The Pickering A restart

David McArthur and Stephen Salaff
Natural Gas Market Report
October 17, 2000

Ontario Power Generation Inc. is seeking to restart in 2001-2002 the four reactors at its 2,060 MW Pickering A nuclear generating station near the eastern boundary of the City of Toronto, without a full Environmental Assessment Panel Review of needs and alternatives.

The $1-billion restart and OPG’s planned long-term lease of the 3,000 MW Bruce A nuclear generating station to British Power may lock Ontario into years more of nuclear expansion, preempting the consideration of high-efficiency natural gas generation alternatives for Ontario.

“If Pickering A returns to service, we can expect a more hostile business environment in Ontario for self generation of electricity, and for new independent power generators,” said nuclear critic Norm Rubin of Energy Probe.

Pickering A is the oldest commercial nuclear generating station in Canada the first of the four reactors was opened in 1971. The Pickering A emergency shutdown system is inferior to those at the nuclear stations built in Canada since Pickering A, and the combined effect of plant aging and obsolescence are seen by Rubin and others as an important issue in the restart deliberations.

However, OPG’s environmental assessment for the CNSC affirmed that Pickering A “has been operating safely for 28 years. If Pickering A were not safe it would not be returned to service.”

“Returning Pickering A to service remains a sound investment that will enhance our competitiveness,” OPG president and CEO Ron Osborne said optimistically. “The performance of our nuclear stations will be a major factor in how successful we are in the new competitive electricity market.” Rubin retorted “that was exactly what OPG’s predecessor company Ontario Hydro said about the earlier retubing of the Pickering A reactors, and we have powerful evidence that they were wrong then.”

Owing to management and plant performance problems, OPG laid up Pickering A in December 1997. The lay-up coincided with an unmet safety deadline for major upgrades to the controversial emergency shutdown system.

OPG announced an $8-billion Nuclear Assets Optimization Plan in 1997 to address “the major deficiencies in our nuclear operations,” indicated Osborne, who said that OPG will concentrate its limited resources on rehabilitating the Pickering B, Bruce B and Darlington nuclear stations. Pickering A and Bruce A remain shut down, but the fuel remains in the reactor cores. Pickering A and Bruce A can only restart upon authorization of the Nuclear Safety Commission, formerly the Atomic Energy Control Board, Canada’s nuclear regulator.

OPG decided in mid-1999 to return Pickering A to service, and in November 1999, formally applied to restart Pickering A. Before a licensing decision on the application can be made, the CNSC must consider the results of an environmental assessment.

While the restart application proceeds, the CNSC will consider the relicensing of Pickering A and Bruce A in January 2001, even in their laid up state. OPG will then seek to amend the Pickering A licence to allow the restart, with a final decision expected at the CNSC in late spring.

OPG representative, John Earl, told Natural Gas Market Report that after restart, Pickering A will operate at a capacity factor of roughly 80% for 10-12 years, when it will be reevaluated for operation. Given CNSC license approval, the station could continue to operate even longer. Earl pointed out that an estimate of the cost of the Pickering A layup depends on nuclear non-performance cost computation, and OPG has not performed this calculation.

Earl was unable to comment on the relationship between the restart and the ongoing development of competition in the Ontario electricity sector. He did not perceive a significant link between the restart and the Bruce A lease initiative.

The CNSC launched a basic level (called a “screening”) environmental assessment of OPG’s restart project in July 1999. The CNSC chose at that time not to institute a panel review, in which the federal minister of the environment establishes the terms of reference and appoints impartial panel members to review the proposed project, undertake public hearings, and prepare a report with advice on whether the proposal should proceed and under what conditions.

Chris Taylor of the CNSC’s radiation and environmental protection division, explained at the first day of the CNSC’s Pickering A restart environmental assessment hearing in Ottawa on October 5 that the Commission rejected a panel process because “except for a few individuals the public attitude research undertaken as a part of the environmental assessment did not identify a high level of concern in the community about the project.”

The research for the environmental assessment is being conducted by OPG itself, which submitted to the CNSC in April its “Environmental Assessment Report, Pickering A Return to Service.” According to Rubin, this arrangement, while apparently legal in Canada, violates the need for an independent and open review of the facts. “If a judge asked one party at a trial to write his decision before the trial began, we would soon have one less judge. Yet the relationship between CNSC and OPG here is just that cosy and improper.”

The CNSC will continue its public hearing on the Pickering A restart in Pickering on December 14. The deadline for intervenor submissions for the hearing is November 14. Following the hearing, and an expected 10-day period of deliberation, the Commission will announce its decision.

Due to a strong apparent perception that the CNSC has disparaged or dismissed public safety concerns, the City of Toronto and the City of Pickering have unanimously passed resolutions asking federal minister of the environment David Anderson to order a panel review of the Pickering A restart under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.

The Toronto City Council on May 10 adopted a motion by Scarborough City Centre Councillor, Lorenzo Berardinetti, requesting Anderson to instruct the panel to deliberate on the risks associated with failure of the containment system during a severe accident, the need to restart Pickering A and alternative means of generating electricity, as well as an economic evaluation of the restart proposal and its alternatives.

Berardinetti told Natural Gas Market Report that “I am frightened by the potentially disastrous consequences for the Greater Toronto Area of a severe nuclear accident at Pickering. The distance of the Pickering nuclear plant from the nearest border of the City of Toronto, in Scarborough, is under 10 km. I prefer the use of natural gas instead of nuclear power to generate electricity.

“Pickering A was shut down in 1997 because of safety and management problems. Annex O of the March 1999 Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan describes the harm that could occur in the event of a nuclear reactor emergency resulting in a major contamination of the environment. A large area may become uninhabitable for an extended period of time.” Berardinetti added that “I am disappointed that Mr. Anderson has thus far not responded to Toronto’s request.”

The City of Pickering on June 26 also passed a resolution calling for a panel review of the Pickering A restart. This position was echoed by a Durham Region motion on September 6.

Many environmentalists, energy industry and independent power proponents and other concerned citizens deplore the lack of an independent review of the restart venture, and criticize its safety, economic and environmental implications.

“We oppose the restart of Pickering A on safety, need and economic grounds. The CNSC acts as a buffer between the nuclear industry and the public. The current limited screening level assessment excluded consideration of impacts of a severe nuclear accident with failure of the containment system on public and worker health, the environment and the economy,” said Irene Kock of Durham Nuclear Awareness.

“We also need an independent review of the need to restart Pickering A it’s the only way to justify the risk involved in running the oldest nuclear station in the country for another 10 to 15 years.”

There are more people living around Pickering than around any other nuclear site in the world, more than 1.5 million in a 30 km radius. According to Annex O of the Nuclear Emergency Plan, a severe accident with widespread radioactive contamination could force the long-term evacuation of scores of thousands of residents in downwind areas. In an attempt to manage these effects, the authorities must undertake major, long-term rehabilitation operations to resettle displaced persons, overcome enormous economic disruption and losses, and protect and restore the environment.

Testimony by Prof. Robert Goble of Clark University in Worchester, Massachusetts for Energy Probe and the City of Toronto in their unsuccessful 1993 legal challenge to the constitutionality of the federal Nuclear Liability Act, indicated that a severe nuclear accident with a relatively high expected frequency of 1 in 10,000 reactor-years of nuclear operation could deliver radiation doses of between 100,000 person-sieverts and 10 million person-sieverts to the population. These doses would result in 4,000 to 800,000 cancers.

Off-site early fatalities could reach the thousands or tens of thousands, depending primarily on meteorology and the number of reactors involved in the accident.

In the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986, the International Atomic Energy Agency established a ranking system for nuclear accidents, called the International Nuclear Event Scale, designed to help the authorities communicate official information about accidents and their consequences to the public. This system, which classifies nuclear accidents into seven levels, has been adopted in Canada and globally. The Chernobyl accident was rated level 7.

The CNSC has limited the Pickering A environmental assessment to the consideration of less serious nuclear accidents rated at level 4 and below on the INES scale, which do not involve loss of containment.

Rubin regretted that “regulators like CNSC, who support nuclear power, don’t like to face up to the consequences of catastrophic accidents, because their job is to permit the risk to happen.”

Posted in Nuclear Economics, Nuclear Plant Security, Nuclear Power, Towards Shutdown | Tagged | Leave a comment

Talking Alternative fuels

Kelly Crowe
Sunday Report, transcript
October 15, 2000

ALLISON SMITH (CBC): If an election is indeed called in Ottawa this week you can be sure the rising cost of fuel will become an issue during the campaign. Oil prices have skyrocketed recently, especially with the crisis in the Middle East. And you’ve seen the results, both at the pumps and in your pocket books. Gasoline, diesel fuel and home heating oil are all more expensive. And as Kelly Crowe reports, it’s forcing Canadians to take another look at alternative energy.

KELLY CROWE (Reporter): For Pat Duxbury this wild tangle of grass is the fuel of the future. It can be fermented into ethanol to replace gasoline. Or it can be processed into pellets and burned like wood. For his Montreal company “switchgrass”(?) is an environmentally friendly answer to the high cost of fossil fuel.

PAT DUXBURY (Resource Efficient Agricultural Products): We have the land, we have farmers that are capable of this, so all we need now is the political will and some investment.

CROWE: There’s just one problem. The world is not set up to run on grass. At least not yet.

TOM ADAMS (Energy Probe): It’s probably ten years before we see a real solid alternative to gasoline. And similarly with home heating.

CROWE: So whatever happened to alternative energy? The great hope after the first oil crisis that the world could end its dependence on fossil fuel? A quarter of a century later, with oil and gas prices back at record highs, people are still searching for a better way. There have been a few breakthroughs. This giant pile of garbage is powering 15,000 homes. As the garbage decays methane gas is captured by a nearby plant and converted into electricity. It’s a small scale success for Greg Vogt, but even he is not predicting a surge of energy options like this.

GREG VOGT (Eastern Power): Will there be a fundamental shift in the way that we create alternate energy so that we can do more of it? I’m not prepared to make that type of a prediction.

CROWE: That’s because most alternative energy is complicated and expensive and interest peaks only when the price of oil is high.

ADAMS: The only chance really that that pattern will be changed in any way is because of a greater awareness of… not just the financial cost of energy use, but also the environmental costs.

CROWE: There are promising signs, like the new hybrid car that runs on gas, and has a special engine to generate electricity. And the fuel cell technology is generating both excitement and investment. It could replace conventional vehicle engines one day, but it’s still several years away from any mass market production. Solar energy is useful in small, specific applications and there’s some hope blowing in the Alberta wind where an Alberta utility has just invested in wind power, a response to international pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

BOB PAGE (TransAlta Power):We believe that we will be expected to do these kind of things. So we can learn by doing, by getting in very early.

CROWE: In the end analysts say environmental pressure could provide a bigger push toward new forms of energy than the fluctuating price of oil and gas. Kelly Crowe, CBC News, Toronto.

Get the full story at the CBC website: cbc.ca/cgi-bin/templates/view.cgi?/news/2000/10/15/energy001015

 

Posted in Renewables | Leave a comment

Electricity utilities told to phase-in power hikes

The Metro
October 2, 2000

The Ontario Energy Board has ruled that electricity rate increases must be phased-in over a three-year period.

The regulatory agency said Friday electrical utilities would only be allowed higher increases in special circumstances.

Tom Adams, the executive director of Energy Probe, an environmental and consumer watchdog group, said the three-year plan will allow for “massive rate increases that are snuck into the rates so the consumer won’t see it,” reported The Canadian Press.

In June, Toronto Hydro was forbidden to implement a six percent interim rate increase. Hydro Mississauga had also planned an increase but decided to wait for the board’s ruling.

Utility companies have until the end of November to apply for rate increases.

New Democrat researcher Fred Gloger said the ruling means the consumer would still pay higher power bills only more slowly.

The deregulation of the electricity market, originally targeted for November, was postponed in June this year. The Ontario government is now said to be aiming for “sometime in 2001.”

 

Posted in Reforming Ontario's Local Electrical Distribution Sector | Leave a comment

Hydro hikes must be phased in, OEB rules

John Spears
Toronto Star
September 29, 2000

Looming electricity rate increases sought by local utilities must be phased in over a three-year period, the Ontario Energy Board has ruled.

That means the utilities will have less money to pay returns to their municipal owners – including the City of Toronto, which has budgeted to receive tens of millions of dollars in payments from Toronto Hydro this year.

“It’s going to cause our shareholder some pain,” Toronto Hydro spokesperson Stephen Andrews said in an interview. “We won’t be able to provide any returns to our shareholder in the transition period.”

“It’s another blow,” said Toronto Councillor Jack Layton (Don River), who is also vice-chair of Toronto Hydro.

“Somehow we’ll just have to muddle through till next year. But it really means we almost start from a negative standpoint before we even start next year.”

Andrews said the decision is welcome in that it clarifies the rules for utilities – an opinion echoed by Ron Starr, chairman of Mississauga Hydro. Mississauga Hydro had proposed a rate phase-in to the energy board.

“We don’t find this a bad decision. We think that we can work with it,” Starr said.

But one critic said phasing in higher rates amounts to a ploy to disguise the true impact of changes in the electricity system.

“The regulator has decided it’s okay to boil consumers slowly,” said Tom Adams of Energy Probe.

The phase-in means the full impact of higher rates won’t hit consumers until after the next provincial election, he said.

Electric utilities have been applying for sharp increases in electricity rates following radical changes in Ontario’s electricity sector ordered by the provincial government.

The province decided to break up Ontario Hydro, which used to hold a monopoly on generating electricity in the province. The Conservatives want to allow competitors to generate and sell electricity.

The province also gave municipal governments direct ownership of local utilities, such as Toronto Hydro, which own the wires serving businesses and homes.

Some cities, such as Toronto, have responded by converting their ownership into a mixture of debt and equity. That means the utilities have to pay interest and dividends to the municipalities.

Toronto planned to reap $88 million in payments from Toronto Hydro this year.

But the new payments require the utilities to raise rates – when the province had promised that the new competitive system would reduce them.

Toronto, for example, applied for a 6 per cent increase effective July 1.

That increase, plus a further 3 per cent increase Toronto Hydro had planned within the next year or two, will now have to be phased in more slowly.

Energy Minister Jim Wilson accused municipalities of making a cash grab, and ordered the energy board to give “primacy” to the interest of consumers in setting rates.

During hearings before the energy board, some municipal utilities warned they’ll have trouble attracting private investment if they’re not allowed to charge rates that produce an adequate return for investors.

But the board ruled “the concerns that are linked to market returns must be given secondary consideration to the primacy of the consumer protection objective.”

Some utilities said they’d defer rate increases if they were allowed to make up the lost money by boosting rates even higher at the end of the deferral period. But the board’s ruling prohibits that.

Wilson proposed legislation in June that would allow the province to bar utilities from taking “windfall profits.”

A spokesperson said the government will study the board’s ruling before deciding whether to proceed with the legislation.

 

Posted in Reforming Ontario's Local Electrical Distribution Sector | Leave a comment

The on/off switch

Ian McKinnon
Alberta Venture
September 25, 2000

White smokestack soaring into the air and steel pipelines gleaming in the sun, a fertilizer plant near the sleepy hamlet of Carseland is the unlikely battle site in a prolonged war whose eventual victor is still unclear. After years of debate and sometimes bitter division that pitted homeowners, industrial customers, power generators and provincial politicians against one another, Alberta is pushing to deregulate its power plants this January.

Alberta’s efforts are being watched closely by other provinces, particularly Ontario which is slowly moving to break up the stranglehold of Ontario Power Generation Inc. (a successor to Ontario Hydro) on generation. But even some supporters of introducing more competition into the power industry say unexpected bumps are making the transition anything but smooth. And it’s at Agrium Inc.’s ammonia and urea plant located about 50 kilometres southeast of Calgary that the future, for better or worse, is taking shape. Clagary-based Agrium is working with an arm of TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. to build an 80-megawatt power plant, a project worth $75 million. Agrium gets a long-term contract to secure its power supply and a new source of steam for its manufacturing processes. TransCanada gets the opportunity to sell excess electricity, since the plant’s maximum demand only reaches 15 megawatts, into the provincial grid. This gives it the chance to cash in on high prices during peak times that can spiral up to $1,000 per megawatt, instead of the average of $78 seen in the first seven months of the year, in just a few minutes if demand jumps or generating sources falter.

Chris Tworek, vice-president of supply management at Agrium Inc. expects to get lower rates than the provincial average because his firm will manage the supply of gas feeding the new power plant and save on distribution charges by having the cogeneration plant on site. In addition, a credit from the provincial government to encourage firms such as Agrium and PanCanadian Petroleum Ltd. will also cut costs.

“We believe we’ll be as competitive as a huge 200-megawatt or 300-megawatt peaking unit,” he says. “We know that we’ll do better than buying from the provincial pool through savings on transmission and managing the gas supply.”

Tworek says future developments, such as the price of gas and government policy, will affect the bottom line and he declined to predict how much money Agrium will save annually through the agreement.

The announcement by Agrium and TransCanada in June shows how, much like an avalanche, deregulation in Alberta has picked up speed. More evidence came in July when eight Canadian and America energy firms committed to bid on much of Alberta’s power generation capacity, estimated by the government to be worth about $3 billion. (See “Power Switch”.) The question is now whether the avalanche will run out harmlessly or whether it will crash with devastating impacts on Alberta’s economy and residents. The timing for the experiment, the first of its kind in Canada, could hardly come at a worse juncture. Rising natural gas prices, surging electricity demand and uncertainty about the provincial government’s plans are combining to boost sharply Alberta’s electricity prices and drastically reduce the amount of excess power supply. “We’re in a tight supply situation, which is not the best thing to be [in] when you go into deregulation,” Tworek notes. “Most markets (that have been deregulated) have always had excess supply and that’s why deregulation has worked well.”

Thousands of Calgarians were shocked in late 1998, for example, when the tight supply-demand balance swung against them and they were cut off from power with no notice for hours. While critics’ dire predictions that the event foreshadowed a winter of Albertans shivering in the cold and dark never materialized, it made many people more aware of the changes rushing towards them.

But the changes, while profound, have been a long time in the making. Utilities, which earn a fixed return on assets, have a natural incentive to expand their rate base as much as possible. Fights in front of provincial regulators in the 1980s over huge projects brought on by utilities, such as the Shearness and Genesee plants, caused many industrial customers to yearn for the sometimes harsh discipline of the market as protection against unneeded expansions.

Alberta took its first steps towards deregulation in the mid-1990s, but they bogged down as power generators, large industrial customers, residential consumers and bureaucrats fought over issues involving policy, timing and money. The quagmire firmed considerably once Steve West assumed control of the energy ministry. The hard-driving politician, now provincial treasurer, spearheaded the passage of Bill 27, the legislation that set the ambitious goal of deregulating power generation as the new millennium officially gets underway. The province established a non-profit power pool, which began operating in 1996, to handle all power bought or sold in the province. A transmission administrator ensures that access to the pool is fair, transparent and non-discriminatory. The power lines that transmit and distribute electrons across the province remain under regulation.

Unlike other areas, Alberta decided not to force the owners of Alberta’s power generation capacity, now controlled by TransAlta Corp., Atco Ltd. and Epcor Utilities Inc., Edmonton’s city-owned utility, to sell off their plants. Instead, the province used the Internet to auction off power capacity totalling approximately 6,400 megawatts. This step, called power purchase agreements (PPAs) in the specialized jargon that has accumulated over the years, was a virtual divestment process and designed to encourage more players in the market. The utilities retain ownership of the units but PPA buyers have the right to buy and sell the output from the plants.

Some controversy surrounded the auction since the government reserved the right to declare whether the auction was successful without defining the criteria for evaluating the sale. In addition, Alberta had a contingency plan if the auction failed which it refused to disclose.

“I’m not aware of any auction where the auctioneer actually publicized its contingency plan,” comments Brad Miller, vice-president of Charles River Associates, a Boston-based firm which advised Premier Ralph Klein’s government on the auction. “It’s not prudent to do so because it doesn’t promote the likelihood of the success of the auction.

“It’s understandable that bidders prefer to know as much as they can but everybody knew everything, there would be no reason to have an auction.”

The Consumers Coalition of Alberta has many doubts about the benefits of breaking up Alberta’s power generation sector. Jim Wachowich, a lawyer who represents the coalition composed of seniors and consumers, says deregulation is not a boon to consumer particular those on fixed incomes. The province’s electricity rates have risen sharply in the past five years, jumping to $42.74 per megawatt last year from $14.42 in 1996. A megawatt is roughly the amount of electricity needed to light 1,000 homes for one hour.

According to the Alberta Power Pool’s (APP) annual report for 1999, 10 independent power projects (IPP) came online last year, raising the total to 454 megawatts of IPP capacity added since the Electric Utilities Act took effect in 1996. However, most of these projects were developed by affiliates of the three utility companies rather than new players entering the market. Another 940 mega- watts of IPP are scheduled to come on-stream this year. Peak demand in Alberta is forecast to hit 7,647 megawatts this year, up 3% from the 1999 maximum, while supply at the end of last year reached close to 8,800 megawatts. The actual working surplus is around 550 megawatts, meaning supply is tight but still manageable, an APP spokeswoman says.

The changes are being driven more by ideology than sound economics or cries from consumers that they want to become free to choose an electricity supplier, Wachowich says. Consumers must decide by November if they want to go shopping for a new electricity company or their previous supplier will continue to fill that role.

He is not expecting the government will reconsider its plans and emulate Ontario, which pulled back from a November deadline to give it more time to prepare. “We’ve already scrambled the eggs so you can’t go unscrambling them. But we haven’t put the eggs in the frying pan to cook the omelette so we can add new ingredients.”

The experience in the telephone industry, where local rates climbed after the long-distance market was opened up to competition, shows businesses rather than ordinary consumers benefit from deregulation, the lawyer says. Complaints about air service also show that less scrutiny from regulators doesn’t always lead to nirvana for customers.

The thin cushion and the volatile nature of electricity prices, which can swing wildly in less than one hour, put homeowners and small businesses at risk in return for little reward, Wachowich says. “The only thing worse than the imperfectly regulated system we have is the imperfect market we have designed to replace it. That imperfect market is a very sharp and unwieldy knife.”

But if Wachowich is unhappy, so are big electricity users. The Industrial Power Consumers and Cogenerators Association of Alberta (IPCCAA), the voice of large industrial customers such as petrochemical plants, refineries and paper mills, says rapidly rising utility bills are turning into an “Alberta disadvantage”, wiping out the much ballyhooed strengths of low taxes and a pro-business attitude of government. It complains soaring electricity rates could jump between 35% and 60% for some members this year and rise another 20% in 2001.

“These types of increases are bad for some industrials and catastrophic for others and it could mean the shifting of production out of Alberta and the consequent loss of jobs,” the association says in a letter to the government. “This is a very serious situation for industrial customers in Alberta and the ‘Alberta Advantage’ is being eroded significantly and may disappear altogether.”

IPCCAA, whose members account for more than 50% of the province’s demand load, is less than thrilled by the way the process is being handled. For example, it says members had to make decisions on the power auction without a clear understanding of all outcomes.

“It’s been very challenging for us as an industrial customer to try to make decisions about what the future is going to be,” says Tworek of Agrium, a member of IPCCAA.

Certainly consumers large and small cannot take much comfort from the experience south of the border where more than 20 states, notably California, have pushed ahead with deregulation. Residents of that state saw monthly bills double in the summer after a heat wave sparked brown-outs and high prices. California imposed caps on peak prices to mitigate the hardship, but power producers down there say artificially low rates will not stimulate investment in new plants to increase supply.

Besides a probe by California officials into prices, federal regulators in the U.S. are investigating bulk electricity markets to see whether competition is flourishing or foundering. Staff from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are expected by November 1 to report on conditions and to see if the market is working efficiently. Commissioners could use the findings to alter existing transmission agreements or make new rules.

Alberta started on its electrical deregulation odyssey nearly a decade ago, making the industry’s journey only slightly shorter than the sojourn home by Homer’s hero. But Dick Frey, president of Atco’s division responsible for transmission, explains the sophisticated and interwoven nature of the business, where a tree falling in Oregon can black out power in Calgary, necessitates caution and much consultation.

“It’s easy for people to say we should have done it quicker,” he says. “There are a lot of details that have to be worked out and it is not something that you can do quickly. I know that someone on the outside, who’s not familiar with the details, might well wonder how it can be so complicated. The fact of the matter is that it is quite complicated.” He says other jurisdictions that have announced much more aggressive timetables, such as Ontario, have missed or consistently pushed back their schedules.

He adds Britain, praised for opening up its industry almost a decade ago, is still making changes.

Regardless of where deregulation is introduced, the same premise underlies the action–that more choice will eventually lead to better rates and improved services. The mantra is found on government websites, such as the one devoted to electricity by Alberta Resource Development, from ministry staff and by officials with companies interested in entering the multi-billion-dollar industry.

“It is pretty early to be making any decisions as to the success or failure of deregulation in terms of delivering lower power prices to consumers,” says Alex Pourbaix, head of TransCanada PipeLine’s power division. “I’m very confident that over the long term that competition is going to be beneficial for customers.”

Supporters of deregulation also say shifts in natural gas markets make it additionally important to send appropriate pricing signals to consumers and regulators. Gas has pricing, timing and environmental advantages that make it the fuel of choice for new power plants.

With the booming North American economy causing electricity demand to surge and conventional gas supplies starting to dwindle, this year’s near doubling of gas prices needed to be reflected in electricity prices or the supply crunch in Alberta could be exacerbated.

“We get out of cycle because we do not have good market signals,” says Nancy Laird, a senior vice-president at PanCanadian Petroleum. “Because we don’t have good market signals, we get chunks of capacity when it’s too early or too late and then we have the volatility of either the price downturn or upturn.

“Hopefully, although we’re going through a transition, better market signals will time investments better.”

The flurry of announcements by firms such as PanCanadian and TransCanada, which is spending nearly $500 million on three projects in Alberta, indicate the government is attracting new investment which could put downward pressure on prices, Pourbaix says. In addition to those developers, California-based Calpine Corp. is building a 250-megawatt plant near Calgary without any government incentives. However, Pourbaix adds price volatility will increase if electricity follows the same road as other industries that have deregulated.

Handling the volatility is something most Albertans are not equipped to deal with, says Wachowich, the lawyer for the alliance of consumers and seniors. While gas prices have bounced from between $1 and $6 per thousand feet in the last five years, electricity prices have wildly gyrated from $10 to $1,000 per megawatt over the same period.

“They’re being asked to become commodity purchasers in the most volatile commodity market that currently exists in Alberta. I don’t know of another commodity market where the price swings hundredfold,” he says.

Watching the happenings in Alberta with great interest is Tom Adams, executive director of Energy Probe in Toronto. He says the Klein government made some mistakes, such as not resolving soon enough some policy questions, but has generally done a good job as it works through the thorny problems that accompany deregulation. “They have kept their hands out and haven’t issued a lot of decrees and directives. They’ve let the situation stabilize according to market signals and ultimately this will result in a much more reliable, stable and sustainable system. Adams says the experience has been much different in Ontario, where government actions and regulatory decisions have politicized the process. The lobbying of big industrial customers, for example, resulted in a transmission tariff different from one recommended by an expert committee.

There has been a lot of noise in Alberta about high gas rates and rising utility charges. Adams hopes the government remains resolute and does not turn timid by going only part way toward free markets, leaving consumers with the worst of both worlds instead of cheaper and cleaner power.

“Ultimately, we have to get politicians out of the power business,” he says. “We need politicians to guide the reforms towards open markets but they have to be prepared to be hands-off so that the market can be allowed to operate and supply and demand can equilibrate.”

But with the both industrial and residential customers calling Alberta’s plan flawed, it’s unlikely the balance point will be found for a long time. As IPCCAA says in its letter to the government: “What we have is a result where all customers are unhappy and the utility shareholders (are) very happy. This is not what restructuring was supposed to be about.”

 

Posted in Alberta Power Industry | Leave a comment

Why are we still subsidizing the nuclear industry?

Norman Rubin

September 22, 2000

 

Dear Friend:

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said it clearly this summer: “The world is abandoning nuclear power.” The next day, he announced that Turkey would not be buying two Canadian Candu reactors – or any other kind – and would instead pursue energy conservation, natural gas, and renewables. Ecevit also turned down the sweetheart $1.5 billion loan that Ottawa had already offered him, out of Canadian taxpayers’ money.

Turkey has joined a growing majority of countries that “just say no” to nuclear power. Some – including Austria, Ireland, and the Philippines – have publicly, politically decided to rule out ever building a reactor. Others – including Italy, Germany, and Sweden – have decided democratically to phase out operating reactors. Others – Britain, the US, and even Canada – have introduced enough competition and market discipline into their electricity sector that construction of new nuclear generating stations is now inconceivable.

But even with the reactor phaseout underway in Canada, our federal government is still squandering millions of our dollars, and Canada’s good name, in a hopeless effort to bring back the nuclear “good old days” of the 1950s.

Ottawa continues to give Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) about $100 million of annual taxpayer subsidies. AECL claims the money is for research, but virtually all of AECL’s non-Candu research activities have been axed. Total taxpayer subsidies to AECL alone would be worth well over $100 billion by now, if they had been left in the productive part of the economy. Instead, they have created well over $20 billion in additional losses and cleanup costs.

In addition, Ottawa spends billions more to finance reactor export projects that international banks would not touch without taxpayer guarantees. The people who rule China have already started taking $1.5 billion of our money from Ottawa.

And Ottawa demeans us through diplomatic tricks. As soon as the world’s major countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, Ottawa tried to get nuclear reactor exports considered a “clean” technology, comparable to renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Although the European Union and others have strongly opposed this scheme, Ottawa is attempting to slip nuclear-power matters into the next conference of the UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development, to get nuclear power accepted through the back door.

The public in the West now realizes that nuclear power isn’t “clean” or “sustainable” because of its grave environmental, social, health, and financial failings. And yet, our government seems grimly determined to soldier on in keeping AECL alive with our money. Ottawa – especially the prime minister – uses every opportunity at international meetings, trade missions, and even social occasions to try to sell Candu reactors to unsophisticated countries who still haven’t figured out that nuclear power – on all counts – is a loser.

Until every last potential purchaser of a Candu reactor becomes fully informed, we are relentlessly opposing the nuclear industry’s distortions at public forums, in government hearings, and through the media. The article Canada’s nuclear nabobs try to turn green in the National Post, for example, exposes Ottawa’s plans to capitalize on international concerns over global warming. Through the Financial Times of London database, this article has now received widespread exposure among international government decision-makers and in the international financial community.

The battle against nuclear madness is not yet won and we cannot rest. The government must soon make hard choices about whether to continue to fund a doomed nuclear export program, which harms people here and in the purchasing country, or to put the money toward goals that the Canadian public truly shares. With your help, we’ll help the government make the right decision.

Sincerely yours,

Norman Rubin
Director, Nuclear Research <!—

Yes!  I think it’s time to stop bailing out the nuclear industry.Please consider making an on-line donation to Energy Probe.
Your donation makes it possible for us to bring you this information.

—>

P.S. We’ve just won another long battle that will make it harder for nuclear salesmen to claim their industry is “clean” and “sustainable”: Almost six years after Energy Probe forced a federal investigation, government scientists have concluded that the ongoing emissions from Canada’s uranium mines and mills and several Canadian radioactive waste facilities – including AECL’s own Chalk River Laboratories! – are environmentally toxic under the legal definition in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. These findings are already on their way to the many local groups in Third World countries that we work with, to help them keep their governments from acquiring Canadian nuclear reactors.

 

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Gas-fired electric plant coming

John Spears
Toronto Star
September 15, 2000

Ontario will have a new privately owned, gas- fired electricity generating plant up and running near Sarnia two years from now.

TransAlta Corp. announced yesterday it is going ahead with the $400 million project, which will serve three big local industries but will also feed into the provincial power grid.

The news was welcomed by those who are looking forward to a competitive electricity market in Ontario.

“The more plants we have like this, the better,” said David McFadden, who heads the Stakeholders’ Alliance for Electricity Competition and Customer Choice.

“I’m delighted to see it, and I wish we had more of these things,” agreed Tom Adams of Energy Probe.

Gas-fired plants don’t pour nearly the pollutants into the air that coal-fired plants do; nor do they have the technical and environmental problems besetting nuclear plants.

But Adams noted that originally several big Sarnia-area oil firms had been interested in the project, and was disappointed that they’d dropped out.

TransAlta chief executive Steve Snyder would say only that “plans were discussed with a number of people . . . . Each of them had to make their own economic decision.”

The TransAlta facility will incorporate an existing 210-megawatt generator; TransAlta will add a plant that churns out another 440 megawatts of power for a total of 650 megawatts.

Three Sarnia companies – Bayer, Dow Chemical Canada Inc. and Nova Chemicals (Canada) Ltd. – will buy 150 to 200 megawatts, with the rest going into the Ontario electricity grid.

The plant will be a co-generation facility, producing both electricity and steam. Some of the steam will be used directly by the three main customers, while some will be recycled to produce electricity.

Snyder said in a phone interview that he expects the new plant to be a relatively low-cost electricity producer, despite the rising cost of natural gas.

TransAlta’s experience running other co- generation plants in the province and the fact that it is recycling waste steam will help keep costs low, he said. He added that the firm seeks more Ontario opportunities.

The provincial government has been trying to encourage more firms to produce electricity now that Ontario Hydro has been broken up. Its generating successor, Ontario Power Generation, still produces more than 80 per cent of the province’s requirements.

The TransAlta plant’s 650 megawatts compares with Toronto Hydro’s daily demand of about 4,500 megawatts.

Sithe Inc., a unit of French utility Vivendi SA, is also building two Ontario 800-megawatt gas- fired plants, one in Brampton and one in Mississauga.

Ontario Power Generation said yesterday it will spend $250 million over the next three years to cut nitrogen oxide emissions from three coal- fired plants, including Lakeview Generating Station in Mississauga.

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Letter to President of Toronto Hydro requesting correction of the record

Tom Adams

September 13, 2000

Mr. John Brooks
President, Toronto Hydro

Dear Mr. Brooks,

In comments before the OEB at RP 2000-0069 on August 10, you made the following comment:

I think if you look at going back to the market design committee process and the Ministry of Energy’s own process in terms of how the components of the cost of electricity are going to be redistributed, it was always intended that distribution rates would go up and that generation rates and some of the other things would come down and, in the long run, it would all balance out. [Transcript v. 2, p. 422, ll., 18-25]

This comment was repeated in your counsel’s closing submissions [p. 19].

The history of Ontario’s electricity reform process is opposite to what you have suggested. The Minister’s speech in releasing the White Paper referred to one of the goals of the restructuring as leading to electricity rates at “the lowest possible cost”. The third sentence of the White Paper referred to the goal of “lower electricity prices”. The White Paper also noted, “The Government will work with Ontarians to ensure that the electricity industry is restructured in a timely and well-managed way, with the necessary protections for both business and residential customers.” In another expression of concern for the interests of ordinary consumers, the White Paper says, “Under the Government’s plan, when consensus on amalgamation among utilities cannot be reached, the Ontario Energy Board would be available, at the request of the utilities, to facilitate the process and ensure that the interests of the consumer are met.” (p.20)

The MDC’s mandate, including the objective of minimizing costs, arose from the White Paper. During my tenure on the MDC, I can assure you that at every turn, with every element of the electricity bill, the purpose of the exercise was to achieve the lowest sustainable cost of electricity. On the specifics of distribution rates, rather than endorsing higher rates as you claimed, the MDC did not express a view, leaving the matter to the OEB.

Your statement at RP 2000-0069 is factually wrong. I urge you to correct the record in a manner that reflects the prominence of your previous statement.

Sincerely,

Thomas Adams
Executive Director

c. Dean R. J. Daniels, U of T Faculty of Law
Dr. B. B. Purchase, Deputy Minister of Energy Science and Technology
Mr. F. Laughren, Chair, OEB
Mr. J. Rusk, Globe and Mail

 

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Sparks set to fly at hydro hearing

John Spears
Toronto Star
August 9, 2000

Utilities, activists square off over electricity costs.

Starting today, a procession of lawyers, lobbyists and electric utility managers will troop in and out of a Spartan hearing room in an office tower at Yonge St. and Eglinton Ave.

Their arguments – stretching through next week – will have a direct impact on what Ontario consumers and businesses pay for electricity.

Electricity rates have already provoked some lively spats between municipal politicians such as Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion and Energy Minister Jim Wilson.

But the process unwinding before a four-member panel of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) threatens to be mind-numbing, even to the few who understand it.

“Maybe we should just put Hazel McCallion and Jim Wilson in a boxing ring and let them slug it out,” suggests Michael Janigan of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre. “It would be a lot more entertaining than a week and a half at the OEB.”

The latest tortuous regulatory twist flows from the Ontario government’s decision to throw the electricity market open to competition.

The move – which was supposed to produce lower prices for consumers – instead resulted in many municipal utilities applying for higher rates.

After all, they were told by the province to put themselves on a commercial operational basis. That means they must earn a return for their shareholders, they argue – and they need higher rates to generate the return.

Wilson then issued an order to the board requiring it to give “primacy” to the objective of protecting consumer interests.

Now, the energy board is asking utilities and other interested parties how it should put the minister’s directive into action when considering rate applications.

Energy Board chair Floyd Laughren concedes that the hearing is “very unusual.”

He’s hoping the board can render a decision in a month, although “a month is probably ambitious.”

It’s not just electric utilities that will show up.

The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty, for example, has linked up with the Ontario Council of Senior Citizens Organizations to argue for the interests of “vulnerable consumers.” It says no rates should increase simply because of corporate restructuring imposed on utilities.

A coalition of Ontario’s biggest businesses – from miners to auto makers – argues that steep electricity rate increases will make them less competitive in world markets.

A unit of the $35 billion OMERS pension fund – with 300,000 members who work for municipal bodies – will also be on hand.

It’s unhappy because it has already invested in Mississauga Hydro, and would like a share of more municipal utilities – but expects to earn a fair return. Wilson’s directive might limit the fund’s ability to get a return on its members’ money.

Lawyers are unsheathing their sharpest instruments for splitting the finest legal hairs.

Toronto Hydro will base part of its argument on the difference between giving “primacy” to consumer interests rather than “paramountcy.’

——————————————————————————– Energy Probe complains about a `lack of due process’

——————————————————————————–

It argues that squeezing rates down could mean utilities have less to spend on environmental protection or on preventive maintenance, leading to dirtier or less reliable power. Some participants will argue the hearings are flawed.

Energy Probe complains of a “lack of due process.”

Participants in the hearings won’t be allowed to cross-examine submissions from other participants, the watchdog group says. Evidence may go untested and positions unchallenged. “In light of these procedural deficiencies, Energy Probe is puzzled as to what the board hopes to achieve,” its written brief complains.

If the confusion over immediate rate increases weren’t enough, the hearings are playing out against a background of even more murk.

Legislation has been presented, but not passed, that would “prohibit municipalities from taking windfall profits” from their local utilities, in Wilson’s words.

The proposed legislation isn’t formally part of the energy board hearings – but everyone knows it is there. In fact, one coalition of a dozen utilities argues thatthe bill and Wilson’s directive “appear to compromise the role of the energy board.”

Laughren shrugs off the criticism. The board is still free to make decisions on important matters, and will guard that independence, he said.

“If the directive was to tamper with a decision of the board, then you’d see smoke rising from this place.”

In addition, the opening of the competitive energy market, scheduled for November this year, has been put off until the spring of 2001.

“The whole electricity restructuring is in a profound crisis,” says Tom Adams of Energy Probe. “The path out of the maze is by no means clear.”

Janigan is also pessimistic. The looming rate hikes are the logical result of the way the system was designed in the first place, she says; asking the energy board to intervene now may be futile.

“It’s problematic at this stage to take the tail end of the process and attempt to shake it to get the appropriate result – which for our constituents is attempting to be shielded from large electricity increases.” u

 

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RP-2000-0069 – Energy Probe’s Written Submission

July 27, 2000

 

Introduction

Energy Probe intervened in the RP-1999-0034 proceeding particularly with respect to the issues now involved in this proceeding. In RP-1999-0034, Energy Probe believes that it took a unique perspective on the issues, being the only party to fundamentally oppose a return to the utility on capital invested by rate payers and the only public interest party to argue that there is no logical distinction between contributed capital and other sources of retained earnings for the purposes of return, in that it has all come from rate payers. Energy Probe’s unique perspective has limited our ability to participate in coalitions for the purposes of our submissions. As the proceeding advances, we will make every effort to coordinate with parties whose views are compatible with our own with a view to economizing the overall costs of the proceeding.

Energy Probe suggests that the process would benefit from a clarification of the Board’s role with regard to distribution rates. Has the government seized authority to determine distribution rates? Is the Board an adjudicator or a proponent or an advisor to the government? What is the role of Board Staff?

As we will discuss later, Energy Probe believes that fixing the problem of the impending local distribution rate shock should have the input of the provincial government. However, we are concerned that Bill 100 creates problems rather than solves problems. We have studies Bill 100 and found it to be so ambiguous that we cannot determine its implications for ratepayers. Under Bill 100, what happens after 2003? Does the legislation apply to privatized utilities? We would urge the government to explain its intentions on the record in this proceeding.

The scope and informal approach to this proceeding as defined by the Board is not sufficient to address the real problems. The disposition of approximately $7 billion in public money, the potential effects on municipal democracy should windfall electricity profits accrue to local governments, the integrity of the regulatory process, and investor confidence in Ontario’s electricity reforms are at stake. Any one of these issue alone should be of sufficient import to warrant mobilization of all the necessary resources for a full inquiry.

Energy Probe is concerned that a lack of due process will undermine the legitimacy of this process, as it did previously with RP-1999-0034. In this case, an issues list was decided with no issues day or, to our knowledge, no other means of consulting with the interested parties. As was the case with RP 1999-0034, there is no applicant. It appears that there will be no proper rules of evidence for submissions. There will not be any cross-examination or other testing of the positions of parties by other parties. In light of these procedural deficiencies, Energy Probe is puzzled as to what the Board hopes to achieve in this proceeding. Parties who duly expect a clear decision on which they can rely will instead get another result untested by the rigour of a formal hearing, with some likelihood of future government interference in any case.

Given the history on this issue and the fact that a multitude of financial decisions have been taken on the basis of the previous Board decision, it is our opinion that the least bad solution for the problems created by the RP 1999-0034 decision requires actions by the provincial government – specifically a windfall profits tax on municipalities, a matter we have advocated publicly(1). Under Energy Probe’s proposal, although the previously approved rate increase would be implemented, the windfall would be taxed back from the municipalities and the proceeds used to offset the Debt Retirement Charge. The net effect on ratepayers of the distribution rate increase would therefore be neutralized. Energy Probe recognizes that its plan would create significant problems for municipalities that have already set lower property tax rates in the anticipation of windfall revenues.

The reason Energy Probe believes that the least bad solution is to leave the rate increase in place is for the protection of investors. Energy Probe believes that in the long run, protection of the rights of investors to receive a reasonable rate of return on prudently invested capital in natural monopoly sectors is a necessary component of consumer protection. (Note that utility shareholders should not have the right to earn a return on capital invested by others, which is what the decision in RP 1999-0034 did.)

On June 22, 2000, the Ontario Energy Board issued a decision in response to application by Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited for an interim rate order, RP-2000-0021. Energy Probe’s interpretation of the decision is that the Board may consider it appropriate for Toronto Hydro to postpone a rate increase by borrowing additional money to pay for certain restructuring related debt costs incurred under the Board’s direction as expressed in the PBR Rate Handbook decision. This interpretation is based on two elements of the decision:

1. On the grounds that Toronto Hydro can meet certain debt payments from its credit facility with a Canadian chartered bank, the Board found that “no financial distress was demonstrated” and therefore turned down the requested rate increase.

2. The Board stated that “Toronto Hydro was not able to demonstrate its concern that the use of the Bank credit line towards the payment of servicing the debt until final rates are in place would jeopardize its credit ratings.” The decision stated that “there were no specific plans provided for the possible issuance of debt instruments to third parties, only a general concern that unless rates are increased Toronto Hydro would not be able to obtain third party financing to replace bank line borrowings.”

Other utilities, seeing the Board’s decision, may be guided to remove assets from the utility and leverage themselves to the limit in order to demonstrate “financial distress” and thereby gain approval for rate increases.

Energy Probe considers that it would be inappropriate for a utility to borrow money for the purpose of deferring interest costs without a considered plan in place on how those moneys might be repaid. In Energy Probe’s opinion, such a measure would increase ultimate costs for consumers, or risk the capital of creditors, or both. If Toronto Hydro must default on its loan covenants, we consider that the public interest is best served by a default that is smaller rather than larger.

Energy Probe urges Toronto Hydro and other utilities to eschew further borrowing related to debt repayment until the distribution rate rules are settled.

Response to the Issues List

1. The rate impacts resulting from the elements in the determination of a market-adjusted revenue requirement.

Energy Probe’s response: This issue appears to be ambiguous. We are uncertain as to whether we are being asked to comment on rate impacts or the MBRR. As noted above, Energy Probe believes that the purpose of the electricity restructuring is to minimize long term rates for consumers. Our proposed solution – allowing the distribution rate increase and then recovering the windfall to discharge the DRC – is discussed above.

2. The entitlement of utilities to recover deferred return and, if so, methods of recovery.

Energy Probe’s response: We anticipate that some interested parties may advise the Board to stretch out the implementation of the rate increases caused by the PBR Rate Handbook. We believe that if costs are just and reasonable, they should be paid now and not deferred. Energy Probe opposes any measure that would conceal future liabilities from customers. In general, costs should only be deferred if the corresponding benefits occur over a number of years, for example capital spending on assets with long useful lives. Ontario’s electricity restructuring should be guided by the long term interests of consumers, not short term expediency. We particularly oppose deliberate efforts to keep rate payers in the dark. Energy Probe therefore strenuously objects to the application of deferral accounts as outlined in 3.4.2 of the PBR Rate Handbook. Even if a phase-in was proposed without deferral accounts we would be opposed.

3. The entitlement of utilities to recover utility business re-engineering costs and, if so, methods of recovery.

Energy Probe’s response: Our understanding is that business re-engineering cost are costs incurred to delineate core regulated utility services from competitive services to be offered by new utility affiliates. These costs should be borne by the affiliates, which are presumably expecting to make a profit on their re-engineered services. In any event, we would expect that these costs are not material relative to the disposition of $7 billion in ratepayers’ capital.

4. Filing requirements that give indications of how rate impact mitigation might affect service reliability and quality, and what these filings might consist of.

Energy Probe’s response: We interpret this issue to address potential impacts on service quality if utilities encounter financial distress due to an inability to increase rates. We question whether it is possible to meaningfully attribute specific service quality problems to the current environment of regulatory and legal chaos however, we believe it would be in the public interest for the Board to acquire and summarize this information if it could be obtained inexpensively.

We are encouraged by the Board’s interest in transparency and disclosure. The current discussion about municipal rate increases is hampered by the fact that the Board’s filing requirements do not require the utilities to disclose their rate increases on an undiluted basis. As we noted in our final submissions on RP 1999-0034 October 25, 1999, there is no information before the Board that would allow MEU customers to understand the rate impact on them of the proponent’s proposal. Without publication of customer rate impact analysis, there cannot be adequate notice to the affected parties.

Another transparency objective should be to track the financial leakage from the electricity sector. Both the Board, in its Decision on Toronto Hydro interim rates, and the government, with the introduction of Bill100, have expressed their views on the importance of utilities’ capital structures in the determination of rates. Although we disagree with this premise, we do agree that it is important for utilities to disclose all transactions with their owners and affiliates, and the details of all changes to their capital structure. Accordingly, all utilities should be compelled to file details on all financial transactions between utilities and their owners and affiliates since 1998, as well as details on all changes to capital structure. This should include all transactions involving transfers of cash, land and other assets out of the utilities, so that these values are available in the event that policy decisions are taken to recapture them for the electricity sector.

5. The level of the 10% within class rate impact guideline related to rate restructuring included in the Rate Handbook.

Energy Probe’s response: Given the reference to the RP 1999-0034 decision, we have interpreted this issue to refer not to distribution rate impacts but to total electricity bill. (See RP 1999-0034 Decision with Reasons, para. 3.1.23) We take the view that it is inappropriate to analyze distribution rate impacts without reference to the undiluted impact. Specifically, it is necessary to remove the cost of power from the rate analysis to be able to consider the rate changes in isolation. The 10% bill impact guideline would permit larger Distribution rate increases for LDC’s with lower distribution margins, for example due to high contribution-in-aid charges. After the opening of the competitive market for the electricity commodity, power costs, and customer bills, will become more volatile. It is inappropriate, and inconsistent with good rate making principles, to allow higher distribution increases solely because power rates increase.

APPENDIX : Energy Probe’s history on RP-1999-0034

The following is a brief selection of summaries of, and references to, previous submissions of Energy Probe on the PBR Rate Handbook, provided here for the assistance of the Board and the parties :

Motions Day, August 24, 1999

Energy Probe argued for due process for consideration of PBR Rate Handbook. (TR 64-68)

 

Technical Conference

Energy Probe’s questions focussed on the OEB’s role in determining in the size of the municipal utility windfall. (V. 2 TR 340-347)

Our oral submissions addressed the rate shock problem head on:

With the old Ontario Hydro restructuring, there is a major effort by many people to move heaven and earth to make electricity rates go down, but on the municipal utilities’ side of the ledger, the OEB staff has come forward with a plan that makes the rates go up.

Does this picture seem backward to you? It does to us. (V. 3 TR 612)

Under the proposed scheme, the OEB’sdraft handbook, not the government’s Bill 35, is bestowing a windfall on municipalities by allowing the distribution utilities to double charge for their capital already paid by their consumers.

By allowing a massive leakage from the electricity ratepayers to municipalities, the OEBstaff proposal will raise electricity rates, which in our view contradicts the intention of the White Paper, and we are very concerned will potentially impair public support for electricity reform in Ontario.(TR 615)

Here is the punch line. In Energy Probe’s opinion, it is in the public interest for the stranded benefits within municipal utilities to continue to benefit electricity consumers. All future cost, including the full and fair cost of new capital should be recovered from users. (TR 617)

Submission of Energy Probe, Prefiled Notes for October 5, 1999 Oral Submission

Many representatives of the MEUs have argued in this proceeding that government’s policy is to commercialize the MEUs. Without detracting from this comment but rather to expand on it, Energy Probe suggests that the government’s policy is also to cut electricity rates for consumers. The Minister’s speech in releasing the White Paper referred to one of the goals of the restructuring as leading to electricity rates at “the lowest possible cost”. The third sentence of the White Paper referred to the goal of “lower electricity prices”. The White Paper also noted, “The Government will work with Ontarians to ensure that the electricity industry is restructured in a timely and well-managed way, with the necessary protections for both business and residential customers.” In another expression of concern for the interests of ordinary consumers, the White Paper says (p. 20), “Under the Government’s plan, when consensus on amalgamation among utilities cannot be reached, the Ontario Energy Board would be available, at the request of the utilities, to facilitate the process and ensure that the interests of the consumer are met.” (page 1)

Energy Probe has developed an alternative procedure for setting initial distribution revenue requirements which accomplishes the following objectives :

  • Distribution utilities will be on a level playing field.
  • Utilities and ratepayers will see normalized rates, including a MBRR.
  • To prevent double payment, ratepayers will get itemized reductions to the normalized rate which will decline over time, while allowing utilities a fair return on new investment.
  • Ratepayers will be spared shocking increases, but utility investors will earn the MBRR

ENERGY PROBE’S PROPOSED REVENUE REQUIREMENT FORMULA

1. Distribution revenue requirement (before MBRR) per Draft Handbook calc.
2. + Current book depreciation per financial statements.
3. – Additions to fixed assets per financial statements (average of most recent 3 yrs).
4. – Utility net income per financial statements.
5. +/(-) Net interest income (expense) per financial statements.
6. = Adjusted current revenue requirement (before MBRR).
7. + MBRR on rate base including contributed capital.
8. = Normalized Revenue Requirement including MBRR.
9. – Portion of net utility cash and marketable securities, if any.
10. – Depreciation of ratepayer-funded rate base.
11. – MBRR on remaining ratepayer-funded rate base
12. = Opening Revenue Requirement- Distribution


Notes

1. The impact of PILS should be disclosed on customer bills when it becomes payable.
2. Opening rate requirement excludes transition or Z-factor costs.
3. Line 8 figure should be used in applying price cap.
4. Line 9 should only be used if positive.
5. Lines 2 and 3 should include assets financed with contributed capital.
(Page 6)

ENERGY PROBE, Oral Presentation to the Board, October 5, 1999

The real concern that brings us here today is the rate implications, the rate shock, which we anticipate to be approximately a 35 per cent increase in the distribution rates which, as we will argue in our presentation, we think is at least partially and perhaps wholly unnecessary. (TR 295)

If the OEB staff plan is pursued, Energy Probe is concerned that ratepayers will blame their higher rates on unbundling and competition, when the real culprit is the substantial transfer of wealth to municipalities implicit in the Board staff plan. (TR 298)

However, with Ontario’s municipal utility distribution rates the proposed increases are, in our view, counter-intuitive. Distribution utilities are flush with close to a billion dollars in cash and marketable securities. Just think about that for a minute, a billion dollars in cash. Think of any place else in the economy where a billion dollars in cash might exist. That’s more than the liquidity requirements of the federal government I am sure.

The utilities have no debt. Their infrastructures appear to be in reasonable condition for the most part. The fact that they have this huge amount of cash on hand is clear evidence that the historic rate-making practice has been inherently inefficient. We believe that customers have been overcharged historically.

In our oral presentation at the technical conference we noted the inequity of ratepayers being charged again with interest for assets, the cost of which they have already paid. We also set out several possible remedies to this distortion, albeit some within the OEB’s purview and some outside of the OEB’s purview, including a special dividend to ratepayers or having municipal utilities absorb a portion of Ontario Hydro’s debt. (TR 298-299)

So our proposal eliminates the double payment issue and ratepayers get an itemized reduction to their normalized rate, which declines over time. It allows the utilities — and I think this is a key point — it allows the utilities to make a fair rate of return on all new investment when there is — as we normalize and rationalize the electricity sector. They have a normal business structure under normal regulation. We expect them to be partially debt financing, partially equity financing their long-term investments, and that debt and equity becomes the basis for a market-based rate of return.

Finally, the ratepayers, under our proposal, are spared rate shock because what we have done is we have eliminated the double payment and the double counting. (TR 304)

RP 1999-0034 Final Submissions on behalf of Energy Probe, October 25, 1999

Energy Probe opposes the severe but unquantified and apparently unnecessary customer rate impacts inherent in the MBRR element of the Staff’s PBR Handbook. We have attached as an appendix an example of how our proposed formula can cause rates to decrease…It may seem peculiar that Energy Probe is advocating an initial rate decrease in conjunction with the adoption of a market-based rate of return for local electricity utilities, when many other parties accept that at least some initial increase is necessary. The explanation of our position is actually quite simple. (P. 1)

There is no information before the Board that would allow MEU customers to understand the rate impact on them of the proponent’s proposal. Without publication of customer rate impact analysis, there cannot be adequate notice to the affected parties. (P. 3)

The proponent’s proposal, articulated in the PBR Handbook and the Supplement have not been properly considered and cannot be accepted by the Ontario Energy Board. The onus on the proponent was not discharged and no adequate notice to affected parties was provided. (P. 4)

The matter of appropriate LDC distribution tariffs deserves extensive further policy consideration and a full hearing with due process and much more complete information than has so far been made available. There is insufficient evidence on the record to do anything but freeze rates until the Board has before it an appropriate plan that minimizes rates. (P. 4)

IN THE ALTERNATIVE

If the Ontario Energy Board is not an independent adjudicator in the matter of the implementation of MBRR, the Board might issue a decision inviting the government to decide the matter. (P. 4)

If the government wishes to have a complete and legally binding decision by the OEB, the Minister could refer the matter back to the Board for full consideration. Alternatively, the government could decide the matter on whatever basis it finds suitable. (P. 4)

1. “Credibility meltdown”, National Post, June 14/2000, by Thomas Adams and Michael Hilson.

 

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