(May 22, 2010) Four years ago, when I first started profiling scientists who were global warming skeptics, I soon learned two things: Solar scientists were overwhelmingly skeptical that humans caused climate change and, overwhelmingly, they were reluctant to go public with their views. Continue reading
Solar scientists worldwide are working to disprove the hypothesis that man is primarily responsible for climate change, according to Dr. Jeff Kuhn, Associate Director of the Institute for Astronomy at the University of Hawaii. In the view of Dr. Kuhn and other top scientists, the Sun changes Earth’s climate. “As a scientist who knows the data, I simply can’t accept (the claim that man plays a dominant role in Earth’s climate),” he states.
Dr. Kuhn last week announced breakthrough research on the role of the Sun – after years of precise satellite measurements, undistorted by Earth’s stratosphere, he and his team discovered that the Sun did not change much in size, as has generally been believed. Rather, the Sun is surprisingly stable, its diameter changing by less than one part in a million during the last 12 years.
Dr. Kuhn’s team, which includes scientists from Stanford University in California and Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa in Brazil, used NASA’s SOHO satellite to obtain resolutions 10 times better than telescopes on Earth, allowing them to measure the Sun’s diameter of approximately 865,000 miles to an accuracy of a few hundred feet. In 2017, when the world’s most powerful telescope — his institute’s Advanced Technology Solar Telescope — starts operating on Hawaii’s Mt. Haleakala’s summit at a resolution 10 times better still, he expects to zero in on details that unravel the mystery of how minute changes on the Sun’s surface affect climate on Earth. NASA’s SOHO satellite revealed that 100 metre high bumps 90,000 kilometres apart cover the Sun’s surface. With his new telescope, Dr. Kuhn expects to capture never-before-seen details of the solar surface.
“We can’t predict the climate on Earth until we understand these changes on the sun,” concludes Kuhn.
Lawrence Solomon is executive director of Energy Probe and Urban Renaissance Institute and author of The Deniers: The world-renowned scientists who stood up against global warming hysteria, political persecution, and fraud.
He can be contacted at: LawrenceSolomon@nextcity.com
Lawrence Solomon, Financial Post, May 19, 2010
(May 18, 2010) After I read the original draft Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reporting regulations, I phoned US EPA contacts as well as some staff in Senate and House representatives offices and asked: Given that all major US stationary GHG sources and importers of carbon-based energy and building products are required to report GHGs from biomass use and will eventually be liable for domestic production and the US consumer end use GHGs:
Clearly, the existing US domestic GHG reporting rule obliges any US forest stand management operation and wood products plant that discharges 25,000 TCO2e/year or more to report their US production GHGs—not counting carbon stock losses. If the US GHG reporting regulations do not oblige biomass feedstock and finished product importers to account for foreign upstream supply chain GHGs, there is the potential that the US reporting regulation will favour imported biomass at the expense of biomass feedstocks and products that are sustainably produced in the US.
There was a rather amazing concensus among the divergent group I contacted with these questions. In all cases, they referred me to the existing US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) as the model that final US GHG regulations will replicate in the future.
The RFS is the regulation that implements the renewable fuel content mandate that is outlined in the 2005 US Energy Security Act and which was further amended in the 2008 Energy Security Act.
The legislation obliges US distributors of gasoline and diesel fuels to demonstrate that the products they sell in the US incorporate increasing percentages of “renewable” content. The legislation leaves it to the EPA to promulgate regulations to implement and enforce this renewable content requirement.
In regards to RFS regulation, the essential components for foreign biomass feedstock and bio-based energy products, in the current regulatory context and then expanded into the GHG regulatory context, are as follows:
So the critical question is: what conditions will Canadian biomass feedstock and finished product exporters need to meet to receive authority from the US EPA to create and ship RINs with their biomass commodity exports?
EPA officials as well as legislation drafters in Senate and House representative offices all respond that the same procedures that are outlined in the RFS regulation will be carried through into all US renewable electricity/portfolio standard and GHG regulation. In other words, the full trade implications of any final US GHG legislation will not be obvious until the EPA finalizes regulations pursuant to that legislation. But it is reasonable to anticipate that those final regulations will reflect existing practice as outlined in the existing RFS.
Read the primary conditions “foreign suppliers” have to meet to gain authorization to ship product with RINs starting on page 109. The regulation outlines separate requirements for “small refiners”, “cellulosic ethanol refiners” and “all other foreign RIN owners”.
In my view, the obligations this existing law imposes on Canadian biomass feedstock and bioenergy suppliers to the US should be deemed entirely unacceptable. They include obliging Canadian producers that are certified to issue RINs to sign a contract stipulating that:
The regulations expressly states:
“Withdrawal or suspension of foreign producer approval. EPA may withdraw or suspend a foreign producer’s approval where any of the following occur:…
(2) A foreign government fails to allow EPA inspections as provided in paragraph (f)(1) of this section.
(3) A foreign producer asserts a claim of, or a right to claim, sovereign immunity in an action to enforce the requirements in this subpart.
(4) A foreign producer fails to pay a civil or criminal penalty that is not satisfied using the foreign producer bond specified in paragraph (g) of this section.”
If/when this existing practise—to date not challenged by any Canadian legislator—is incorporated in US GHG and renewable electricity/portfolio standard regulations, the US EPA will have completely bypassed Canadian legislators and made any major Canadian exporter of carbon-based products directly accountable to the US Congress and subject to US law.
When we are working together to develop an inventory-based methodology for accounting for forest and forest product carbon, I will be trying to ensure that the final methodology will have sufficient environmental integrity to both (1) meet with US standards and (2) support a WTO challenge of the current and anticipated future US EPA dictates that Canadian plants become directly subject to US laws.
For purposes of determining whether a biomass-based product is renewable and its producer will be authorized to issue RINs, the original RFS defines renewable energy that is cellulosic in origin somewhat ambiguously: “derived from any lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis, including dedicated energy crops and trees, wood and wood residues, plants, grasses, agricultural residues, fibers, animal wastes and other waste materials, and municipal solid waste…”
This original definition has spawned confusion and numerous disputes in the US market. This led to significant amendments to the original RFS regulation—but no changes in the conditions that apply to foreign suppliers—and a new law was adopted on March 26, 2010.
I repeat: the above wording exists in existing law and determines how US distributors of gasoline and diesel will comply with existing US renewable fuel standards. The existing law does not, at this time, directly apply to renewable electricity and GHG standards. However, I have received many and frequent assurances from EPA officials and staff of elected Congress persons active on the climate change file that they see no need to develop an entirely separate procedure for demonstrating “renewable” for purposes of generating RINs to establish a zero-GHG charge for biomass used in all future regulated carbon-based products sold in the US.
The new version of the RFS states:
The EISA definition includes:
Clearly, the existing US domestic GHG reporting rule obliges any US forest stand management operation and wood products plant that discharges 25,000 TCO2e/year or more to report their US production GHGs—not counting carbon stock losses. If the US GHG reporting regulations do not oblige biomass feedstock and finished product importers to account for foreign upstream supply chain GHGs, there is the potential that the US reporting regulation will favour imported biomass at the expense of biomass feedstocks and products that are sustainably produced in the US.
There was a rather amazing concensus among the divergent group I contacted with these questions. In all cases, they referred me to the existing US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) as the model that final US GHG regulations will replicate in the future.
The RFS is the regulation that implements the renewable fuel content mandate that is outlined in the 2005 US Energy Security Act and which was further amended in the 2008 Energy Security Act.
The legislation obliges US distributors of gasoline and diesel fuels to demonstrate that the products they sell in the US incorporate increasing percentages of “renewable” content. The legislation leaves it to the EPA to promulgate regulations to implement and enforce this renewable content requirement.
In regards to RFS regulation, the essential components for foreign biomass feedstock and bio-based energy products, in the current regulatory context and then expanded into the GHG regulatory context, are as follows:
So the critical question is: what conditions will Canadian biomass feedstock and finished product exporters need to meet to receive authority from the US EPA to create and ship RINs with their biomass commodity exports?
EPA officials as well as legislation drafters in Senate and House representative offices all respond that the same procedures that are outlined in the RFS regulation will be carried through into all US renewable electricity/portfolio standard and GHG regulation. In other words, the full trade implications of any final US GHG legislation will not be obvious until the EPA finalizes regulations pursuant to that legislation. But it is reasonable to anticipate that those final regulations will reflect existing practice as outlined in the existing RFS.
Read the primary conditions “foreign suppliers” have to meet to gain authorization to ship product with RINs starting on page 109. The regulation outlines separate requirements for “small refiners”, “cellulosic ethanol refiners” and “all other foreign RIN owners”.
In my view, the obligations this existing law imposes on Canadian biomass feedstock and bioenergy suppliers to the US should be deemed entirely unacceptable. They include obliging Canadian producers that are certified to issue RINs to sign a contract stipulating that:
The regulations expressly states:
“Withdrawal or suspension of foreign producer approval. EPA may withdraw or suspend a foreign producer’s approval where any of the following occur:…
(2) A foreign government fails to allow EPA inspections as provided in paragraph (f)(1) of this section.
(3) A foreign producer asserts a claim of, or a right to claim, sovereign immunity in an action to enforce the requirements in this subpart.
(4) A foreign producer fails to pay a civil or criminal penalty that is not satisfied using the foreign producer bond specified in paragraph (g) of this section.”
If/when this existing practise—to date not challenged by any Canadian legislator—is incorporated in US GHG and renewable electricity/portfolio standard regulations, the US EPA will have completely bypassed Canadian legislators and made any major Canadian exporter of carbon-based products directly accountable to the US Congress and subject to US law.
When we are working together to develop an inventory-based methodology for accounting for forest and forest product carbon, I will be trying to ensure that the final methodology will have sufficient environmental integrity to both (1) meet with US standards and (2) support a WTO challenge of the current and anticipated future US EPA dictates that Canadian plants become directly subject to US laws.
For purposes of determining whether a biomass-based product is renewable and its producer will be authorized to issue RINs, the original RFS defines renewable energy that is cellulosic in origin somewhat ambiguously: “derived from any lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis, including dedicated energy crops and trees, wood and wood residues, plants, grasses, agricultural residues, fibers, animal wastes and other waste materials, and municipal solid waste…”
This original definition has spawned confusion and numerous disputes in the US market. This led to significant amendments to the original RFS regulation—but no changes in the conditions that apply to foreign suppliers—and a new law was adopted on March 26, 2010.
I repeat: the above wording exists in existing law and determines how US distributors of gasoline and diesel will comply with existing US renewable fuel standards. The existing law does not, at this time, directly apply to renewable electricity and GHG standards. However, I have received many and frequent assurances from EPA officials and staff of elected Congress persons active on the climate change file that they see no need to develop an entirely separate procedure for demonstrating “renewable” for purposes of generating RINs to establish a zero-GHG charge for biomass used in all future regulated carbon-based products sold in the US.
The new version of the RFS states:
The EISA definition includes:
Both versions of the US RFS and more background can be downloaded here.
Aldyen Donnelly, May 18, 2010
Lawrence Solomon
May 14, 2010
Minerals Management Service: People Promoting Energy, the Environment, and the Economy
Minerals Management Service Disburses $10.68 Billion in FY 2009
Minerals Management Service: Royalty Relief
Minerals Management Service: Frequently Asked Questions
The Minerals Revenue Management (MRM) Program
Minerals Management Service: Milestones
Minerals Revenue Management: Guide to Royalty Information
Randall Luthi, Director of the Minerals Management Service, remarks at the International Oil and Ice Conference
Johnnie Burton, head of the US Minerals Management Service (MMS), speech at the Special Institute on Royalty Valuation and Management
Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continetal Shelf
(May 17, 2010) A study on the possible health risks related to radiofrequency electromagnetic fields from cell phone technology. Continue reading
(May 17, 2010) The Interphone Study Group today published their results in the International Journal of Epidemiology (direct media link). The paper presents the results of analyses of brain tumour (glioma and meningioma) risk in relation to mobile phone use in all Interphone study centres combined. Continue reading
Elisabeth Cardis;
Oxford University Press
May 17, 2010
Background: The rapid increase in mobile telephone use has generated concern about possible health risks related to radiofrequency electromagnetic fields from this technology.
Methods: An interview-based case–control study with 2708 glioma and 2409 meningioma cases and matched controls was conducted in 13 countries using a common protocol.
Results: A reduced odds ratio (OR) related to ever having been a regular mobile phone user was seen for glioma [OR 0.81; 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.70–0.94] and meningioma (OR 0.79; 95% CI 0.68–0.91), possibly reflecting participation bias or other methodological limitations. No elevated OR was observed ≥10 years after first phone use (glioma: OR 0.98; 95% CI 0.76–1.26; meningioma: OR 0.83; 95% CI 0.61–1.14). ORs were <1.0 for all deciles of lifetime number of phone calls and nine deciles of cumulative call time. In the 10th decile of recalled cumulative call time, ≥1640 h, the OR was 1.40 (95% CI 1.03–1.89) for glioma, and 1.15 (95% CI 0.81–1.62) for meningioma; but there are implausible values of reported use in this group. ORs for glioma tended to be greater in the temporal lobe than in other lobes of the brain, but the CIs around the lobe-specific estimates were wide. ORs for glioma tended to be greater in subjects who reported usual phone use on the same side of the head as their tumour than on the opposite side.
Conclusions: Overall, no increase in risk of glioma or meningioma was observed with use of mobile phones. There were suggestions of an increased risk of glioma at the highest exposure levels, but biases and error prevent a causal interpretation. The possible effects of long-term heavy use of mobile phones require further investigation.
International Agency for Research on Cancer
World Health Organization
May 17, 2010
The Interphone Study Group today published their results in the International Journal of Epidemiology (direct media link). The paper presents the results of analyses of brain tumour (glioma and meningioma) risk in relation to mobile phone use in all Interphone study centres combined. This interview-based case-control study, which included 2708 glioma and 2409 meningioma cases and matched controls was conducted in 13 countries using a common protocol. Analyses of brain tumours in relation to mobile phone use have been reported from a number of cohort and casecontrol studies, including several of the national components of Interphone. No studies, however,have included as many exposed cases, particularly long-term and heavy users of mobile phones, as this study.
Lawrence Solomon
Financial Post
May 14, 2010
Is it any wonder that the BP calamity occurred? Here’s what has been preoccupying its environmental regulator, the Minerals Management Service, ever since MMS was established in 1982.
“Record for number of lease sales in a year,” MMS crowed, referring to its success in 1983. “Greatest high bid dollar amount received in a lease sale,” it added, displaying its haul to the very last digit: “US$3,469,214,969 in the Central Gulf of Mexico.” In 1984, more records: “Most tracts offered at a lease sale (8,868 tracts in Eastern Gulf of Mexico)”; “Record number of exploratory wells drilled in a year (597)”; and “Record number of platform installations in a year (229).”
Year after year, this agency went from one business milestone to another, seeing the accomplishments of its leaseholders — companies like BP, Exxon Mobil, and Texaco — as its own. In 1996, it cheered the “Well drilled in deepest water (world record well at 2,324 meters, or 7,625 feet)” and the “Deepest well drilled from a semi-submersible at 7,712 meters (25,450 feet).” In 2000, it achieved the “World’s tallest freestanding structure Installed in 535 m (1,754 ft) of water” and the “World’s deepest water drilling and production platform.” In 2001, it boasted the “largest find to date world deepwater drilling record set at 9,687 feet.” In 2002, it “Established world water depth record for well production and laying a pipeline at 7,209 feet” and announced that “The tallest self standing conductor.”
This all translates into cash. Last year royalties approached US$13-billion, making this agency an important source of revenue for the government, its take second only to that of the Internal Revenue Service.
The federal government, in turn, depends on MMS to meet numerous needs, everything from funding national parks to dams, canals, and other land and water-related projects. After the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the government asked MMS to crank up its lease-sales effort to come up with the cash needed to help restore New Orleans. To squeeze more money still out of the Gulf by maximizing the amount of drilling underway, the MMS offers leases on the cheap in marginal drilling areas.
MMS is in the business of making money for government — it is, in effect, the continent’s largest exploiter of natural resources, as was intended when the U.S. government created it as a cash cow. By MMS’s 25th anniversary in 2007, its director summarized with pride his agency’s accomplishments: “Since our formation in 1982, MMS has overseen the production of 11 billion barrels of oil and 116 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,” he stated, and “collected and remitted to the U.S. Treasury, the Indian Tribes and the States their shares of nearly US$165-billion dollars.”
This gung-ho money-making agency of 1,700 employees is overwhelmingly focused on its bottom line — setting the royalty rates it charges the oil and gas drillers, ensuring it collects the royalties that are its due, creating financial instruments to squeeze more value out of its royalties, delivering the money to its government masters. MMS also has a sideline — it regulates its leaseholders to ensure safety. To acquit its responsibilities in this sideline — overseeing the safe operations of 2600 companies operating 4,000 drilling platforms and 30,000 wells in 43 million leased acres over an expanse of 1.76 billion acres of the Outer Continental Shelf alone — it hires some 60 inspectors. Put another way, it might almost not bother.
Because of the conflict of interest — numerous reports indicate MMS downplays safety concerns to maximize its take — the federal government is now proposing to beef up the number of inspectors and place them in an independent safety-inspection division within MMS. This would do nothing to change the fact that MMS would still be regulating itself, or that safety would still be subject to political trade-offs. Governments are not disinterested parties looking out for the public good — first and foremost, they look out for themselves. In the case of the BP spill disaster, for example, the federal government suffers few financial concerns — thanks to its Oil Pollution Act 1990, it inoculated itself from the pain that citizens and private businesses in the Gulf will endure.
The Oil Pollution Act 1990 determines liability for accidents such as the one now underway in the Gulf of Mexico. In passing it, the federal government took pains to accomplish two ends. First, to save itself from the billions in cleanup costs that an oil spill could cause, the federal government held oil companies and drillers fully liable here.
And second, to make sure that the oil industry wouldn’t be scared off by the much greater potential damage to citizens and private businesses from a massive oil spill — the costs to the fisheries, tourist industry, and private landowners — the federal government eradicated the private sector’s property rights by denying it fair compensation for its economic losses: The Oil Pollution Act 1990 limited the liability of the oil and gas industry to these private parties to US$75-million in the event of a spill, or a few cents on the dollar in the event of a worst-case accident.
Governments make for good regulators, but not when they regulate themselves. To provide the independent, arms-length regulation that the public deserves, there is but one option: Governments must get out of the private sector by privatizing their commercial holdings. A privatization of the Outer Continental Shelf would be a good place to start.
Lawrence Solomon is executive director of Energy Probe and Urban Renaissance Institute and author of The Deniers: The world-renowned scientists who stood up against global warming hysteria, political persecution, and fraud.
(May 14, 2010) Is it any wonder that the BP calamity occurred? Here’s what has been preoccupying its environmental regulator, the Minerals Management Service, ever since MMS was established in 1982. Continue reading
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