cost, scheduling and engineering work.

Adams noted that Epp recently completed an evaluation of the Pickering A project, and wondered how that could have been conducted without first doing firm cost and scheduling estimates.

“OPG is lost,” he said. “They can’t find themselves on the map.”

If OPG still hasn’t finished basic planning and engineering work, he said, it should simply be telling Manley’s committee the status of the project, complete with gaps and unfinished business, rather than preparing yet another plan.

Posted in Nuclear Economics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Khan-du fallout hits Canada

Fabian Dawson
The Asian Pacific Post
February 5, 2004

Hate to say it,
but we told you so!

On Jan 16, 2003, The Asian Pacific Post in an investigative expose reported that Pakistan’s nuclear hero, Dr. A.Q. Khan and at least five other Pakistani nuclear scientists were linked to an underground network trading in nuclear secrets. The story warned that the scientists and several others who were trained in Canada were selling their expertise to rogue nuclear nations like North Korea, Libya and Iran.

On Jan 20, 2003, The National Post newspaper, following up on the report by The Asian Pacific Post, quoted Ian Dovey of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, (AECL), saying the article appears to rely on rumours and innuendo and lacks sufficient evidence to support the allegations. “From what I have read, everything in there is unsubstantiated,” said Dovey.

On January 31, 2003, Shahid M.G. Kiani, the Deputy High Commissioner from the High Commission for Pakistan in Ottawa sent letters to the media denouncing the report by the Asian Pacific Post. “The allegations are factually incorrect, baseless and malign Pakistan and its nuclear program. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state,” wrote Kiani adding the charge against Mr. Khan is absolutely false and part of a malicious campaign against a distinguished Pakistani scientist whose contribution to the country’s security has earned him the respect and admiration of the people of Pakistan.

On February 2, 2004, Pakistan fires Dr. A. Q. Khan from his government job after investigators concluded he made millions of dollars from the sale of nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and other countries. Several other scientists and individuals are investigated for being part of a clandestine nuclear K-mart. The fallout exposes the global nuclear program to damaging scrutiny. Khan this week in a 11-page confession said he shared nuclear know-how with Iran, Libya and other countries to further the Muslim cause.

ANALYSIS
Asian Pacific News Service

Feb 5, 2004

The sacking of Pakistan’s nuclear godfather Dr A.Q. Khan from a government job after investigators concluded he made millions of dollars in the nuclear blackmarket, should be the trigger for an inquiry into Canada’s secretive nuclear program.

Khan and dozens of other Pakistani nuclear scientists were trained and hosted by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, (AECL) – a 40-year-old Crown corporation that hoovers up C$100 million in taxpayer money every year to make and sell Candu reactors.

One year ago, when The Asian Pacific Post warned that the Canadian training given to Khan and others from Pakistan was linked to the clandestine development of weapons programs in Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea – the response from AECL was muted and sarcastic.

We wonder what AECL has to say now.

Last weekend, after pressure from the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Pakistan’s National Command Authority chaired by President Pervez Musharraf, decided to fire Khan as a government advisor.

Investigators also found that the European-educated 67-year-old metallurgist had accumulated wealth not commensurate with his monthly salary of about C$3,000.

So far it has been revealed that the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb counts among his assets four houses in Islamabad, a palatial lakeside retreat in the nearby village of Bani Gala, shares in two restaurants and a hotel in Timbuktu, Mali, that he named after his wife, who is of Dutch ancestry.

Khan is reported to have spent a million dollars on his daughters weddings and set up family businesses as conduits to channel millions of dollars in contracts for his nuclear bazaar.

Investigators are now taking a microscope through his lifestyle which included a 50 million rupee program to publicize his achievements, his frequent first class trips abroad, and his lengthy periods of residence under an assumed name at some of the world’s most expensive hotels.

Canada’s relationship with Khan, and others like Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a pioneer of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and a vocal admirer of the Taliban, who confessed he’d had several meetings with bin Laden before and after September 11 to discuss nuclear weapons, dates back more than three decades

The Candu was Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor, acquired in a deal like many other Candu deals, via heavily subsidized Canadian government low-interest loans.

Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who got his uranium enrichment expertise in Canada was among the first to run the Candu reactor named Kanupp or the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant.

In addition to Mahmood, up to 50 Pakistani scientists and engineers were brought to nuclear facilities in Ontario and New Brunswick to be trained as plans for a second, Chinese-built reactor came online.

Many of those trained in Canada later went into Pakistan’s clandestine military nuclear program and helped divert plutonium from Kanupp into a weapons program, according to the Nonproliferation Review, a journal of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Others defected to seek more money according to a memo prepared by engineers of the CHASNUPP nuclear power plant, which was built with Chinese assistance in central Pakistan.

As for Khan, Canada and AECL simply ignored the fact that he stole blueprints from Holland in 1976 to transform uranium into weapons-grade fuel.

Despite the warning signs that Canadian nuclear expertise was leading to proliferation problems, AECL continued a strong and active relationship with Pakistan sacrificing caution for business.

This relationship continues till today under the auspices of the so-called Candu Owners Group, an AECL consortium.

Khan’s weekend sacking in Pakistan and the details emerging from the ongoing investigation provide proof that Canada’s nuclear promiscuity is fuelling the radioactive blackmarket.

AECL’s standard line that Candu reactors worldwide are subject to stringent international inspections to ensure byproducts do not end up as ingredients for a bomb-in-a-box, ring hollow in the wake of Khan’s descent from hero to zero.

Its mantra that AECL is in no way involved in the nuclear proliferation problem is anemic.

Canada’s public face as a global leader in the nuclear disarmament process is a façade which Khan and others are likely to destroy when their nuclear adventures hit the courts.

Hopefully, the fallout from that will shock Canadians into asking why billions of their dollars are being spent to make this world a more dangerous place.

 

Posted in Nuclear Proliferation | Leave a comment

NB Power CEO appointed to OPG board

Energy Probe

January 30, 2004

On Dec. 23, 2003, the new Ontario Liberal government appointed James Hankinson to the board of Ontario Power Generation. Mr. Hankison was the CEO of the provincial Crown corporation NB Power from 1996-2002.

Under Mr. Hankinson’s leadership, NB Power’s finances rarely climbed out of the red, not withstanding NB Power’s adoption of inaccurate and incomplete accounting methods to report costs of nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning in 1999 (see www.energyprobe.org/energyprobe/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=4135). During Mr. Hankinson’s administration, NB Power’s accumulated net income was a loss of $506-million. In public comments associated with his confirmation hearings before the NB Legislative Assembly’s Crown Corporations Committee in 1996, Mr. Hankinson had described the utility’s finances to be in “pretty good shape.”

During Mr. Hankinson’s term as CEO, the Canadian nuclear safety regulator repeatedly raised concerns about the management of NB Power’s troubled nuclear utility, Point Lepreau. The federal nuclear safety regulator, the Atomic Energy Control Board, in its Staff annual assessment of the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station for the Year 1997 made the following comment about NB Power’s management: “In early 1997, in response to AECB concerns about deteriorating operational safety, NB Power introduced a performance improvement program. It found that the root causes of the station’s declining safety performance were a corporate failure to understand the lifetime management of the station, and a failure to develop a strategic plan and allocate resources.”

Mr. Hankinson’s business record includes initiating a $750-million refurbishment of the oil-fired Coleson Cove power plant to burn a new fuel – Orimulsion, a unique tar-based fuel only produced in Venezuela. When Venezuela indicated recently it wanted to stop selling tar fuel, NB Power discovered it had no signed contract covering its deal with Venezuela to supply Orimulsion to Coleson Cove.

In 1997, NB Power brought a defamation suit against Tom Adams of Energy Probe for authoring business analysis associated with testimony before the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly’s Standing Committee on Crown Corporations. NB Power withdrew its defamation action after Mr. Adams filed a Statement of Defense. Mr. Hankinson also sued the Fredericton Daily Gleaner newspaper in response to an editorial cartoon caricaturing Mr. Hankinson’s performance as NB Power’s CEO.

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment

Candus can’t do it, nuke critics say

John Spears
Toronto Star
January 2, 2004

Critics of nuclear power said a $12 billion proposal by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. to build eight new nuclear reactors in Ontario to generate electricity has little credibility, given the nuclear industry’s track record.

But Energy Minister Dwight Duncan says he’ll look at the nuclear option, along with all other solutions to the province’s electricity issues.

“For $12 billion, a lot of people have solutions to our problems,” Duncan said in an interview.

AECL, owned by the federal government, says its first choice would be to build four pairs of its “advanced Candu reactor” or ACR, which is still being developed.

Duncan said he won’t make up his mind whether to pursue the nuclear option until after he sees two reports. One, due within two weeks, is from a task force on electricity conservation and supply.

The second, from a panel headed by former federal finance minister John Manley on the future of publicly owned Ontario Power Generation, is due in March.

Duncan said he already has a meeting with AECL scheduled for January, but also wants to hear from the public before making decisions.

While Duncan kept his options open, the AECL proposal drew scathing criticism yesterday from critics of the nuclear industry .

David Martin of the Sierra Club of Canada said the advanced Candu doesn’t yet exist.

“The ACR is a pig in a poke. The design work isn’t even done, and they’re claiming cost reductions as if it were a fact,” he said. “It’s dishonest.”

AECL estimates the new plants will produce power at a cost of 4.4 cents a kilowatt hour, but Martin said that’s yet to be tested.

“Until there’s a demonstration plant, their claims of cost reduction are meaningless,” he said.

Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe, called the proposal a “very, very tired sales pitch.”

Adams said that AECL has no bright sales prospects in overseas markets now that it has recently completed a project in Qinshan, China.

The company has not been able to persuade regulators in the U.S. to approve the design of the ACR, he noted, so Ontario is one of the few options the company has left.

Martin agreed that AECL’s export prospects are dim.

“This is an act of desperation from AECL because they know they have no sales prospects offshore,” he said.

Martin speculated that the company is trying to get big public subsidies for the venture.

“I think they’re trying to float a public-private partnership in which the federal and provincial governments would take a large part of the risk,” he said.

“There’s no way the private sector would get into building a demonstration plant like the ACR without extremely generous public support.”

Martin said the focus on building more generating capacity to meet Ontario’s electricity needs is a mistake.

“The big contribution has to come from conservation,” he said.

A very large portion of Ontario’s electricity is used to heat buildings and hot water, he said, and there are more efficient alternatives to both that could reduce electricity consumption in Ontario.

Adams said the track record of AECL’s Candu technology has been poor.

He pointed to the refit of the Pickering A nuclear plant, which is years behind schedule and billions over budget. Pickering A, completed in the early 1970s, had already had an extensive refit in the mid-80s, which also went over budget, Adams said.

“It’s going to discourage anybody else with any brains from retooling their Candus,” he said.

In New Brunswick, the province’s public utilities commission has recommended against overhauling the province’s AECL-designed reactor at Point Lepreau, he noted.

 

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New nukes – or none?

Matthew McClearn
Canadian Business
December 7, 2003

For Jerry Hopwood, the Wigan Coalfield served as a sobering lesson about the cost of man’s need for energy. During his youth, in the 50s and 60s, in Manchester, England, Hopwood witnessed its ravages first-hand. “I grew up around coal mines and coal dust, and people dying of silicosis and mine accidents,” he says. “That coalfield was just coming to the end of its life, and people realized that this was a very difficult way to make energy.” After graduating from university with a master’s in applied physics from Oxford, he decided he wanted to be part of the solution.

Three decades later, Hopwood, a man who speaks thoughtfully and confidently on energy issues, is a director of business development at Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. In that capacity, he is an ambassador for the Crown corporation’s next generation of Candu (short for “Canada deuterium uranium”) nuclear reactor, the ACR-700 (ACR stands for Advanced Candu Reactor). As AECL’s engineers draw up designs and schematics for the ACR, however, Canada’s nuclear industry has reached a crossroads of sorts. Older Candu reactors in Canada seem to bear witness to a similarly stark message: nuclear is a difficult ? and expensive ? way to make energy.

Canada’s 22 Candu reactors (most are in Ontario, but some are in New Brunswick and Quebec) provide 13% of the nation’s electricity. Several are dormant; none will be operating beyond 2020 without expensive refits or reactor replacements. All of which raises the question: will Canada go with new nuclear or no nuclear? “I believe we are going to have to face that question sooner rather than later,” Dave Goulding, president and CEO of Ontario’s Independent Electricity Marker Operator, said during a speech earlier this year.

The same question has come up in energy circles around the world, and several nations have already given their answers. Governments in Belgium, Sweden and Germany have initiated plans to phase out nuclear power in coming decades. China, South Africa and Japan are leaning the other way, with new nuclear plants now under construction. Canada, which invested heavily in maintaining its nuclear infrastructure in recent years, must come up with a clear, coherent policy. Regrettably, our leaders seem some distance from finding one.

One need look no further than the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station A’s four reactors to grasp the troubled history of nuclear power in Canada. Located on the shores of Lake Ontario east of Toronto, all four units at Pickering A shut down in 1997 over concerns about management, process and equipment. “The failure of Pickering A couldn’t have happened at a worse time,” wrote journalist Gordon Laird in his recent book, Power: Journeys Across An Energy Nation. He notes that coal-fired generators have taken up the slack, creating a surge in greenhouse gas emissions. “After a golden era of nuclear megaprojects ? resulting in a thirty-billion-dollar public debt ? atomic power faltered right when smog and greenhouse gas issues became critical.”

If that wasn’t bad enough, electrical utility Ontario Power Generation’s $800-million restart plan proved an inglorious boondoggle. It was to see all four reactors restarted between June 2000 and June 2002. The first, Unit 4, finally re-entered service on Oct. 4 ? only to shut down in November due to equipment problems. (OPG claimed it would return to service shortly.) The other three units remain dormant, and should they be restarted, too, the invoice could top $4 billion. It’s not the first such disaster: Pickering A’s reactors were shut down in 1983 after a loss-of-coolant accident. Repairs cost more than $1 billion and took a decade to complete.

Pickering A is not an anomaly. South of the Bruce Peninsula, which juts out into Lake Huron, Bruce A Unit 4 has been testing in preparation for its return to service. When fully operational, it is expected to generate 750 megawatts, enough to power a city of 300,000 people. Unit 3 is expected to come back online soon after. Those restarts have been a long time coming: Unit 2 was shut down in October 1995, followed by the other reactors in March 1998. Bruce Power, a consortium that leased the eight reactors from Ontario Power Generation in 2001, announced the same year its plans to restart Units 3 and 4 by summer 2003, at a cost of $340 million. That would have helped Ontario through the electricity-sucking hot months ? had Bruce Power not missed its target. Unit 4 restarted in October, while Unit 3 is expected to be back on the grid in the coming months.

During the industry’s ? and AECL’s ? genesis in the 1950s, proponents envisioned nuclear power as an energy source “too cheap to meter.” That promise, and many others, vaporized faster than water inside a reactor. In the wake of shattered budgets and deadlines missed by spectacular margins, the industry’s future is uncertain. The last reactor built in Canada was Ontario’s Darlington station, completed in 1993. Of the more than 150 nuclear reactors built across North America ? including Darlington ? all were ordered before 1974. The dearth of orders at home has forced AECL to look abroad; during the past decade, it built reactors in Romania, South Korea and China.

If Canada’s nuclear industry has a future, you’ll find it at AECL’s facility at Sheridan Park in Mississauga, Ont. Here, a development staff of 300 are busy working on the ACR-700. Still very much in the design and licensing phase, it’s one of a third generation of reactors conceived by the industry’s global leaders, such as General Electric, Westinghouse and France’s Framatome ANP. It’s a global race to reduce the risks and costs associated with nuclear power generation, to make it more competitive with other technologies.

The ACR is the next evolutionary step for Candu technology. It’s more compact than the current flagship, the Candu 6, and requires less heavy water ? an expensive commodity used as a coolant and a moderator inside traditional Candus. The ACR uses enriched uranium, so fuel bundles last roughly three years, as opposed to one year in a Candu 6. The result, AECL says, will be shorter construction times and less waste. And, more importantly, lower cost: after construction of the first ACR, subsequent units should cost 40% less than the $1.5-billion Candu 6.

AECL plans to be ready to build its first unit by early 2006. And while it remains enthusiastic about foreign markets ? particularly China ? it also hopes to build ACRs in North America. A few years ago, such talk would have seemed far-fetched. But sitting in an office at Sheridan Park in October, Hopwood and Ian Dovey, AECL media relations manager, are decidedly optimistic. Hopwood sees nuclear playing an increasing role in Canada’s energy future. Dovey’s message, repeated often during an interview, is that nuclear is the “workhorse” of Ontario’s electrical grid ? a role he wants retained.

Neither Dovey nor Hopwood will speculate on the chances of seeing new nuclear plants built in North America. “That’s a political decision,” Dovey interjects. And yet, AECL is spending millions to license and market the ACR in both Canada and the United States. The federal government pledged $46 million toward that effort in September, in addition to the $51.5 million already committed to the project. Clearly, AECL at least hopes political winds will sway in its favour. Pressed on the issue, Hopwood says that the tone of the energy debate has changed. “Nuclear” was a word politicians were reluctant to use a few years ago, he offers. “Events like the Aug. 14 blackout stimulate a lively debate,” Hopwood says. “All of a sudden, the nuclear option is being spoken about, recognized and debated. We’re back on the agenda.”

The Great Blackout of 2003 may have spurred Canadians to think more about energy, but nuclear’s renewed appeal has more to do with Canada’s commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Canada has agreed to lower greenhouse gas emissions to 6% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, a target many see as unattainably aggressive. “Our trend line on CO2 emissions has been going up, and there are not a lot of easy ways to turn it around,” says Hopwood. “One of the best ways to contribute to that is nuclear.” After all, nuclear power plants emit no carbon dioxide. With the power sector contributing hugely to the nation’s total emissions, that’s a considerable benefit.

Nuclear also has attractive implications for energy security. North America’s increasing reliance on imported hydrocarbons ? oil and gas ? is becoming an acute problem. North Americans can mine, fabricate and enrich uranium on their own soil, and then use it to generate their own electricity. Unfortunately, a move to nuclear would do little to alter the continent’s reliance on oil ? after all, very little petroleum is used to generate electricity.

There’s one final ? and very potent ? argument in favour of building more reactors: the country has invested a mind-boggling amount in the industry over the past 50 years. The industry now employs more than 30,000 people and is said by some to contribute billions annually to the Canadian economy. That point was hit home recently by the Canadian Nuclear Association, the industry’s non-profit promotional arm. It commissioned a report by the Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) to study the industry’s economic impact. The report offered an enticing carrot: if Canada builds two 720-megawatt reactors, it claimed, $2.6 billion would be injected into the economy. The National Energy Board, for one, can foresee new nuclear facilities in Canada. In a recent study, the ENB envisioned a scenario in which “new nuclear facilities, based on the Advanced Candu reactor, are located on the sites of existing nuclear facilities as advancements in technology for safety and waste disposal provide for wider public acceptance.” Under that scenario, nuclear could expand to 11% of fuel share by 2025 from 7% in 2000. “The ACR,” the report concluded, “could be among the most economic options for new generation in Canada.”

Tom Adams, the vocal executive director of Toronto-based Energy Probe, speaks about capitalism and markets with something approaching reverence. Among the many criticisms of nuclear, his are among the more incisive: Adams believes the market has rejected it as a viable alternative. He’s confident Canada will, too. “Nuclear has no future in Canada,” he says. “The existing record will stop them.”

Adams points to the Pickering A units not only as valuable lessons on nuclear economics, but also as indications of what to expect down the road. Alongside Pickering A, for example, sit the newer Pickering B reactors. Unit 5’s pressure tubes are at the end of their service life and are “close to the malfunction point,” he says. He estimates it could cost $850 million to retube the reactor. Reactors in New Brunswick and Quebec face similar situations, he says, adding that most reactors in Canada encounter serious troubles early in their teenage years. “The only rational way to manage this industry is in wind-down mode,” he says. “We made terrible mistakes getting into this thing, and we ought to manage as graceful as possible an exit.” That means operating existing plants for as long as feasible, until they become too costly or unsafe; when they require expensive refits, pull the plug.

That nuclear persists at all on the agenda is a tribute to the industry’s public relations efforts, Adams alleges. “These people have never generated a return on investment, but they’ve been able to secure massive amounts of state aid,” he says. “They are the No. 1 panhandlers in industrial history.” How much the industry has received is anyone’s guess. The Sierra Club of Canada, an opponent of nuclear, claims the industry has received subsidies totalling $17.5 billion (in 2001 dollars) from the feds during the past 50 years. (A 2002 estimate from AECL put that figure at just $6 billion.)

The bottom line, critics argue, is that nuclear is an energy source almost too expensive to meter. Some think-tanks agree. In a recent review of clean power alternatives, the Conference Board of Canada notes that the long approval and construction process for nuclear facilities makes them unattractive to investors. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change based in Arlington, Va., examined advanced nuclear technology alongside other clean energy alternatives and concluded it would be a “relatively expensive” method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. “If decisions were purely economic,” wrote Laird in Power, “nuclear power would likely be phased out.”

On the other hand, energy-policy decisions are not purely economic. They never have been.

The market may well have rejected nuclear. But have governments?

On behalf of the nuclear industry, the Canadian Energy Research Institute released a study earlier this year on nuclear’s potential in Alberta’s oil sands. CERI posited that steam provided by a modified ACR facility for bitumen production would be economically competitive with steam from a gas-fired plant. Alberta premier Ralph Klein was decidedly cold to the idea. “I have some concerns about nuclear power,” he said last January. “When I think of nukes, I think of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.” Other provinces also have reservations, though they’re probably thinking more about Pickering. Hydro Quebec’s plans to increase Quebec’s generation capacity, for example, focus mostly on hydroelectricity. In any case, few Canadian utilities plan to build major generation capacity soon.

The real question mark is Ontario. Debates in its legislature have clearly identified the electricity supply challenges facing the province today are expected to worsen as existing facilities age. The new Liberal energy minister, Dwight Duncan, is awaiting two reports to guide future decisions. One if from the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force, which will suggest ways to attract new generation. The other is expected soon from the Pickering A review panel, which will advise on whether to continue efforts to restart that facility’s three remaining dormant units. The government has already committed to shutting down dirty coal plants, and is working on a feasibility study to develop the Beck hydroelectric station at Niagara Falls. “New nuclear projects have not been ruled out,” said spokesperson Angie Robson. Premier Dalton McGuinty has already spoken out in favour of nuclear. “We’ve had a nuclear industry in Ontario for about 50 years and it has been, by and large, a very successful and solid record,” he has said. “Nuclear generation is an integral part of a responsible, progressive plan to generate electricity in the 21st century.” As for exactly what that role should be, Ontarians have yet to hear.

Policy within the federal government, which has jurisdiction over nuclear energy, is similarly uncertain. The current regime is decidedly pro-nuclear. During a trade mission in late October, Prime Minister Jean Chr?tien participated in opening ceremonies at two new Candu reactors in eastern China. He has aggressively marketed AECL’s technology for more than 20 years. And his energy minister, Herb Dhaliwal, expressed enthusiasm for the ACR when he committed $46 million toward its marketing and U.S. licensing in September. The support, however, clearly has limits. The feds recently backed away from participating in an international experiment into nuclear fusion, reportedly for fears of cost overruns.

Chr?tien’s successor, Paul Martin, has not been averse to the nuclear industry. As finance minister, he presented a budget in 1996 that continued subsidies to AECL, albeit at the reduced rate of $132 million a year. The continued funding reflects in part “a desire to maintain the Canadian Candu nuclear reactor as an energy option for the country,” according to Natural Resources Canada. Canadians have no reason to believe Martin’s thinking has changed. Neither he nor his communications staff responded to repeated inquiries about his position on nuclear power.

The lack of clarity on policy makes it at least conceivable that ACRs will be built in Canada. To critics, that would mean ignoring the lessons providing by existing reactors. In Ottawa last March, New Brunswick Power president Stewart MacPherson told the Canadian Nuclear Association that the utility’s Point Lepreau nuclear facility ha a “less than stellar” record, and that the industry must improve performance if it ever wishes to gain public acceptance. The ACR may be AECL’s last opportunity to do so. If it, too, delivers less than promised, a fate similar to that of the Wigan Coalfield, which now lies abandoned, cannot be far off.

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The nuclear failure

Lawrence Solomon
National Post
December 6, 2003

For four decades, in three provinces, under Liberal, Conservative and NDP governments alike, nuclear power has brought Canadians nothing but grief.

In New Brunswick, nuclear power has all but bankrupted NB Power. The utility now has negative net worth and an insecure supply of power, all because its big gamble in building its one nuclear plant – which accounts for 30% of that small province’s production when operating – didn’t pay off.

In Quebec, nuclear power was less of a disaster, but only because the province recognized its error and pulled the plug early on. One of the two plants built in Quebec was mothballed as soon as it was built; the other produces expensive power. Hydro Quebec remains solvent only because of the huge hydro-electric reserves to which it has access.

In Ontario, nuclear power effectively bankrupted Crown-owned Ontario Hydro in 1997, leading to its breakup and reorganization. Of the 21 nuclear plants built in Ontario, only 14 are operating today. The province’s vast supplies of hydro-electric power from Niagara Falls and other water plants, though they produce inexpensive power, cannot counteract the huge costs the power system must bear from its nuclear system. Even the nuclear plants that do work are financial albatrosses. Darlington, Hydro’s last nuclear plant, came in at $14.4-billion, almost three times its initial estimate and 10 years late. It produces the most expensive power in Canada, raising rates for all and encouraging industries to locate elsewhere. This week’s news, that refurbishing the Pickering reactors is now estimated at $4-billion, or more than five times its initial estimate, is true to form.

Federal taxpayers have likewise been hit: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation, has bled red ink from the get-go and needs annual transfusions in federal support – the tab to date: more than $20-billion.

Neither are Canadians alone in being disappointed by nuclear power. In the late 1980s, the United Kingdom decided to shut down much of its nuclear fleet, and cancel its nuclear expansion program, when the privatization of its power sector revealed that the country’s Crown-owned utility had been providing parliament with wildly fraudulent financial accounts. The balance of the U.K.’s nuclear fleet, privatized as British Energy in the 1990s, went bankrupt earlier this year, despite generous subsidies designed to keep it afloat.

The story is little different in Germany, Sweden, the United States and every other Western nation, with the possible exception of Finland. Elsewhere, nuclear power remains popular only in nations such as China, Iran, India, Pakistan and North Korea – countries with nuclear weapons programs.

Nuclear power can only survive in a monopoly system, where governments can force society to subsidize its operations. When countries turn to competitive markets to meet their power needs – as has happened in the U.K., New Zealand, and parts of Australia, Canada and the United States – no private sector player has ever built a nuclear power plant.

The U.K. was the first country to turn to competition, at the same time that it privatized its non-nuclear plants in 1989. Almost immediately, the private companies that now had access to the marketplace went on a building spree – the largest the country had ever seen. They soon flooded the U.K. with a vast new supply of inexpensive and clean power, most of it from the modern, high-efficiency natural gas generating plants that the private sector always preferred, but also from some wind power and renewable energy. Rates dropped for residential and small business consumers first, then for big business. The U.K.’s power prices are now a remarkable 30% lower than they were prior to privatization.

In the United States, competition came more slowly, and state by state. Some states, like California, badly botched their attempt at opening up their market, and paid dearly as a result. But most states deregulated sensibly, leading to a flood of inexpensive power in the United States, too. In some U.S. states, power companies have the ability to generate almost twice as much power as they will need on the coldest and hottest days of the year. Since 1999 alone, deregulation has increased the U.S. power supply by 24%, creating an immense surplus. Ontario now depends on this surplus from the United States to get by, and New Brunswick may soon, too.

Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick are now all reassessing their power systems, wondering whether to pour more good money after bad in an attempt to refurbish their ailing nuclear reactors. If they do, they can count on more of the same – cost overruns, followed by high-priced power if the plants work and no power if the plants don’t.

If they decide to stop their nuclear bailouts, they have a ready alternative in open markets. Small power producers – once they become confident that governments won’t change the rules of the game on them after they had invested millions – will soon flood Canadian power markets with inexpensive and clean power. Power shortages will give way to power surpluses. After four decades of careening from one crisis to another, politicians can move on to other fields.

Lawrence Solomon is executive director of Urban Renaissance Institute and Consumer Policy Institutes, divisions of Energy Probe Research Foundation. E-mail: LawrenceSolomon@nextcity.com.

 

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Execs fired as reactor refit costs soar

Lee Greenberg
CanWest News Service, with files from news services
December 5, 2003

Toronto: Rebuilding four ageing reactors at the Pickering nuclear generating station will cost as much as $3-billion more than originally expected and take five years longer than planned, a report released yesterday states.

“This is an affront to the people of Ontario,” said Dwight Duncan, the provincial energy minister. “It’s a horrible mess.”

He accepted the resignations of three top executives from Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the public utility responsible for the Pickering A restart. The men will collect about $3-million in severance payouts, sources said.

The delays at Pickering left Ontario starved for electricity when consumption peaked, and exacerbated a week-long shortage after the big blackout in August.

Mr. Duncan said it was too early to speculate on the future of nuclear power in Ontario, which supplies about 35% to 40% of the province’s electricity, but industry observers said there is no point in trying to bring the Pickering reactor back on-line.

“The answer now is to terminate the project,” said Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe. “We need power plants that work and that cost a reasonable amount of money.”

Without Pickering A’s 2,060 megawatts of power, or about 7% of Ontario’s total capacity, the province has been importing electricity from Quebec and the United States at market rates that have exceeded its own generating costs by 500 times in hours of peak demand.

Premier Dalton McGuinty was quick to blame the previous Conservative government for the cost overruns.

“Not only were the Tories fiscally irresponsible and managerially incompetent, but they failed to exercise their responsibilities,” Mr. McGuinty said yesterday in Charlottetown, where he is meeting with other premiers. “They were negligent when it came to overseeing, on behalf of the people of Ontario, the affairs that were taking place at OPG.”

Mr. McGuinty conceded that purging the top OPG executives will cost millions.

“I don’t think there’s any doubts that there are some people in there with very expensive packages, but the fact of the matter is many have not been doing their job properly. The people of Ontario are paying the price and we’re going to have to move on this.”

The report, authored by former federal energy minister Jake Epp, highlights an “alarming” litany of mismanagement and waste at Pickering.

Mr. Epp blames OPG’s management and board, as well as the company’s sole shareholder – the Ontario government – for failing to take control of the project while costs spiralled.

“There are people in management who accepted sliding deadlines” and other unacceptable excuses, he said. “It is that type of culture, which does not take responsibility and is not accountable, which I believe needs to be changed.”

OPG chairman Bill Farlinger, a key advisor to former premier Mike Harris, and two other long-time Tories – chief executive Ron Osborne and chief operating officer Graham Brown – resigned from the multi-billion-dollar utility yesterday morning.

Mr. Duncan indicated he would have more to say on the Pickering A restart next week. Work on three of the four generators continues at a cost of $25-million a month.

In 1997, four units at Pickering A were taken off-line for safety reasons. Work to get them running again began in 1999.

The Pickering A restart project was originally approved by Ontario Hydro’s board in August, 1999. The estimated cost to refurbish one of the 30-year-old unit’s reactors, Unit 4, was $457-million.

That reactor came back into service on Sept. 23, 2003, more than two years behind schedule and, at $1.25-billion, nearly triple the cost estimates.

Since that time, cost estimates on the project were changed 11 times and completion dates changed 13 times.

Mr. Epp, who served as Conservative MP for the Manitoba riding of Provencher from 1972 to 1993, said bad decisions were endemic to the project.

“What we have concluded was that this project began under a set of flawed assumptions that underestimated the size and complexity of the project from the outset,” Mr. Epp said. “There were people then in charge who believed the restarts would be relatively simple . . . [that] this was a ‘low-hanging fruit.'”

Management deemed it unnecessary to prepare a report on the work and costs involved in refurbishing the nuclear reactor, as is common industry practice.

That lack of structure led to confusion among contractors, who were forced to prioritize projects without any knowledge of overall goals. The result was a “fundamentally flawed” project, the report says.

For example, final engineering packages for Unit 4 – precise instruction booklets given to mechanics and technicians who performed the job – were delivered over 24 months later than originally scheduled.

The construction workforce began to mobilize 18 months before their final work instructions were completed.

“There were often not enough tasks to keep workers fully occupied, and some work had to be redone based on subsequently completed engineering,” the report states. “Of the 43,000 tasks generated for Unit 4, 15,000 were eventually cancelled during replanning.”

A short-sighted decision to keep nuclear fuel in the reactors forced workers to wear cumbersome radiation protection suits, which slowed them considerably.

Workers were operating at about 20% efficiency, Mr. Epp said.

“Even such fundamental things as access to the plant, badges, clearances, authority to enter what area – that’s pretty straightforward stuff. And we found examples of where people stood in line for up to three hours to get into the plant. Then by the time they were suited, by the time they went into an area that was quite congested . . . somebody else from another company was already in the area. So the whole sequencing is put in jeopardy.”

NDP member Marilyn Churley called for a criminal investigation into the project to find out if “something’s gone very, very wrong here,” she said. “I don’t want these three stooges walking away with their big, fat bonuses and leaving a mess for the taxpayers to clean up.

“I want to find out what happened to those billions of dollars and I want to be darn sure that there was no misappropriation of funds.”

Former Tory energy minister John Baird, who commissioned the report, said his government should have kept a closer eye on the project.

“I think the whole issue of oversight could have been stronger, should have been stronger. And I accept that.”

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