Power rates surge

Daniel McHardie
Moncton Times and Transcript
March 8, 2002

A two-year power rate freeze has ended as New Brunswickers are being hit with a three per cent hike in their power bill on April 1, and the increases may not stop there.

NB Power announced the $19-million rate increase yesterday after it finalized its 2002-2003 budget, which means homeowners will be seeing a three per cent power rate spike and commercial and wholesale buyers are facing an additional 1.5 per cent.

Sharon MacFarlane, vice-president of finance and information systems, said people understand the overall 2.1 per cent price increase is absolutely necessary because of a drop in energy exports and the year-long nosedive taken by the Canadian dollar.

“The average person would know and would appreciate that we haven’t had a general increase in three years or a residential increase for two years. I think people generally know that our costs increase over time,” MacFarlane said.

New Brunswickers may take umbrage with their power rates rising, but the senior executive pointed to the Nova Scotia power utility that is looking for an increase of 8.3 per cent and its Ontario counterpart upping its price by eight per cent. She said NB Power’s rates are “low and competitive.”

The impact of the residential increase will depend on consumption. But a normal residential bill with 1,000 kWh, per month will increase from $91.39 to $92.69, an increase of $1.30. New Brunswickers consuming 2,500 kWh per month will see an increase from $176.74 to $182.56, a jump of $5.82.

Though MacFarlane said the surge in power prices shouldn’t be a shock considering the tough times being experienced in the energy sector, the move does fly in the face of comments made last year by James Hankinson, NB Power’s former chief executive officer. He told a legislative committee he didn’t “see a need for a rate increase in the next four years.”

MacFarlane said her former boss didn’t mislead the politicians and was accurate based on the information he had at the time. The chief financial officer also wouldn’t rule out any more rate increases.

“We haven’t gone that far yet. We haven’t put together a rate plan. We will be doing that over the course of the summer months and will be going to our board in the calendar year,” MacFarlane said.

Natural Resources and Energy Minister Jeannot Volpé said he supports this increase and residential customers must pay their fair share for power. With the increase homeowners pay 93 per cent of the power costs compared to businesses that cover up to 123 per cent. He said every group should pay between 95 and 105 per cent of the cost of production.

“This one is being supported because we feel it is needed. We’ve seen their (NB Power’s) numbers and we feel it is needed for them to be able to cover their cost of production. The residential sector is the only one not covering its cost now,” Volpé said.

The energy minister said the smaller rate increases, compared to Ontario and Nova Scotia, are easier to stomach. But if the power utility is raising rates, it must also continue to find efficiencies in its operations. Allowing NB Power’s debt to mount with continuous deficits is not sustainable, said the minister.

“At some point either we pay it on our power rate or our taxes, but there is a cost. If NB Power makes a deficit it will be reflected on the taxes of New Brunswick,” Volpé said. “So we feel it is better to have it paid to those that are using the power, so the residential are getting an increase, yes it is an increase, but if you look around us at some of the other jurisdictions it looks like increases will be much higher.”

Opposition Leader Bernard Richard isn’t comforted by the minister’s comments that New Brunswickers are still better off than their counterparts in other provinces. But the Liberal leader is taking exception to NB Power raising rates a year after promising a four-year freeze, and he is demanding a better explanation when the utility’s officials come before a legislative committee next Tuesday.

Richard said New Brunswickers should get prepared to ante up even more for their power bills in the future as this will be one of many increases.

“I think they are not asking for just an adjustment because of a one-year event. They are asking for a permanent increase,” Richard said. “We are not likely to see rates go down at the end of this year even though the markets might recover and exports go back up again. I think that is not fair and consumers need to be protected.”

An industry watchdog echoed the opposition leader’s comments on the likelihood of more rate increases. Tom Adams, executive director of the Toronto-based Energy Probe, has been extremely critical of NB Power’s financial state and said it is in dire straits.

“The increases they’ve announced are not going to stabilize the financial situation at NB Power, so ratepayers should expect a lot more bad news to follow,” Adams said. “These rate increases are a small token relative to the kind of hole NB Power has to fill. The music has not stopped, we are going to see more rate increases and I expect they will be reasonably soon.”

The NB Power executive discounts Adams’ musings on the Crown corporation’s finances and said it is not a liability for the province’s credit rating.

“NB Power’s debt is self-sustaining, credit rating agencies believe NB Power’s debt is self-sustaining, it has no impact on the province’s credit rating. We cannot ever allow ourselves to have an impact on the its credit rating,” MacFarlane said.

She said throughout the last five years, NB Power has reduced its debt by $500 million and continues to make advances in the extremely apital-intensive energy industry. The chief financial officer said NB Power’s operational budget is looking to break even this year and with the $19-million rate increase it should post a “slight profit” in 2002-2003.

But Adams remains skeptical of NB Power’s financial viability based on statements released to the public utilities board and believes his assessments are accurate.

“New Brunswickers are facing a serious electricity crisis,” Adams said. “The utility is not being responsibly managed from a financial point of view, they are not reporting their books accurately and they are building enormous liabilities that are going to hit taxpayers or ratepayers or both.”

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | 1 Comment

N.B.’s electricity rates must go up

Tom Adams
Saint John Telegraph Journal
March 6, 2002

Electricity customers in New Brunswick and PEI face rate hikes possibly as high as 30 per cent to cover costs at the troubled Point Lepreau Candu nuclear power station unless NB Power gets permission from the provincial Public Utilities Board (PUB) and the government to invest $845 million to extend the reactor’s life expectancy. But, approving the refit megaproject creates the risk of an even worse financial crisis in future if the reactor fails to achieve the aggressive production targets expected by its owner, NB Power.

Some of the coming rate impacts relate to historically underestimated costs for depreciation and nuclear waste, but others relate to undisclosed expenses revealed for the first time at a regulatory hearing last week in Fredericton.

The testimony reveals an undisclosed liability of $120 million. In 1999, faced with worse aging of parts than had been expected at Point Lepreau, NB Power reduced the life expectancy of the unit by six years. Shortening the recovery period for the money sunk in the reactor resulted in a $450-million charge.

Although NB Power recognized the cost of the reduced life expectancy, the utility did not make a corresponding increased charge by recognizing the liabilities associated with cleaning up and dismantling, or decommissioning, the station after its use. Instead, the utility continued to report decommissioning liabilities as if the station would continue to operate at a high level of production until the end of the original, longer life expectancy.

NB Power’s annual report notes that the assumptions underlying decommissioning costs are different than those used for the recovery of money sunk in the reactor. The impact of this discrepancy wasn’t revealed until testimony filed last week by NB Power at a hearing before PUB. The undisclosed liability of $120 million translates into a 3 per cent rate increase if all other costs and assumptions remain the same. (This was revealed in the testimony of Sharon MacFarlane, NB Power’s vice-president of Finance and Information Systems, p. 4. The figure of $120 million breaks down into $30 million a year for four years – $30 million divided by NB Power’s 2001 domestic revenue of $931mm equals 3.2 per cent.)

However, the damage is not limited to undisclosed decommissioning costs. The $450-million writedown in 1999 resulted from NB Power taking the most optimistic interpretation of an external technical review of Point Lepreau’s decay. The utility now claims that the life expectancy of the station must be cut by another two years, to 2006, consistent with the most pessimistic scenario set out back in 1999.

The utility is also suggesting that the end may come as early as 2005, an event that would increase the potential writedown significantly. If the option of investing in a refit for Point Lepreau is turned down, the financial impact of recovering the money already sunk in the station – based on the most optimistic estimate for the shorter remaining service life, combined with the need to recover the undisclosed decommissioning costs – would result in a rate impact of 13 per cent. (This also was revealed in Mr. MacFarlane’s testimony. For the period 2002-2006, subtracting the amortization and decommissioning expectations for the retubing scenario [$758 million] from the non-retubing scenario [$1183 million] equals $425 million. Assume that approximately $50 million in ‘new’ amortization and decommissioning costs are recovered in this period under the retubing scenario. Therefore, the incremental amortization and decommissioning costs are estimated at $475, equal to an annual impact of $147 – 13 per cent of rates.)

Even if NB Power had no other undisclosed and underestimated costs, the utility would be facing a severe financial crunch due to under-recognized nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning costs. The utility estimates its costs for waste disposal and decommissioning at $843 million.

Although Point Lepreau is more than three quarters through its service life and its best production years are behind it, NB Power only recognizes $205 million in provisions for these future costs. Recovering its forecasted exposure to nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning costs may drive rates up by 16 per cent. ($638 million/four years/$931 million in domestic gross revenue = $157 million a year. The current collection rate reflected in rates is $10 million a year. The difference – $147 million, divided by $931 domestic gross revenue – equals 15.8 per cent.)

Nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning costs may rise further. NB Power’s estimated decommissioning cost is below the most optimistic estimate used by the nuclear regulator in the United States. NB Power estimates $454 million, whereas the NRC’s range is $475 million to $715 million for pressurized water reactors, which are smaller and less radioactive than CANDUs. (See http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html)

Canada’s nuclear safety regulator has grown increasingly uncomfortable in recent years with the nuclear utilities’ historic waste-funding practices, and thankfully so.

Canada’s nuclear utilities have not set aside money providing for these so-called “back-end” costs in funded accounts at arm’s length from the utility and its other financial obligations, as could be done through segregated trust accounts. Instead, the money collected for back-end costs has been used by utilities to invest in general operations.

NB Power’s severe debt crisis directly threatens these investments. Armed with recently upgraded legal powers, the federal regulator is moving toward tighter, U.S.-style financial standards with full funding of back-end costs. Ontario’s decision to start funding back-end costs for nuclear reactors is one of the factors driving up electricity rates there.

If the Point Lepreau refit is approved and the reactor works as efficiently as the utility forecasts, the massive buildup of undisclosed, underestimated and under-recognized costs can be stretched over the next 30 years. That is a big “if.”

Experience with other Candu reactors shows that such refits are commercially risky. From 1983-1989, Ontario Hydro attempted the same refit on four Pickering reactors that NB Power is proposing for Point Lepreau. Between 1993 and 1997, Ontario Hydro recognized that the refit had been a failure, wrote off the debts it had accumulated to pay for the refit, and put the four reactors into an extended lay-up condition.

A large element of Ontario Hydro’s Pickering refit write-offs was debts owing from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), the federal nuclear company. AECL and Ontario Hydro had a risk-sharing partnership in two of the Pickering reactors. AECL has a risk sharing partnership with NB Power in the Point Lepreau project. The failed Pickering refit was one of the main causes of Ontario Hydro’s financial collapse in 1997.

A failed Point Lepreau refit would have a more severe impact on New Brunswick than the impact Pickering has had on Ontario. NB Power’s assumptions used to evaluate the refit are aggressively optimistic. For the expected 25-year service life after the refit, the utility’s feasibility estimates assume that the reactor will operate about 20 per cent more productively than it has averaged in the last six years. (NB Power is assuming a post retubing capacity factor of 89 per cent, whereas in the period 1995-2001 the average has been about 73 per cent.)

Rates for customers in PEI are indexed to 110 per cent of the rates in New Brunswick. With the exception of PEI and the Territories, small-volume rural New Brunswick electricity customers already pay the highest rates in Canada. NB Power’s tactic of holding ratepayers hostage unless the utility gets approval for its pet project has maneuvered the Public Utilities Board into a corner.

The Lord government’s recent declaration of support for the Point Lepreau refit megaproject makes the prospect of independent regulatory oversight even more remote. No government or utility senior management team wants to be around when the music stops and costs can no longer be pushed off to future generations. NB Power’s massive buildup of undisclosed, underestimated and under-recognized costs should not come as any surprise to the New Brunswick government.

A financial analysis published in 1995 by Norman Betts, then assistant dean and accounting professor in the Faculty of Administration MBA program at UNB, now Minister of Business New Brunwsick, and until recently the Minister of Finance, concluded that “NB Power is in financial crisis.” He correctly forecast steep power rate increases to residential electricity users and recommended “significant cost control measures.”

New Brunswickers, particularly children, can only hope that the government heeds Professor Betts’ old advice and stops NB Power from further ramping up its debt in a vain attempt to put off judgment day.

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment

Ontario Hydro couldn’t recoup $410 million in penalty fees

Mac Trueman
New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal
March 4, 2002

Ontario Hydro had to kiss $410 million goodbye, thanks to a deal like the one that Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. is offering New Brunswick.

Ontario’s former provincial power utility couldn’t get money back from Atomic Energy’s performance guarantee for two nuclear stations at Pickering, Ont. The guarantee is similar to one that Atomic Energy is offering New Brunswick for its proposed package for refurbishing the Point Lepreau nuclear generating station.

After it was unable for nearly nine years to recover the hundreds of millions that Atomic Energy owed to it, Ontario Hydro wrote the amount off in 1993, its annual report for that year shows.

Tom Adams, executive director of the watchdog group Energy Probe, says the Ontario arrangement was “virtually identical” to one that Canada’s nuclear generator builder has offered NB Power. “Its commitment has proven to be a promise that AECL is not prepared to live up to.”

Louise Duhamel, Atomic Energy’s director of communications, has refused to respond to Mr. Adams’ contention. “Basically, these are commercial activities, and we don’t comment on that,” she said Friday. “That would be my reply to you.”

Last week, New Brunswick Natural Resources Minister Jeannot Volpé lauded the plan by which NB Power and Atomic Energy would share the risk as well as the benefits over the 25-year life of the refurbished plant. Whenever the station generates less than 80 per cent of its annual capacity, Atomic Energy pays a penalty to NB Power. When it exceeds 80 per cent, the two corporations share the extra profit, Jim Hankinson, then NB Power president, explained in an interview last year.

But Mr. Adams warns it may be difficult to collect the penalty payment. The Ontario agreement pitted the performance of the first two Candu reactors built in the early 1970s at Pickering against that of two coal-fired generating stations in Lambton, Ont., says the hydro corporation’s 1993 report.

Ontario Hydro was to make monthly payments to Atomic Energy based on how much cheaper it was to generate power at the two nuclear stations. But when Lambton performed more cheaply, Atomic Energy was to make similar payments to the hydro company. By 1983, a plague of setbacks culminated in a five-year program to replace defective pressure tubes at the heart of the Pickering stations. Over the next five years, one of the two stations or the other was shut down.

Atomic Energy and the hydro company agreed to pay off the resulting tab by using the forward payments that would eventually come, once the two stations were restored to their former performance level. But that didn’t happen. The rebuilt plants were afflicted by new problems and mishaps that cut productivity and put the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission on edge.

“Because of the interest on the debt, the debt was growing faster than it was being paid down,” Mr. Adams said. And that is what led Ontario Hydro to throw in the towel in 1993, he said.

Dr. Allan Kupcis, who served as president and CEO of Ontario Hydro in 1993, said Friday he doesn’t remember details of the write-off. He described the issue as “interesting, because it sounds like there are some parallels in the kind of proposal going forward in New Brunswick.” The New Brunswick Public Utilities Board will conduct a hearing in May into NB Power’s application to go ahead with the project.

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment

Casting Doubt and Undermining Action

Sharon Beder
Pacific Ecologist
March 1, 2002

When the US withdrew from the Kyoto agreement on climate change in March 2001, the world was shocked. Kyoto represented the only mechanism obliging developed nations to reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told the press that: “The president has been unequivocal … He does not support the Kyoto treaty. It is not in the United States’ economic best interest.”

The announcement was not surprising considering the funding Bush’s campaign received from the fossil-fuel industry. For example, one Democratic Congressional representative estimated that during the 2000 election campaign the coal industry contributed $US3.8 million, nearly 90 percent going to the Republicans. The oil industry is estimated by the Center for Responsive Politics to have contributed $US14million with $10million going to Republicans. The Seattle Times noted: “Bush began his business career in the West Texas oil fields, and he has received substantial support from the industry since entering politics in 1994.”

The US withdrawal has been widely viewed as a disaster, but how much hope does the Kyoto Protocol really offer for preventing global warming, with or without US participation? The outcomes of the 1997 Third Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), embodied in the text of the Kyoto Protocol, were disappointing but not surprising given the strength of industry opposition to an effective treaty. Although the European Union had been pushing for average reductions of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by 2012, the average reduction finally agreed upon turned out to be little more than 5 per cent, and three countries were, in fact, granted approval to increase their emissions, including Australia (by 8 per cent). Targets for developing nations remained voluntary. No enforcement measures were decided upon.

Whilst other countries continue to talk the talk, the US has admitted it will not comply. But are countries like Australia merely keeping up appearances whilst having no real intention of doing what it takes to meet emissions targets?

When nations met at the Hague at the end of 2000 to work out mechanisms for meeting reduction targets, none had ratified the Kyoto Protocol and few were on track to achieve the targets set for them (for the Protocol to be legally binding it has to be ratified by a minimum of 55 nations responsible for at least 55 per cent of emissions–a country that fails to ratify it is not bound by it).. In the US, greenhouse-gas emissions had increased by more than 13 percent over 1990 levels (compared with a target of 7% reduction) and in Australia they had risen 17 per cent since 1990.

The Hague talks collapsed when agreement could not be reached over the extent to which countries should be allowed to use forests as carbon sinks to offset their greenhouse-gas emissions. Agreement could not be reached because some countries believed that the excessive use of offsets and sinks would enable countries like Australia and the United States to continue increasing industry-based greenhouse emissions year after year.

The governments of the US and Australia, which produce the world’s highest per capita emissions of greenhouse gases, have for many years obstructed international greenhouse-gas reduction. However, this obstruction reflects the power of industry in these countries rather than any lack of concern on the part of their citizens. Polls have shown that the majority of people in the US and Australia want their governments to act to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. In Australia, a Sydney Morning Herald/AC Nielsen-McNair survey, conducted in November 1997, found that 90 per cent of Australians are concerned about global warming, 83 per cent believe it is a serious threat to humans and the environment, 79 per cent said that Australia should sign a treaty to cut emissions, and 68 per cent said that economic concerns should not prevent the Government from signing such a treaty.

However, politicians in both countries have not been responsive to people’s concerns, largely due to industry lobbying and the confusion corporate-funded scientists, front-groups and think tanks deliberately spread. Corporate influence goes far beyond the millions of dollars in campaign donations made by the fossil-fuel industry to politicians and political parties though these amounts are not insubstantial.

As the Kyoto Conference approached, the fossil-fuel industries in the US and Australia stepped up their campaign to prevent a treaty being signed that involved greenhouse-gas-reduction targets for both countries. A US consortium of 20 organisations launched an anti-climate-treaty campaign in September 1997. Industry groups, representing oil, coal and other fossil-fuel interests, spent an estimated $US13 million on television, newspaper and radio advertising in the three months leading up to the Kyoto Conference to promote public opposition to the treaty. Speaking at a news conference during this campaign, the President of the National Association of Manufacturers, Jerry Jasinowski, argued that the treaty would mean energy prices would go up, jobs would be moved to developing countries, and US businesses, farmers and consumers would suffer.

In 1998 the New York Times reported internal American Petroleum Institute (API) documents showing that fossil-fuel interests intended to raise $US5 million over two years to establish a Global Climate Science Data Center as a non-profit educational foundation to help meet their goal of ensuring that the media and the public recognise the uncertainties in climate science. The documents state that victory will be achieved when climate change becomes a non-issue and those promoting the Kyoto Protocol using existing science appear “to be out of touch with reality.”

This was just the latest phase in a corporate-funded campaign to discredit global warming predictions and undermine the political will necessary to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. It was a campaign conducted in the face of growing scientific evidence supporting the concept of global warming and the corresponding need for action

In September 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which involves 2,500 climate scientists, issued a landmark statement representing a level of consensus that had not previously been achieved on the issue of global warming. IPCC stated that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate” and that climatic instability was likely to cause “widespread economic, social and environmental dislocation over the next century.”

Yet it is not widely known that this level of consensus amongst the world’s climate scientists has been achieved because the corporations that would be affected by measures to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions have waged a deceptive campaign to confuse the public and policy-makers on the issue. They have used corporate front groups, public relations firms and conservative think tanks to cast doubt on predictions of global warming and its impacts, to imply that we do not know enough to act and to argue that the cost of reducing greenhouse gases is prohibitively expensive.

Fostering doubt is a well-known public relations tactic. Phil Lesly, author of a handbook on public relations and communications, advises corporations that:

People generally do not favor action on a non-alarming situation when arguments seem to be balanced on both sides and there is a clear doubt.
The weight of impressions on the public must be balanced so people will have doubts and lack motivation to take action. Accordingly, means are needed to get balancing information into the stream from sources that the public will find credible. There is no need for a clear-cut ‘victory.’ . . .. . . Nurturing public doubts by demonstrating that this is not a clear-cut situation in support of the opponents usually is all that is necessary.

The success of this strategy is evident in US Gallup polls in October and November 1997. These revealed that 37 per cent of those surveyed thought that scientists were unsure of the cause of global warming. A comparison with a poll conducted in 1991 showed that there had been a drop in public concern about global warming.

Perhaps nowhere has the fossil-fuel industry been more successful, however, than in Australia where the government presented the fossil-fuel industry’s interests as being synonymous with the national interest. In 1988, when the National Greenhouse ‘88 Conference was held in Australia, there was unprecedented public interest in the issue. This has been systematically eroded, as we will see below, through a well-orchestrated international campaign to portray global warming as little more than a theory that scientists can’t agree on. This strategy (see below) is aimed at crippling the impetus for government action to solve these problems, action which might adversely affect corporate profits.

Front Groups

Various front groups have been formed, particularly in the US, to oppose measures to prevent global warming. They include the Global Climate Information Project, the Coalition for Vehicle Choice, the Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC), the Information Council on the Environment, the Global Climate Coalition and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, even the Greening Earth Society and the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change.

In the negotiating sessions leading up to the Kyoto Conference, industry representatives made up most of the observers. Industry representatives did not represent their firms at these meetings but rather corporate bodies or front groups such as the Global Climate Coalition and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association.

The Global Climate Coalition, originally a coalition of 50 US trade associations and private companies representing oil, gas, coal, automobile and chemical companies and trade associations, put together with the help of public relations giant Burson-Marsteller, has spent millions of dollars in its campaign to persuade the public and governments that global warming is not a real threat. On its home page the Global Climate Coalition said its concern was with the “potentially enormous impact that improper resolution [of global climate issues] may have on our industrial base, our customers and their lifestyles and the national economy.”

GCC’s activities began receiving unwanted publicity in 1997 and corporations began leaving it because of the adverse impact on their own reputations. First to leave was Dupont, then in 1997 BP, which argued that it was time to act to prevent greenhouse warming rather than continue to debate whether it would occur or not. Royal Dutch/Shell soon followed in 1998, then others including Ford in 1999, Daimler-Chrysler, Texaco and The Southern Company in 2000.

General Motors left in March 2000, three days after the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration published a report showing that the US had experienced the warmest winter since records had been kept — 105 years. As time goes by the evidence of global warming becomes more compelling. On every continent ice is melting; in the Arctic Ocean the ice cap has shrunk by over 40% in 35 years.

By March 2000, so many companies had left the GCC because of its poor reputation and the increasing evidence of global warming that the GCC had to restructure itself to be a coalition of trade associations that individual companies can’t join. The GCC has also softened its own public stance, arguing for voluntary measures to reduce emissions rather than disputing the need for measures.

The Worldwatch Institute has likened the exodus from the GCC to the demise of the Tobacco Institute, set up by the tobacco industry to undermine the certainty of the science that linked smoking with lung cancer and other disease. The Tobacco Institute closed shop in January 1999.

It is surprising, in these circumstances, to find a new group of Australian business people intent on continuing the program of greenhouse disinformation. The Lavoisier Group was formed in 2000 to cast doubt on global warming theory and oppose measures being taken to prevent global warming. It includes some high profile businessmen and politicians, including its president, Peter Walsh (former Labor Minister for finance 1984-90), Hugh Morgan (CEO of WMC — previously Western Mining Corporation) and “ex-ALP and Liberal powerbrokers” Gary Gray and Tony Staley. The business leaders who are associating the names of their companies with the Lavoisier Group seem to be unable to learn from the experience of former members of the GCC.

The Greening Earth Society was established in the US in April 1998 by the Western Fuels Association to convince people that “using fossil fuels to enable our economic activity is as natural as breathing.” Another recent addition to the campaign has been the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, which, according to CLEAR, the Washington-based Clearinghouse on Environmental Advocacy and Research, seems to have a strong working relationship with both the Western Fuels Association and the Greening Earth Society.

Scientists

Corporations and their front groups have utilised a handful of dissident scientists to cast doubt on the likelihood of adverse impacts arising from global warming. These scientists, who oppose the general scientific consensus on global warming, have had their voices greatly amplified by fossil-fuel interests.

Such scientists do not disclose their funding sources when talking to the media or before government hearings. One example is Patrick Michaels. Generally described in the media as being from the University of Virginia, Michaels edits the World Climate Report, which is funded by Western Fuels Association (a consortium of coal interests) and associated companies; has received funding for his research from the Western Fuels Association, the Cyprus Minerals Company, the Edison Electric Institute and the German Coal Mining Association; and is on the advisory board of the Greening Earth Society. He was also at one time on the advisory board of other front groups including TASSC and the Information Council on the Environment. Michaels was featured in New Scientist in July 1997 as “a climatologist at the University of Virginia” and one of the “world’s top scientists.” His criticisms of global warming models are cited in the article, but without any mention of his funding sources. He in turn cites the New Scientist article as supporting his views without mentioning the article was based on an interview with him.

Michaels told an Australian business audience that global warming would lead to milder wi
nters, longer agricultural seasons in cold climates and little extra heat in warmer climates. He was referred to in the Sydney Morning Herald as “a leading American climatologist” from the University of Virginia. The paper quoted him as saying: “You’d have a very hard time saying it [global warming] was a net negative . . . I find it very hard to believe that the folks in the Pacific Islands won’t adapt to a 30 centimetres sea level rise.”

Other scientists involved in the campaign to discredit emission-reduction targets include Drs Richard Lindzen, Robert Balling, Sallie Baliunas and S Fred Singer. Lindzen, who was also featured in the New Scientist article and in the Australian Institution of Engineers’Engineering World as “an independent scientist” is a consultant to the fossil-fuel industry, charging $US2,500 a day for his services.

Balling is also heavily funded by fossil-fuel interests. He is reported in the Arizona Republic as saying that he had “received more like $700,000 over the past five years” from coal and oil interests in Great Britain, Germany and the US. Balling, like Michaels, is on the panel of scientific advisors for the Greening Earth Society and was also on the advisory council for the Information Council on the Environment.

Fred Singer is executive director of the “think tank,” the Science and Environmental Policy Project (SEPP). SEPP argues that global warming, ozone depletion and acid rain are not real but rather are scare tactics used by environmentalists. Singer speaks and writes prolifically on these subjects and is in demand by anti-environment groups. He has made at least two trips to Australia (in 1990 and 1992) to publicize his views on global warming. He has also worked for companies such as Exxon, Shell, and Arco. According to the Environmental Research Foundation:

For years, Singer was a professor at the University of Virginia where he was funded by energy companies to pump out glossy pamphlets pooh-poohing climate change. Singer hasn’t published original research on climate change in 20 years and is now an ‘independent’ consultant, who spends his time writing letters to the editor, and testifying before Congress, claiming that ozone-depletion and global warming aren’t real problems.

Because these and a handful of other scientists have been used so much by those trying to discredit the scientific consensus on global warming, and because their industry funding and associations have been exposed by organisations such as Ozone Action, efforts have been made to find new “clean” scientists to play this role. The recently uncovered API documents reveal a new plan to:

Identify, recruit and train a team of five independent scientists to participate in media outreach . . . this team will consist of new faces who will add their voices to those recognized scientists who are already vocal.

Think Tanks

SEPP is just one of the many conservative think tanks in various parts of the world that seek to undermine the case for global warming preventative measures. Think tanks are generally private, tax-exempt, research institutes that present themselves as providing impartial disinterested expertise. However think tanks generally tailor their studies to suit their clients or donors.

Corporate-funded think tanks have played a key role in providing credible “experts” who dispute scientific claims of existing or impending environmental degradation and therefore provide enough doubts to ensure governments “lack motivation” to act. These dissident scientists, usually not atmospheric scientists, argue there is “widespread disagreement within the scientific community” about global warming (see below). Most conservative think tanks have argued that global warming is not happening and that any possible future warming will be slight and may have beneficial effects.

The Heritage Foundation is one of the largest and wealthiest think tanks in the US. It gets massive media coverage in the US and is very influential in politics, particularly amongst the Republicans who dominate the US Congress. In October 1998 it published a backgrounder entitled. “The Road to Kyoto: How the Global Climate Treaty Fosters Economic Impoverishment and Endangers US Security.” It began:

Chicken Little is back and the sky is falling. Or so suggests the Clinton Administration . . . By championing the global warming treaty, the Administration seeks to pacify a vociferous lobby which frequently has made unsubstantiated predictions of environmental doom.

In the 1999 edition of its Environmental Briefing Book for Congressional Candidates, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) argues that “the Kyoto Protocol is a costly, unworkable, and inappropriate policy to suppress energy use around the world” and that the US Senate should reject it. It argues that the “scientific case for an international climate treaty has collapsed” and anyway, “no one should worry about a modest warming, should it occur” as it is likely to result in beneficial impacts.

One of CEI’s publications, The True State of the Planet, was partially funded by the Olin Foundation, created by Olin Chemical. In it Robert Balling claims that:

(the) scientific evidence argues against the existence of a greenhouse crisis, against the notion that realistic policies could achieve any meaningful climatic impact, and against the claim that we must act now if we are to reduce the greenhouse threat.

CEI is an active member of the Cooler Heads Coalition. The Cooler Heads coalition was founded by the corporate front group Consumer Alert and distributes a bi-weekly newsletter, published by CEI. Its object is clear: “The Cooler Heads Coalition focuses on the consumer impact of global warming policies that would drastically restrict energy use and raise costs for consumers.”

Think tanks in other parts of the world are also seeking to cast doubt upon global warming predictions. The Australian Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), which gets almost one-third of its budget from mining and manufacturing companies, has also produced articles and media statements challenging the greenhouse consensus. In IPA Review, Aaran Oakley has accused Australia’s public broadcaster, the ABC, of bias because “ABC reporters made the assumption that global warming is real, some even making assertions to that end.” He complains that ABC reporting therefore “represents a pernicious mixture of science and environmentalism.”

However the ABC has given air time to IPA Senior Fellow, Brian Tucker, previously chief of the CSIRO division of atmospheric research. In 1996 in a talk on the ABC’s Ockham’s Razor he stated that “unchallenged climatic disaster hyperbole has induced something akin to a panic reaction from policy makers, both national and international.” In the talk he ignored the scientific consensus represented by the IPCC 1995 statement and argued that global warming predictions are politically and emotionally generated:

[T]here is little evidence to support the notion of net deleterious climate change despite recent Cassandra-like trepidation in the Australian Medical Association and exaggerations from Greenpeace. Why then has so much alarm been generated? The answer is complicated. In
my opinion, it is due partly to the use and abuse of science to forment [sic] fear by those seeking to support ideological positions, and partly due to the negative and fearful perspective that seems to characterise some environmental prejudices.

Tucker’s article, “The Greenhouse Panic,” was reprinted in Engineering World, a magazine aimed at engineers. The article, introduced by the magazine editor as “a balanced assessment,” argues that “alarmist prejudices of insecure people have been boosted by those who have something to gain from widespread public concern.” This article, which would have been more easily dismissed as an IPA publication, has been quoted by Australian engineers at conferences as if it were an authoritative source.

Think tanks have been so successful at clouding the scientific picture of greenhouse warming and providing an excuse for corporations and the politicians they support that they have, to date, managed to thwart effective greenhouse reduction strategies being implemented by governments in the English-speaking world.

Conferences

Australian politicians and bureaucrats have travelled the world looking for allies for the country’s renegade position on global warming, particularly during 1997 as the Kyoto conference approached. Whilst it has found few governmental allies it has found support amongst US industry interests and US senators. In July 1997 the Australian Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Anderson, met with some top fossil-fuel industry executives in the US who praised Australia’s position on global warming.

That same month the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Australian Embassy in Washington addressed a CEI conference on “The Costs of Kyoto.” He claimed Australian businesses were strongly behind their government’s stance in opposing uniform greenhouse emission targets for industrialised countries. Also speaking at the conference were Patrick Michaels, contrarian Wilfred Beckerman from Oxford University and others who gave reasons for not agreeing to emissions reductions at Kyoto.

In August the Frontiers of Freedom Institute, a conservative corporate-funded US think tank, organised a conference in Canberra in conjunction with the Australian APEC Study Centre. The conference, “Countdown to Kyoto,” was organised, according to The Australian, to “bolster support” for the Government’s increasingly isolated position on global warming in preparation for the Kyoto Conference. US Senator Chuck Hagel, who co-sponsored the Senate resolution condemning ratification of any treaty agreement in Kyoto which harmed the US economy or failed to include commitments by developing nations (see Introduction above), was a speaker, as was US Congressman John Dingell. Other speakers included the Chairman of Australian multinational BHP and the Director of the local think tank, the Tasmania Institute.

Malcolm Wallop, who heads the Frontiers of Freedom Institute, chaired the conference with Hugh Morgan, Chairman of WMC. Wallop, a US Senator for 18 years, boasts of his achievements in promoting SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative or “Star Wars”) and opposing welfare, progressive taxation, Social Security, and government funding for higher education. Wallop said in a letter to US conservative groups: “This conference in Australia is the first shot across the bow of those who expect to champion the Kyoto Treaty.”

He also stated that the conference would “offer world leaders the tools to break with the Kyoto Treaty.” The conference was opened by the then Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fisher, who argued that tough emission-reduction targets could put 90,000 jobs at risk in Australia and cost more than $150 million.

Patrick Michaels argued at the “Countdown to Kyoto” conference that the science to support “expensive and potentially disruptive policy to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. . .is sorely lacking.” Michaels also gave the “good news” about global warming to a global warming seminar organised by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia, when he visited Australia in 1997. He has travelled the world on behalf of anti-climate-treaty interests. In October 1997 he attended a conference similar to Canberra’s Countdown to Kyoto in Vancouver organised by Canadian conservative think tank, The Fraser Institute. Also attending this conference was Robert Balling and Sallie Baliunas.

Economists

In both the US and Australia, think-tank economists have been influential in the debate over the costs of greenhouse-gas abatement. In Australia the Commonwealth government has relied heavily on figures provided by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE)–a governmental agency. ABARE was set up by the Commonwealth Government but now bills itself as an “independent” research agency. It relies on both government and industry funding. For its economic modelling of the impacts of meeting greenhouse-gas targets, ABARE raised $1.1 million from oil companies and industry lobby groups by offering them the opportunity to pay $50,000 to sit on the steering committee and “have an influence on the direction of the model development” (as stated in ABARE’s literature).

Those who took advantage of the offer included Mobil, Exxon, Texaco, BHP, Rio Tinto, the Australian Aluminium Council, the Business Council of Australia, and the Norwegian oil company Statoil. The Australian Conservation Foundation, which could not afford the $50,000, requested a waiver of the fee to be on the steering committee but was refused. According to Clive Hamilton, from the Australia Institute (an environmental think-tank), 80 per cent of the funds for ABARE’s climate-change modelling come from the fossil-fuel industry.

Not surprisingly, ABARE’s model (MEGABARE) predicted huge costs in jobs and income if emission-reduction targets are to be met. This is disputed by environmentalists and alternative energy experts, as well as by 131 Australian economists who signed a joint statement that noted:

the economic modelling studies on which the Government is relying to assess the impacts of reducing Australia’s sgreenhouse-gas emissions overestimate the costs and underestimate the benefits of reducing emissions.

Professor Mark Diesendorf, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Futures, claims that ABARE’s model has serious flaws because it neglects the role of technological change as well as the benefits of different energy paths such as the new industries created. And several Australian studies over the last few years have shown that emissions could be cut in Australia by at least 20 percent without cost. In fact an earlier 1991 ABARE study “concluded that emissions could cost-effectively be cut by 30 percent.”

Corporations

In 1997, when it left the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), BP earned the reputation of being environmentally progressive in an industry that largely refused to accept that global warming was likely to occur. In several speeches made that year CEO, John Browne argued that it was time to act to prevent greenhouse warming rather than continue to debate whether it would occur or not.

Browne earned the praise of environmental groups such as Greenpeace. Management Today magazine announced “Sworn ene
mies BP and Greenpeace have done the unimaginable–they’ve joined forces to develop solar power as a clean energy source.” The Earth Day Network 2000, which includes organizations such as the World Watch Institute and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) gave BP a 1999 Earth Day award for its progressive approach to global warming.

The question is whether BP’s move was an indicator of environmental leadership or a cynical attempt to manage its reputation. At the time BP was receiving adverse publicity and criticism from human rights groups because of its activities in Colombia. The dramatic break with other oil companies on the issue of global warming provided a useful diversion. In 1997, a year in which BP had adverse publicity about its activities in Colombia and favorable publicity about its stance on global warming, BP’s share price and profit were up.

Certainly BP’s record of environmental protection has not been any better than other oil companies. It has contributed more than its share of oil spills and pollution. BP was cited as most polluting company in the US in 1991, based on the EPA’s toxic-release inventory. One local residents’ group claimed: “BP has treated us as a PR problem instead of taking our concerns seriously.” In 1992 Greenpeace International named BP as one of Scotland’s two largest polluters. BP is “a Potentially Responsible Party for 23 hazardous waste Superfund sites in the United States.”

Nor has BP become a model company since its apparent environmental conversion in 1997. In 1999, BP was charged with burning polluted gases at its Ohio refinery and agreed to pay a $1.7 million fine. In July 2000 BP paid a $10 million fine to the US EPA and agreed to reduce the air pollution coming from its US refineries by tens of thousands of tons. The agreement, although voluntary, was taken to head off EPA enforcement action. In return for the agreement the EPA “has offered a “clean slate” for certain past violations.”

BP’s activities in Alaska, both existing and proposed, have been of concern to indigenous people and environmental groups: “Between January 1997 and March 1998, BP Amoco was responsible for 104 oil spills in America’s Arctic.” In 1999 BP admitted illegally dumping hazardous waste at its “environmentally friendly” oil field in Alaska and was fined $500,000 for failing to report it. It also paid $6.5 million in civil penatlies to settle claims associated with the disposal of the hazardous waste.

In 1999 six senior employees of the company that operates the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), in which BP has a majority ownership stake, warned that irresponsible operations could cause an environmentally damaging rupture of the 22 year old pipeline. In a letter to CEO Browne they alleged falsified inspection reports, intimidated workers and “persistent violations of procedures and governmental regulations.”

BP has, however, invested heavily in solar power and introduced a program to reduce its own greenhouse-gas emissions. So does this represent “a new brand of progress for the world,” as its advertisements claim, or is this more reputation management?

Despite its investment in solar energy, bp remains committed to ever increasing production and usage of oil and gas. Director of Policy David Rice told the Global Public Affairs Institute in London: “we make no secret of our intention to grow our core exploration and production business, and to continue our search for new sources of oil and gas.”

Whilst bp has promised to reduce its own greenhouse-gas emissions it does not accept the need to reduce the emissions arising from the products it sells. “As a company, our contribution is small,”Browne argues. “If one adds up the emissions from all of BP’s operations and from all the products we sell, it comes to around one percent of the total emissions from human activity.” However this is a huge amount for one company to be responsible for, and certainly a more important contribution than that of bp’s own operations. Yet Browne is using the very argument used by recalcitrant countries like Australia (which also contributes about 1%) to argue against the need for reductions.

By 1999, BP’s emissions were “greater than those of Central America, Canada or Britain.” And BP’s recent acquisitions mean bp is now responsible for about 3% of worldwide greenhouse emissions.

The bp corporation continues to explore for more oil, often in environmentally sensitive areas such as the Atlantic Frontier, the foothills of the Andes and Alaska. It is seeking US government permission to explore in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), one of the last remaining pristine wilderness areas in Alaska. It does this through direct lobbying and funding of politicians and through funding the lobby group Arctic Power. The bp corporation’s Northstar project involves the first undersea pipeline in the Arctic and the US Army Corps of Engineers calculates that “the total probability of one or more large oil spills . . . is approximately 11% to 24%” during its fifteen-year lifetime.

Whilst it has been attacked for its Arctic exploration, BP has emphasized its solar investments. In March 1999 BP launched its “Plug in the Sun” program based on its investment in solar energy and the installation of solar panels on petrol stations around the world. In its advertisements it said, “We can fill you up by sunshine” although it was still petrol people were putting in their cars.

For this program, it was awarded a Greenwash award by Corporate Watch, which stated that “the company hopes that by spending just .01% of its portfolio on solar as it explores for more oil and sells more gasoline, it can convince itself and others of its own slogan: BP knows, BP cares, BP is our leader.” BP invested $45 million in the solar firm Solarex, compared to $120 billion over two years to acquire Amoco, Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) and Burmah Castrol.

In a similar satiric vein, Greenpeace USA gave CEO John Browne an award for “Best Impression of an Environmentalist.” Greenpeace noted that BP planned to spend $5 billion over the next five years on exploring for and producing oil in Alaska even though the planet could “not afford to burn 75% of the fossil fuels we’ve already discovered, if we are to avert catastrophic global warming.”

But would a company spend hundreds of millions of dollars in solar investment just to enhance its reputation? Well, bp has spent that just on rebranding. In 2000, the transnational oil giant BP Amoco was rebranded as “bp, beyond petroleum,” part of an effort to portray BP as an energy company rather than an oil company, one that incorporated solar energy in its portfolio and was willing to move away from oil as a source of energy. Research and preparation for the rebranding cost $7 million and bp intends to spend $200 million over two years rebranding its facilities and changing signs and stationery. Hundreds of millions more will be spent over the next few years advertising bp petrol.

BP’s move from the GCC to other coalitions, such as the Business Industry Council of the Pew Climate Change Center and the Safe Climate, Sound Business coalition, as well as its involvement with groups such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the US President’s Council on Sustainable Development, has enabled it to lobby for environmental protection measures that are gradual,
market-based and do not interfere with profits and economic growth.

The Safe Climate, Sound Business Coalition recommends ways to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions without reducing economic growth. It affirms its intention of meeting “growing needs for energy” and emphasizes the need for “gradual transition” so as to “avoid the need to retire existing equipment prematurely.”

Browne concurs: “Actions that seek, at a stroke, drastically to restrict carbon emissions or even to ban the use of fossil fuels would be unsustainable because they would crash into the realities of economic growth.” He also argues the timetable of change should be “compatible with capital stock turnover in the energy sector and the wider economy” and constrained by “the magnitude and age of existing energy infrastructure.”

In Australia, bp has joined with other industry leaders to lobby the government not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless the US does so first. The industry leaders also urged the government to guarantee that no jobs will be lost to greenhouse reduction measures (interesting given the massive job losses that resulted from BP’s recent acquisitions) and to seek the most “liberal” rules for meeting targets which include the use of carbon sinks.

Browne has called for policy instruments that enable multinational corporations to have the flexibility to reduce emissions in countries where “the marginal cost of such curbs is lowest.” As an example of this, bp is involved with forest conservation programs in Turkey and Bolivia in order to offset its own greenhouse-gas emissions. It is debatable that conserving forests that already exist does much to solve the climate change problem. However, other more effective policies that involve less reliance on fossil fuels, such as support for public transport and the development of hybrid or electric cars, would threaten the profits of a company such as bp–bp depends on an increasing demand for oil and gas for the bulk of its profits.

The public conversion of fossil-fuel companies to mainstream greenhouse science is no real indication that they are committed to contributing to the reduction of global greenhouse emissions, particularly where that interferes with their profits.

Conclusions

Clearly, corporations and industries that depend on fossil fuels for the greater part of their profits are doing their best to obstruct and undermine effective measures to reduce greenhouse gases. The front groups, scientists, economists and think tanks on their pay roll need to be exposed for what they are–the voices of vested interests. In addition, the voice of the public needs to drown out the influence of corporations, their lobbyists, advertisements and their political donations. Unless politicians are swamped by protests, letters and phone calls demanding action to prevent global warming, it will be too easy for governments to accede to corporate interests.

References available in the original

Professor Sharon Beder is a visiting professorial fellow at the University of Wollongong.

Posted in The Deniers | Leave a comment

Belgian cabinet approves nuclear phase-out bill

Jennifer Laidlaw
Reuters
March 1, 2002

BRUSSELS, March 1 (Reuters) – Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt said on Friday that his cabinet would ask parliament to pass a controversial bill to shut down the nation’s nuclear reactors by 2025, emulating similar moves by Sweden and Germany.

“We are going to proceed with the closure of nuclear plants between 2015 and 2025,” he told a news conference after the weekly cabinet meeting. “It is a balanced and realistic decision.”

If put into law, the bill would shut down the nation’s seven plants and prohibit the construction of new ones.

The bill, proposed by Secretary of State for Energy Olivier Deleuze, is the result of a pledge made by Verhofstadt when he took office three years ago.

Belgium gets nearly 60 percent of its electricity from nuclear reactors, making it the country most dependent on nuclear power after France. It uses natural gas and coal to meet the rest of its needs.

SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

Verhofstadt said his government was looking at alternative energy sources to compensate for the expected loss. Energy conservation would also be encouraged, he said.

Should the country’s energy supply be threatened meantime, the government would still be able to bypass the law, he added.

The bill would phase out the reactors after 40 years of use.

Belgium’s first three reactors went into operation between 1974 and 1975 and the other four a decade later.

Divisions within the cabinet, which includes members of the Ecolo and Agalev environmentalist parties, forced it to meet several times earlier in the month to discuss the bill.

The bill had raised concerns that energy prices would rise if nuclear power was phased out.

The daily La Libre Belgique on Friday cited an expert opinion sought by Verhofstadt that foresaw the country relying on natural gas for 85 percent of its energy needs. Such a heavy reliance on a single source was seen as making the country vulnerable to fluctuating gas prices.

But Verhofstadt said he did not think that the decision would lead to a rise in energy prices.

“The only good solution is…to liberalise the sector,” he said.

Belgium’s dilemma is the same as that faced elsewhere in Europe, where nuclear energy meets about a third of its needs.

European Energy Commissioner Loyola de Palacio has acknowledged the reluctance among some countries to phase out their reactors before finding a suitable alternative.

For example, Sweden has delayed the closure of a reactor because it had not figured out how to make up for the loss in power generation.

In 2000, Germany got the industry to agree to gradually phase out the country’s 19 operational reactors over the next 25 years.

(Additional reporting by Gilles Castonguay)

Posted in Towards Shutdown | Leave a comment

NB Power pegs Lepreau cost at $845M

Bruce Bartlett
The Telegraph Journal
February 28, 2002

Lepreau the sequel will not go into cost overruns, like the original project, according to plans released by NB Power Monday.

When Point Lepreau came online in 1984, it cost NB Power $1.2 billion – well over the projected $300-million cost. On Monday the power company filed documents with the province’s Public Utilities Board, stating it wants to spend $845 million to refurbish the plant and add another 30 years to its life. The province has a clear choice to make by 2006: It can keep Lepreau at a cost of at least $1 billion or it can decommission the station for about $455 million. The $845-million upgrade bill does not include the cost of buying replacement power during the proposed 18-month overhaul, which would increase the total price tag of the project by about $300 million.

The nuclear plant has been under study for the past two years and 1,700 recommendations have come forward, said Ken Little, vice-president of regulatory affairs, Monday. “As a part of that we got a firm price from AECL (Atomic Energy Canada Ltd.) for all of the re-tubing work,” he said. Worn tubing has been the cause of many of the problems experienced at the plant over the past few years, which have caused numerous shutdowns. AECL will also act as the general contractor for the project, if it is approved. It will co-ordinate all the work that needs to be carried out.

Before the project can go ahead, the proposal still has to get a positive reception from the Public Utility Board, which will hold hearings in the spring; the Department of Environment and the provincial cabinet. But NB Power has 82 per cent of the proposed project under a firm price commitment at this point, said Mr. Little. At the same time negotiations are underway with labour groups to make sure there will be no strikes. “We have experience in using those agreements at Belledune and Dalhousie, where we had very successful construction projects,” he said. AECL will have the ultimate responsibility to see that the project works.

Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe, a national consumer and environmental watchdog in Toronto, said Monday the deal with AECL may protect NB Power but could place the federal taxpayer at risk. Engineers can make estimates about how long a particular job will take but all that can slip away once the work begins and unexpected problems are found, he said. The scope of a job can also change once it begins. “When they get into it, they can discover the regulator changes the rules, or it’s more complicated than they thought,” he said.

A third major unknown can be problems that arise when a plant restarts. Those problems don’t fit into the original budget of the project but can still cost a lot of money. NB Power has already experienced this at Point Lepreau with what Mr. Adams calls “maintenance induced disrepair.”

“What NB Power is proposing here is both technically and financially risky,” he said. A gas-fired power station with a larger output than Point Lepreau could be built for the same money, Mr. Adams contends.

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment

Proposed revisions to regulatory funding mechanisms

Keith Bryan

February 28, 2002

Please also see  Energy Probe urges ammendments to Ontario Energy Board :http://energy.probeinternational.org/utility-reform/reforming-ontarios-local-electrical-distribution-sector/energy-probe-urges-ammendment

Summary and Conclusions

The evolution of Ontario’s regulatory processes is resulting in a situation where the interests of some stakeholders may not be adequately represented. It is necessary that a mechanism be put in place that will allow for the funding to be obtained during all aspects of each process.

Introduction

In recent years the province of Ontario has joined various other jurisdictions, both in North America and elsewhere in the world, in attempting to increase the benefits accruing to society by changing its approach to the regulation of natural monopolies in the energy sector. Its efforts have taken the form of two major sets of initiatives. One has been to encourage regulated companies to unbundle the activities they engaged in into those that have to be regulated and those that do not and to remove the latter from the regulated environment. The second set of initiatives, examples of which include PBR and future rule making processes, have been targeted at reducing the time and effort, and thus the cost related to, the process of regulating the remaining activities. While it is obviously beneficial, where possible, to reduce the time and costs associated with the regulatory process, these reductions should not be at the expense of the overall public interest. It is the tension between the desire to modify the regulatory process and the need to ensure that the public interest is protected that will be addressed here.ContextThe body charged with the responsibility for regulating the activities of natural monopolies in the energy sector in Ontario is the Ontario Energy Board (“OEB”). The OEB draws its authority from the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 (“the Act”).

One of the underlying principals of the OEB’s responsibilities under the Act is the protection of the public interest. This has traditionally been interpreted to mean that the Board should consider the interests of all consumers, and society in general, when arriving at its decisions. This responsibility is also set out in the Act. In terms of the Board’s objectives in relation to the regulation electricity, Part I, Section 1.3 identifies one as:

“To protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices and the reliability and quality of electricity service”

While Section 1.6 identifies another as:

“To facilitate energy efficiency and the use of cleaner, more environmentally benign energy sources in a manner consistent with the policies of the Government of Ontario. 1998, c.15, Sched. B, s.1.”

Similarly, Part 1 Section 2 sets out the Board’s objectives concerning its responsibilities for the regulation of activities involving natural gas. Section 2.2 identifies one of those objectives as:

“To maintain just and reasonable rates for the transmission, distribution and storage of gas”

While Section 1.5 states another as being:

“To facilitate opportunities for energy efficiency consistent with the policies of the Ontario government. 1998, c.15, Sched. B, s.2.

 It is also clear that the government takes these responsibilities related to consumer interests seriously. On June 7, 2000, the Minister of Energy, Science and Technology issued a letter to the OEB related to its deliberations concerning allowable earnings levels for electrical distribution utilities. The letter stated, in part:

“In making an order under section 78 of the Act approving or fixing just and reasonable rates for the distributing of electricity by a municipal electric utility, in being guided by the objectives set out in section I of the Act, the Board shall give primacy to the objective “to protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices and the reliability and quality of the electricity service.”

Leaving aside what many saw as an intrusion into the Board’s jurisdiction and a threat to its independence, it is clear that the government thought it of the utmost importance that the Board gives the interests of the consumers’ primacy.

The logical first step in the Board carrying out its mandate to protect the interests of consumers is becoming aware of what those interests are. These interests are not always obvious and they must be derived in the context of a process where normally some parties are actively representing their own interests. A presiding panel of the OEB must base its decision on the evidence and arguments it hears in a given proceeding. The only exceptions to this are facts that are generally known or those that are commonly accepted technical or scientific facts that are within the members’ areas of expertise. This means that the panels are, for the most part, dependent upon the evidence and arguments put forward by the parties that are active in that particular proceeding. It is therefore necessary for some party to actively advocate for the stakeholders that are not able to do so directly if those interests are to be properly represented in the decision making process.

Actively participating in an OEB process is both time consuming and expensive. Since larger customers generally have the concentration of interests and the resources to obtain such representation, it is the residential and smaller commercial customers that, due to their lack of connectivity and organization, find participation difficult or impossible. In addition there is a need for parties to represent the more general aspects of the public interest, such as environmental matters, which are less directly cost driven. In some U.S. jurisdictions, the task of representing such interests in the regulatory process has been undertaken by a public advocate that is part of, or associated with, the state government. In Ontario there has never been an official government sponsored advocate. Traditionally various public interest groups have taken on the role of representing the interests of those parties who were not present and more general societal interests. Small commercial interest seem particularly underrepresented. At one time, the staff played a very role as well but this ceased with the reorganization of the Staff a few years ago. At that time, there was a concern with redundant activities and the most appropriate use of the Board Staff’s limited resources. The decision was made to cede this responsibility entirely to the public interest groups and leave the Board Staff with the duties of advising the Board on technical matters and ensuring that there was as complete a record as possible upon which the Board could base its decision. As a result the Staff would no longer take positions on matters at issue before the Board. This meant that the Board has had to rely solely on the public interest groups to act on behalf of smaller customers and other interests that would otherwise go unrepresented.

The above situation will be exacerbated in the future by the changing role of the municipal electric distribution utilities. Whereas in the past, as municipally owned, non-profit entities, they acted as an advocate for the customers served by their systems and were responsible to locally elected officials, there is a growing tendency for these entities to be put on a for-profit footing. As a result, their interests may not always be as coincidental with the interests of their customers and thus may deprive the latter of another source of representation.

Current Situation

Regulation is frequently viewed as a process that is both costly in terms of both financial and other resources and one that does not necessarily adequately achieve the goal of replicating what would occur in a competitive market. Over the past few years there have been initiatives around the world that have attempted to bring market discipline to regulated companies. Many, if not most, of these initiatives have taken the form of some variant of Performance Based Regulation or PBR. A PBR mechanism is one that in some fashion seeks to provide an incentive to a regulated company to attempt to achieve a stated objective, such as the reduction of costs, where that same incentive would not be present in the previous cost of service regulation. In addition, many of the mechanisms have a multi-year time frame with limited if any regulatory activity in the interval. This has the benefit of reducing the level of regulatory expenses for all of the parties involved.

The most common PBR mechanisms provide a cap for either rates or revenues each year. These mechanisms first establish a base for the chosen variable and then allow it to escalate by some inflation related factor each year. This is usually modified by a factor to introduce some level of anticipated productivity improvement. The end result of these mechanisms is that if the utility can hold its cost escalation to an amount that is less than the allowable increase less the productivity offset, it will enhance the revenues flowing through to shareholders. Conversely, if the utility incurs costs that are larger than the amounts allowable under the formula, the returns to shareholders are decreased. In Ontario, most of the PBR mechanisms that are either in place or contemplated fall into this category.

In addition to the movement towards multi-year PBR mechanisms, there has also been a tendency towards the use of consultative processes to either augment or in some instances replace the standard hearing process. These consultations are attractive for a number of reasons. The meetings involved are frequently more productive because the atmosphere is generally less confrontational and adversarial. As such the discussions are more open and parties are less guarded and willing to discuss compromises. In addition, they are less costly since they do not to the same degree require the incurrence costs such as those for legal and transcript services. There still are however, substantial costs associated with participating in these processes. Typically the processes are complex and require substantial time to review and analyze and, in some cases, the assistance of outside experts. In addition, the processes typically involve a series of meetings, such as information and negotiating sessions, which parties must attend if their participation is to be effective. This does not present a hurdle for larger entities such as customers with significant usage levels, some marketers and many other utilities that have substantial financial stakes in the outcome. It can however act to deter other entities like smaller customers and utilities and public interest groups that must rely on fund raising to support their activities. Where funding for such groups was, and still is, available for the hearing process, there is no such mechanism that can be accessed with respect to the activities that occur prior to or as a partial alternative to the start of the formal, legal, filing. Similar problems will arise as the OEB begins to engage in rulemaking proceedings.

While it might be argued that the disadvantaged parties will have an opportunity to express their concerns during the formal process, which still operates under the OEB’s current funding mechanism, this is only superficially true. The impact of group dynamics and the integrated nature of most settlements, make it much more difficult to effect a settlement agreement once it has been finalized by the participating parties as compared to achieving the same result during the settlement’s development. Parties that might be swayed by arguments during the initial discussions may be less likely to agree to re-open the settlement when that might put other aspects of the agreement at risk. In addition they may be concerned about being viewed as being unreliable by other parties. In fact many settlement agreements prohibit parties to that agreement from opposing any aspect at a later date in all but the most extreme of circumstances. In any event the social sanctions that would apply to any party that changed its position would act as a great deterrent. Similarly, the OEB panel that would have to weigh the arguments of the new parties against the chances that the agreement that had been reached would unravel due to the changes it was directing. All of these factors work to increase the burden of proof that the new participants would have to meet in order to be successful and thus likely puts them at a disadvantage that could at times be significant.

The lack of a funding mechanism also puts the utilities in an awkward position. They would prefer to have all parties involved from the beginning. This works to avoid having the settlement, into which they have often invested considerable time, effort and money, unravel during the hearing process. However, if they were to provide funding themselves it would be at the expense of their shareholders. Further, given the presence of representatives from some stakeholders in the process, the utilities often feel the responsibility to represent the interests of those that are not represented. This is not appropriate because the interests of those stakeholders may not always be aligned with the interests of their shareholders. Further, it potentially results in the utilities being forced to take the side of one group of stakeholders against another when, in fact, the utility’s own direct interests are not at stake.

Absent some sort of funding mechanism, the public interest groups have two courses of action open to them: They can decline to participate until the formal hearing process starts or they can try to participate using their organization’s own funds. If they take the first option they risk encountering all of the problems set out above. On the other hand, given the acute shortage of funds experienced by most such organizations, if they try to participate using their own funds they risk their involvement being ineffective due to under funding. In addition the funds used to participate in the regulatory process would be at then expense of the group’s other activities.It might be suggested that the obvious answer would be for these groups to raise funds directly from the customer groups involved. This is often easier said than done. As mentioned earlier, the interests of both the regulated utility and larger individual customers can be said to be concentrated, however for the smaller customers they are diluted. While larger customers are frequently sophisticated enough analyze the material involved in order to recognize the benefits of participating in the regulatory process and then to retain and instruct legal counsel accordingly, the same is likely not true of residential and smaller commercial customers. These parties often do not have the same understanding of the process and likely think that since the utility is regulated that some government agency is looking out for their best interests. Individually these customers do not have the funds to participate and the pooling of resources is difficult. Direct fund raising is an inefficient method of funding these activities since the administrative costs are high and the direct benefit to those that do contribute may be out weighed by the costs of participating. This gives rise to the question of fairness since those that do not contribute will none-the-less reap the benefits arising from the efforts and contributions of those that do.

Proposal

As the new regulatory environment develops, it will be necessary to ensure that a level playing field for all stakeholders is maintained and that the OEB be able to properly consider the interests of all stakeholder groups when arriving at its decisions. It will therefore be necessary to develop a mechanism whereby there are parties participating in all phases of that process who will represent the interests of the residential and small commercial customers.

There would unlikely be significant support for the establishment of a Public Advocate like that which exists in many U.S. jurisdictions. Current government policy is targeted at reducing both the size of government and its footprint in business process. It would be unlikely that they would entertain the establishment of a new agency at this time.

Similarly, there would probably be difficulties in gaining approval for the expansion of the OEB staff that would be necessary for them to assume this role. Further, there are hazards inherent in this course of action. Given the close day-to-day proximity and the close working relationship between the Board Staff and the Board members, there is a danger of a perception that the staff would have undue access to, and therefore would, even inadvertently, exert undue influence on, those members.The most appropriate mechanism would be to extend the funding currently available to public interest groups during the formal hearing to other phases of the regulatory process. This would allow those entities to adequately participate in all aspects of the processes and thus ensure their ability to act for those interests that would otherwise not be represented. Another advantage of this approach would be that the variety of public interest groups that would likely be involved would better reflect the diversity of opinion concerning the topics at issue than would a single group such as OEB Staff.

The discipline of the mechanism could be maintained by continuing to apply, with some minor modifications, the funding rules currently utilized by the OEB as set out in Part IX of their current Rules of Practice and Procedure. Under this mechanism the burden of proving that the costs were incurred necessarily and directly in order to participate in the proceeding lies with the party claiming the costs. The party seeking cost recovery would be obliged to file an affidavit setting out a detailed claim for those costs and the OEB panel would have to be assured that that party’s involvement was in the public interest and aided the process as a whole. In addition, the OEB requires that, where parties represent similar points of view, they attempt to work co-operatively in order to reduce costs. It would be open to the utility involved to challenge part or all of a claim with the OEB as arbitrator. Board Staff, which is generally present during the consultation meetings, could provide assistance to the OEB panel during such a challenge if that were to be required.The current cost recovery process results in payment being made after the OEB renders its decision in a proceeding. Given the length of some of the consultations, it might not be feasible for those requiring recovery to wait that long for their entire funding. One approach to address this concern would be to pay a per diem for attendance at the meetings on a regular basis while leaving the recovery of claims for costs such as preparatory activity until the conclusion of the hearing. The attendance at the meetings would likely be the least controversial aspect of any cost claim. The OEB would set the per diem amount each year and the utilities would put the amounts involved into an interest bearing deferral account for recovery at a later date. The opportunity for such recovery would be guaranteed as long as the rules set down by the OEB were adhered to. Some might challenge that appropriateness of using revenues from ratepayers to represent their interests without their expressed consent. However, the precedent of small residential customers providing, through the rates they pay, the funds necessary to protect their interests is well established and should not be altered by the change in the form of the regulatory process. As discussed above it is likely not practical or efficient for the public interest groups to raise funds directly for the purposes of participating in regulatory processes. Further, it is likely that the overall costs payable by these customers would still be significantly less than that under the current system.


Resume-Keith BryanPROFILE

·  Twenty-four years experience gas electricity industries assuming steadily increasing levels responsibility activities primarily related regulation rate design but involving wide range functional areas.

·  Directed applications interventions before Ontario Energy Board (OEB), National Energy Board (NEB) U. S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). ·  Appeared witness before regulatory tribunals on numerous occasions.

·  Played major role redesign gas utility rate schedules meet challenges resulting restructuring industry due deregulation.

·  Frequently served company representative on industry groups

WORK EXPERIENCEINDEPENDENT ELECTRICITY MARKET OPERATOR

The IMO operates bulk electricity system province Ontario. Once electricity market opens, IMO will run electricity spot market province will bill settle financial accounts with those wholesale market.

Manager Regulatory Proceedings Research 1999-2001

·  Provided management, strategic tactical support IMO’s annual financial regulatory filings with OEB.

·  Managed, coordinated chaired series meetings with stakeholders related potential benchmarking IMO costs services.

 ·  Managed IMO’s compliance with regulation related conditions set out its OEB licence.

·  Facilitated monitoring IMO’s participation regulatory proceedings matters Ontario other jurisdictions including FERC.

·  Provided research support concerning regulatory related matters

. ·  Acted primary representative directed involvement IMO Electronic Regulatory Filing project. an initiative Ontario Energy Board developing methodologies required allow regulatory proceedings conducted an electronic opposed paper environment.

·  Managed development regulatory databases both electronic hard copy format

UNION GAS

(Formerly known Centra Gas, ICG Utilities Northern Centra Gas)

Union Gas major Canadian natural gas utility providing storage, transmission services customers Canada U. S. distribution services customers over 400 communities Ontario.

Manager, Regulatory Planning Research 1995-1999

·  Directed activities Union Gas Centra Gas applications other utilities before OEB. Recommend strategy senior management approval direct legal counsel. Determined reported on implications developments such applications Union Centra.

·  Directed staff five persons charged with researching regulatory developments other jurisdictions order keep senior management other personnel apprised matters interest importance Union Gas Centra Gas. group’s activities included development publishing two periodic newsletters circulated within utility its affiliates.

·  Managed activities two regulatory libraries

·  Acted primary representative directed involvement Union Gas Centra Gas Electronic Regulatory Filing project.

·  Directed Regulatory Affairs Departments activities related Y2K problem.

·  Acted an advisor other personnel on cost allocation rate design matters. Manager, Regulatory Projects Research 1992-1995

·  Directed Centra’s interventions applications other natural gas electric utilities before OEB NEB.

·  Acted an advisor rate design cost allocation personnel including, where required, appearing witness regulatory proceedings. involved development presentation both written oral evidence production legal argument.

·  Served company representative on various industry committees including Direct Purchase Industry Committee, which consisted utilities their customers attempting shorten regulatory proceedings reaching consensus on contentious matters related direct purchase activities.

·  Identified, researched reported senior management on wide range topics including developments other jurisdictions involving regulation, direct purchase matters, rate design cost allocation methods.

Manager/Supervisor, Regulatory Projects 1988-1992

·  Administered regulated activities two subsidiary pipelines under jurisdiction NEB FERC.

·  Managed Centra’s interventions regulatory proceedings other utilities both federal provincial levels.

·  Directed administration company’s regulatory library.

·  Conducted research into wide range matters related regulation rate design.

Supervisor, Rates Cost Studies 1985-1987

·  Took lead role complete redesign Centra’s rates meet requirements newly deregulated environment. Developed provided extensive written evidence oral testimony support these changes. These were accepted virtually without modification regulator, which commended Centra on its efforts.

·  Administered company’s rates developing evidence support modifications necessary reflect changes costs. EDUCATIONM.B.A. (Natural Resource Management Personnel Management), University of TorontoHonours B.A. (Economics), Laurentian University Sudbury

 

Posted in Reforming Ontario's Local Electrical Distribution Sector | Leave a comment

Energy Probe urges ammendments to Ontario Energy Board

Tom Adams

February 28, 2002

Mr. Paul Pudge, Board Secretary
Ontario Energy Board
2300 Yonge St., Suite 2600
M4P 1E4

re. Draft Rules of Practice and Procedure

Dear Mr. Pudge:

Energy Probe has reviewed the Board’s draft Rules of Practice and Procedure issued on February 6. The purposes of our submissions are four fold: to urge a comprehensive reassessment of the future of the adjudication functions of the Board, second to request a public process for the review of the draft Rules, third to recommend specific amendments to the draft Rules, and fourth to provide input to the Board on the future of the cost process.

Future of Regulatory Adjudication and Due Process

In our view, these draft rules represent another step in a continuing trend that has steadily eroded due process and the independence of the Board’s adjudicative powers. Replacing these foundation stones are bureaucratic and political rule making activities. We believe that this trend jeopardizes the Board’s ability to act as an independent arbiter of disputes among consumers, shareholders, and the public interest at large on matters related to monopoly energy utilities.

Energy Probe’s concerns about regulatory adjudication and due process are long standing. We testified before the Ontario legislature hearing on Bill 35, commenting “Without due process, the regulatory process risks losing its independence, authority, and respect, and the marketplace itself risks losing legitimacy.”

On January 25, 1998, Energy Probe wrote to Minister Wilson regarding the OEB’s report called “Advisory Report to the Minister of Energy, Science and Technology on Legislative Change Requirements for Natural Gas Deregulation”. Energy Probe made the following comments:

The recommendation at page 44 of the Board’s report on legislative change suggests that the Ontario Energy Board should emerge from the adjudicative model of regulation and pursue rulemaking powers in response to emerging markets and the need for prospective, flexible, and participatory rules.

If the government is considering empowering the OEB with rulemaking powers, it is essential that these new powers are designed so as to compliment the continuing role that the adjudicative model must continue to play. The quasi-judicial role of the OEB has served gas customers well as a serious opportunity for informed decision making. Rulemaking has the potential for reducing the independence and impartiality of the Board and reducing the opportunity for public interest organizations to participate as intervenors in quasi-judicial proceedings, with opportunities for cross examination, evidence, and costs.

The major challenge for the government is to understand the competing roles of the rulemaking and adjudication in regulating modern markets. While rulemaking is often necessary as a result of a maturing market, there remains a central and continuing role for adjudication. The judicial or quasi-judicial process continues to function as the most effective means of “searching for the truth” in complex and factual adversarial matters.

In Ontario, parts of the electrical and gas markets are being opened to competition, while other parts of the business will remain within the monopoly business. In the past, the OEB has regulated the natural gas monopoly rates through a quasi-judicial adjudicative model. The model worked very well at keeping gas rates competitive. The deregulation of functions that are naturally competitive and no longer in need of regulation raises new problems

In contrast, Ontario Hydro is subject to quasi-judicial hearings regarding rate increases but not subject to binding decisions. Until now, OEB Hydro rate hearings have been elaborate notice and comment processes similar to the current process for approving federal legislation. The weakness of the current oversight of Hydro belies any move to replace the OEB’s current adjudicative model for regulating gas rates with a rulemaking notice and comment procedure. If the evidence underlying the Board’s decisions is not tested in an adjudicative process, with rights to cross examination, opportunity to lead evidence, and binding decisions, the OEB moves closer to the model that Ontario Hydro has operated under in the past and away from the model that has regulated natural gas. This would be an unfortunate circumstance.

The challenge for the government will be to protect the OEB’s traditional adjudicative function, while at the same time empowering it with rulemaking powers to regulate the emerging markets. An example is that rulemaking powers are needed to respond to the serious concerns over unregulated agents, brokers and marketers that are now beyond the scope of the OEB’s regulatory powers while continuing to adjudicate general rate applications.

The choice between adjudication or rulemaking, as an appropriate means of controlling and structuring discretion is an important one that requires a balanced view of the competing paradigms. There is no more public and accessible regulatory process in Ontario that carries as much authority as the OEB does in setting gas rates. The challenge now is for the OEB is to adopt rulemaking powers to include greater public consultation, prospective rulemaking, and regulation to meet the challenges of a maturing gas and newly opening electricity markets without weakening needed, continuing adjudicative regulation over monopoly services.

Formal Rules Review Process

Today, the Board could facilitate improved public participation in the regulatory process if it published and kept updated its plans for rulemaking. We do not consider a comment period to be an adequate form of review for proposed rules. Energy Probe believes that all rulemaking and all amendments of Rules of Practice and Procedure including the amendments we are now commenting on should be considered formal proceedings. Formal evidence should be adduced. A decision with reasons should be issued.

Specific Amendments

Rule 2.01 – Delete “expeditious” and “least expensive.” Barring deletion, place these descriptors in a subsidiary position to the term “just”.

Rules 4.04 and 4.05 – Delete these two rules and replace them with “The Board shall act only in accordance with the Rules.”

Rule 5.03 – Delete this rule.

Rule 11.01 (b) – Delete this rule and replace it with a rule that allows the Board to order supplemental filings to explain or add information as deemed necessary. Filings that are accurate, responsive, and inform the process should never be ordered revised, even if they are potentially embarrassing for some person.

Rule 23.03 (c) – Delete this rule. Provision of evidence to parties should be automatic.

Intervenor Costs

Energy Probe commissioned the attached study from Mr. Keith Bryan, a regulatory affairs expert well known to the Board and to the energy community generally in Ontario and beyond. We asked Mr. Bryan for his views on intervenor cost issues. His report was independently prepared. Given Mr. Bryan’s standing in the community and his reputation for balanced judgement, we believe that Mr. Bryan’s opinions deserve very careful consideration as the Board considers Practice Directions related to intervenor costs.

Sincerely,

Tom Adams
Executive Director

 

Posted in Reforming Ontario's Local Electrical Distribution Sector | Leave a comment

NRC upgrades security at U.S. nuclear

CNN
February 27, 2002

WASHINGTON (CNN) — The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued orders Tuesday to all 104 of the nation’s nuclear power plants, upgrading the high-level security measures already in place.

“Some of the requirements formalize a series of security measures that NRC licensees had taken in response to advisories issued by the NRC in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,” the commission said. “Additional security enhancements, which have emerged from the ongoing comprehensive security review, are also spelled out in the orders.”

The agency provided few specifics, but new security requirements generally include:

# Increased patrols.

# Augmented security forces and capabilities.

# Additional security posts.

# Installation of additional physical barriers.

# Vehicle checks at greater standoff distances.

# Enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities.

# More restrictive site access controls for all personnel.

The commission said the requirements will stay in effect until the threat level has diminished or until other security changes are needed following a comprehensive re-evaluation of safeguards and security programs.

Under the new orders, licensees are required to provide the NRC with a schedule for achieving full compliance within 20 days.

Licensees would also have the same time frame to notify the agency if they feel they are unable to comply with any of the requirements or if implementation of any requirement would adversely impact safe operation of the facility.

Posted in Nuclear Plant Security | Leave a comment

Environmentalists split on Point Lepreau refit

Mac Trueman
New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal
February 27, 2002

Environmentalists are divided on whether NB Power should rebuild its nuclear power station at Point Lepreau.

The project’s $845-million estimated cost could build an all-new natural gas-fired generator that could provide even more electricity than the refurbished nuclear power plant could, Tom Adams, executive director of the anti-nuclear group Energy Probe, said Monday.

But Gordon Dalzell, whose Saint John Citizens Coalition has campaigned for many years to make Saint John air more breathable, isn’t on Mr. Adams’s side. “Let’s face it,” Mr. Dalzell said Tuesday. “People like Tom Adams don’t live in Saint John.”

Mr. Dalzell emphasized that he is not a proponent of nuclear energy, and that if NB Power were building a power station from scratch, he’d probably advocate for natural gas. “But the fact is, there are no carbon emissions from Point Lepreau. In fact, if you look at all the emissions that have been (not produced) over the years with Point Lepreau, you can see from an air-quality perspective, this nuclear option does have quite a compelling rational around it.”

He also emphasized that Lepreau has other serious problems that must be solved, among them the long-term management and storage of its nuclear waste. He wants Canada to follow the U.S. example and establish no-fly zones and no-boat zones around Lepreau, as a precaution against terrorists. But, “let’s say it’s mothballed,” he proposed. “Where are we going to get this energy, this 30 per cent of energy in New Brunswick. Do we get it from Indiana coal-burning plants? Do we go on the grid with Kentucky and start buying our energy from dirty, coal-burning plants? No. I don’t think I’d like to see this option.”

David Coon, policy director for the New Brunswick Conservation Council, questions why NB Power has to restore its 630-megawatt nuclear generator, when its own evidence to the Public Utilities Board predicts that it would need only 300 megawatts to replace the station if it switches it off in 2006. The power corporation expects the figure to grow to 400 megawatts by 2012. A 400-megawatt plant that runs on natural gas could be built for half the price of refurbishing Lepreau, he said. He argued that NB Power should replace Point Lepreau with a 200-megawatt generator fired by natural gas and make up the difference by building 100 megawatts worth of windmills and by encouraging New Brunswickers to conserve a further 100 megawatts.

The world doesn’t have to completely eliminate its industrial emission of carbon dioxide, he said. It only has to reduce it to a rate the world can consume by natural processes. “It’s the overall scale of emissions, province-wide, that is the problem with carbon dioxide.”

Ken Little, NB Power’s vice-president of regulatory affairs, agreed Tuesday that building a 400-megawatt gas-fired plant would be cheaper than reconditioning Point Lepreau. But supplying a smaller plant with natural gas would cost a lot more than nuclear fuel for Lepreau does, he said. “The advantage of nuclear is that its fuelling cost is so cheap compared to other alternatives, including gas.”

Mr. Little said that when his company predicted to the Public Utilities Board that it would need 400 megawatts by 2012, it already took into consideration the province’s increasing energy conservation, homes switching from electric heat to gas and the future addition of windmills to the province’s electrical grid.

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment