Electricity Metering Options for Ordinary Consumers in Competitive Electricity Markets

Posted on April 12, 2002 by energyprbe

Tom Adams and Allen Stanbury
Prepared with the Financial Assistance of Industry Canada
April 12, 2002

Executive Summary

In Canada, the United States and many other jurisdictions around the world electricity markets are changing. Liberalization, including commodity price deregulation and customer choice, already exists in one Canadian jurisdiction, is imminent in another and under active consideration in several more.

As Canadian jurisdictions move toward customer choice, de-regulating the price of commodity electricity, and unbundling of their electricity supply, ordinary consumers must chose between being billed on new electronic interval meters or their existing electromechanical meters.

The meter is the cash register of the power system. The type of meter chosen will affect the electricity bill paid by the consumer. Using older electromechanical meters means the actual consumption in each hour must be inferred from an reference profile assumed to be correct for all customers without interval meters. In Ontario, the reference profile is called the net system load shape (NSLS).

With interval metering, the customer is billed on actual consumption in each hour. The consumer’s bill will accurately reflect the actual consumption pattern even if consumption varies from the NSLS, perhaps because the consumer works a night shift that results in unusual usage patterns, takes a vacation that happens to coincide with an electricity price spike, or has installed special load control equipment.

This paper reviews the potential benefits of interval meters as they might be used by ordinary consumers in the future. This report identifies qualitatively the benefits and costs of interval metering.

The natural market for interval meters appears to be larger customers, customers with a naturally favourable load shapes, and customers with manageable loads. As customers who can benefit from interval meters leave the pool that forms the NSLS, the pool will become more unfavourable over time, driving the exit of more customers.

Federal and provincial regulatory rules will have a significant influence over the rate of introduction of interval meters.

Interval meters will not be cost-effective for all customers. For example, a small customer with a standard contract with an energy retailer would get no value from metering improvements.

Introduction

This qualitative discussion of metering issues focuses on the changes underway in Ontario’s electricity market. This study does not deal with sub-metering of bulk metered, multi-occupant buildings.

Electricity cannot be stored efficiently or economically. To maintain reliable service, power production must be continuously adjusted to exactly match consumption. Historically, most modern electricity systems imposed few administrative controls on consumption. The common exception was that in many utility jurisdictions a few large industrial customers, willing and able to reduce and/or eliminate their consumption when required by the system dispatcher, were induced to make this flexibility available to the system through offers of price discounts. Reliability of service was maintained predominantly by actions on the supply side of the equation. Centralized planning aimed to construct and operate facilities sufficient to meet peak demand. These measures were generally undertaken by vertically integrated monopolies encompassing generation, transmission and distribution functions. North America’s experience has been that this system provided reasonably reliable service. By relying primarily on the supply side of the equation, the cost to society for reliability was higher than it might have been with a more balanced reliance on greater demand-side flexibility. Building sufficient generation capacity to meet seasonal peak electricity demands has meant that much of the available generating capacity sits idle during off-peak times.

More and more jurisdictions are moving to liberalized markets for commodity electricity, where efficient prices reflecting the degree of scarcity of electricity provides signals for more rational demand responses, power system operation decisions, and, hopefully, more rational investments in generation and transmission capacity. These jurisdictions should eventually have the lowest societal costs for electricity. Two of the many challenges facing those seeking to liberalizing once monopolized electricity markets are price volatility and the tendency for small customers to see higher commodity prices even if aggregate prices are not changed or decline as a result of competition. Monopolized electricity markets can conceal great changes in the fundamental scarcity of electricity, with the impacts of changes in scarcity being apparent to the consumer only in exceptional cases. The proper functioning of liberalized markets requires accurate, scarcity-reflective prices. While the tendency of market forces is to level out volatility over time, at the outset competitive electricity markets are prone to “ill-behaved” volatile prices. California and Alberta in the winter of 2000/2001 were both examples. A fundamental cause of the price volatility in both instances was the lack of demand elasticity. Customers with more accurate price signals in both markets demonstrated significant price elasticity, a factor that mitigated the scarcity.

In Ontario, the evidence suggests that the benefits of competition, relative to energy costs in a non-competitive environment, may not be distributed evenly. Load data from the local electricity distribution utility in Milton, Ontario shows customers using over 100 KW of demand, as a group demonstrate an electricity usage pattern, prior to the introduction of market pricing, that is much less weather sensitive than customers under 100 KW. If we assume that future market price changes are correlated positively with demand and that the total societal cost of commodity electricity remains unchanged at the beginning of market pricing, it is likely that residential and smaller commercial/industrial customers will pay more for electricity after the introduction of competition unless the usage pattern for small customers improves.

Market Power Mitigation Agreement (MPMA) rebates will be allocated to customers on the basis of their volume of consumption, not their exposure to peak prices.1 In the event of significant and sustained price volatility where the average annual price is high, some extraordinarily flexible customers are likely to receive significant rebate amounts although their average cost of power may be low.

Incremental power consumed during periods of peak demand is likely to come from fossil units with poorer fuel efficiencies and worse emissions profile than plants used for intermediate and baseload operations. In Ontario, the coal-fired Lakeview station is one of the commonly used peaking stations but it has one of the worst emission profiles and local air impingements of any fossil-fired station in Ontario.

What is an Interval Meter?

An interval meter is an electronic device that records electricity consumption in each hour, or more frequently, such as in 5 or 15 minute intervals. Each reading is date and time stamped and can be collected through a variety of technologies. Itron’s MV 90 software suite is the leader in providing dial-up access to interval meters and is used in almost all wholesale electricity markets.

Other technologies such as power line carrier, wireless and satellite data collection are usually grouped together under the term automated meter reading (AMR). Many AMR technologies exist and their deployment in the industry is growing, but to date no single AMR technology that will address all of the data collection needs of distributors has become standard. Most distributors using AMR rely on a more than one AMR technology for data collection.

Interval meters are always electronic. In addition to facilitating daily and monthly data

1 The rules surrounding the Ontario electricity market require that Ontario Power Generation refund to consumers a portion of its revenues in the event that the weighted average spot market price exceeds 3.8 cents/kWh.

collection, they offer important features for consumers. In Italy, where demand per household is capped, electronic interval meters are used to manage the demand in a residence within the cap by load shifting from one appliance to another. The clothes drier may by held back while the refrigerator is allowed to run. This is accomplished by a self forming local area network. Each appliance is retrofitted with a device that communicates over the 240V mains to the meter. The meter knows the capped maximum demand and is programmed to shift load from one appliance to the other so that inconvenience is minimized.

Electronic meters capable of 2-way communications may eventually also supply market price information to the consumer. In the future, either the meter or other energy management technology might be able to read the spot price over an Internet connection and might be able to manage residential usage during high price periods, giving the market enhanced elasticity to help stabilize energy prices.

Some high-end meters already have Internet protocol addresses and can be read with a browser. Many electronic meters provide additional information of value to the customer such as the frequency and duration of interruptions and voltage surges/sags/swells.

What is an Electromechanical Meter?

Most residences in Ontario are metered with an electromechanical meter. The Ferraris disk meter was invented in 1890 and is both stable and reliable but it must be read manually and provides no information other than the total energy consumed between readings, typically at approximately 30-60 day intervals. This is adequate in a market where prices changes only once a year but in most de-regulated jurisdictions, Ontario in particular, the price at the delivery level will change hourly depending only on supply and demand in that hour.2

How then would a customer with an electromechanical meter be billed in such a market? The energy distributor reads the meter and allocates the total energy consumed to each hour based on an arbitrary consumption pattern. In Ontario, the NSLS is calculated each day by the distribution company and applied by the distributor for billing purposes at the end of the month.

The NSLS is computed in each hour based on the difference between the sum of the wholesale meters (which are interval meters) on the distribution company boundary and the sum of all interval meters installed within the distribution company. This includes a mix of industrial, commercial and residential customers so the NSLS may not match the actual consumption profile of any single consumer it purports to describe.

2 Prices in the IMO market can change every 5 minutes but are aggregated into hourly prices in bills to consumers issued by distribution utilities.

Some consumers will have valid concerns about the accuracy of their bills under the NSLS approach. Some consumers may have actually purchased most of their power in low price hours but may be required to pay for some of this usage as if it was purchased in high priced hours.

Electricity Pricing in Ontario’s Future Electricity Market

Once the new electricity market is operating in Ontario, customers without a contract with an electricity retailer and without an interval meter will buy commodity electricity from their local distribution utilities under Standard Supply Service (SSS).

Distribution companies have three options for offering customers SSS. They can use a reference price set by the Ontario Energy Board, arrange for a third party to supply SSS, or seek Ontario Energy Board approval to pass through the spot market price. It appears likely that few if any utilities will adopt third party SSS. From the customer’s perspective, there is little difference between the reference price SSS and the spot pass-through SSS.

With the reference price, bills for consumers will be calculated on the basis of a forecast price with regular true-ups to invoice or credit the customer with accumulated differences between the forecasted price and the market price. With the spot pass-through, the utility knows the market price for the arrears periods covered by each customer’s bill and charges you that amount. In either case, the mapping of market prices onto customer bills is done using the concept of a NSLS.

One implication of the net system load shape approach is that consumers who tend to use power in low price periods will cross-subsidize customers who tend to use power in high price periods. Consumer benefits of interval metering have been demonstrated on a site-specific basis in the UK for small industrial and institutional customers.3

The movement of customers toward interval meters is likely to develop a momentum of its own over time. Non-interval metered customers who are cross-subsidizing other consumers have an incentive to improve their meters. As customers with naturally favourable load profiles leave the pool of non-interval metered customers, the remaining customers collectively face higher exposure to peak electricity prices.

3 Consumer Advantages from Half-Hourly Metering and Load Profiles in the UK Competitive Electricity Market, P. Stephenson and M. Paun, Kingston University, Faculty of Technology, London SW15 3DW UK, Stephenson P & Paun M, DRPT2000 Int. Conf. on Elc. Utility Deregulation and Restructuringand Power Technologies, Proc., London, UK, 4-7 April, 2000; 35-40.

Categories of Benefits

The benefits of interval metering are a function of price volatility. If the price for electricity was always the same, there would be no need for interval meters because the incentive to consume or conserve would not be related to timing. While some insight can be gained into expected price behaviour by studying data from various competitive jurisdictions, actual behaviour is unpredictable and fluid.

Increasing the penetration of interval metering will provide customers more direct means to manage their electricity costs, however, the benefits of switching to interval meters will not be evenly spread. Small business consumers, due to higher volumes of usage, are more likely to benefit from advanced meters than households. Customers with a naturally favourable load shapes, that is customers tending to use power at times when it is cheapest, and customers with manageable loads are also more likely to benefit from interval meters.

Customers with interval meters and sufficient communication to have reasonably accurate knowledge of the market price will have a greater incentive to align their consumption behaviour with the level of scarcity that exists in the market. Cost-effective implementation of interval metering on a widespread basis can be expected to help reduce the amplitude of price spikes relative to the amplitude we would anticipate with existing crude metering. Enhancing demand elasticity is recognized as a mean of mitigating market power. “Increases in the price elasticity of demand at peak times have a profound impact on the ability of generator to abuse market power. If demand is more elastic, then generators will lose a larger proportion of their output for a given change in price because total demand will fall.”4

The benefits are not limited to participating (those installing interval meters ) customers. Non-participating customers could also be expected to benefit from the peak demand reductions resulting from real-time price signals on customers with new interval meters. Customers in commercially connected utility regions may also benefit from the impact of these strategic demand reductions.

In addition, as more interval meters are deployed, distribution utilities will have much better data than they have today to assess power quality, manage distribution assets, and make better use of the transformer capacity. Rather than specifying equipment on the basis or assumptions about coincident peak demands of consumers, actual load data can be used to reduce costs. Knowing the duration and magnitude of excess loads can allow loading above name plate rating without loss of life making even more capacity available from existing transformers.

4 Options for Market Power Mitigation in the Alberta Power Pool, Final Report, Prepared for the Alberta Department of Energy by London Economics, Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts, January, 1998 www.energy.gov.ab.ca/index.asp

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The introduction of interval meters to small customers will impact consumption behaviour and therefore price. Since the price outlook is one of the inputs in determining the benefits from interval meters, prospective assessment of the benefits of metering improvements is necessarily uncertain.

Categories of Costs

Purchasing, installing, monitoring and verifying an interval meter is inherently more costly than it is for the common analogue meter now in use. Cost per unit tends to decrease as the number put in use increases. Functional replacements for electromechanical meters are presently in the range $70 to $150 per meter and will fall with increased sales volume.

Meters capable of interval data and automated data collection range from $250 to $800 per meter. Again this price will fall dramatically with increased sales volume, as it did in the U.K. where the introduction of the electricity market created long production runs with the result that meter prices for equivalent capability are often 20% of the functional equivalent in Canada.

Communication costs for electronic data collection can be significant. For residential meters the cost depends on the data collection technology and the ownership of the communications medium. Two types of technology are used in Canada dial up and automated data collection (AMR).

If the telephone line used for dial up is used exclusively, the meter data collection costs can be $125 to $400 per meter per year. On the other hand, many municipal utilities are able gain access to an existing customer telephone line at no cost since the meter is called once per day for about one minute between midnight and 3:00 am. Since there is no long distance charge, the cost of dial-up can be as low as $25 to $50 per year.

Dial-up is not suited to collect data for more than about 5000 thousand meters per day. On the other hand AMR systems are designed to collect data in volume. Many AMR technologies exist. Each uses a mixture of wireless, satellite, power line carrier and wide area network technologies. The cost per meter reading has been declining for over a decade but still remains higher than manual meter reading.

Technological uncertainties exist with changing meters. Some of these uncertainties include the choice of one-way vs. two-way communication, the future role of the Internet, and how meters might in future integrate with energy management technologies. Experience with time-or-use meters, which several Ontario distribution utilities invested in during the 1990s, but which became obsolete because of the recent market reforms, provides a cautionary lesson.

Cost issues for meter verification are discussed in the next section.

Some consumers, particularly those using a small amount of electricity, may not see sufficient payback to justify acquiring an interval meter. As meter and communication costs decline, the market for meters will expand.

Regulatory Issues

Two regulatory agencies currently control the metering options available to Canadian electricity customers: Measurement Canada, the federal agencies that administers weights and measures, and the Ontario Energy Board, the provincial agency that regulates electricity distributors.

Federal Regulations

Electricity meters in Canada are regulated under the national Electricity & Gas Inspection Act. National regulations are a significant factor in the lifecycle cost of an electricity meter since Measurement Canada requires that the meter population be sampled periodically to ensure that each group of meters in the population is accurate.

Measurement Canada is currently in the process of modernizing its practices with regard to electronic metering. Under the existing Measurement Canada policy, electronic meters are subject to much more stringent and costly meter verification than analogue meters and the approval of new metering technology is a slow process. Under the auspicious of the Canadian Electrical Association, the metering industry is pushing for new rules that will permit the metering industry to modernize.

The glass enclosed Ferraris disk meter with the rotating disk seen is seen on nearly every household today. These meters are inexpensive, reasonably accurate, rarely influenced by voltage surges and have service lives exceeding 40 years. The purchase price is low – about $35 each. The cost of meter reading in urban utilities where meters are located outside is often in the range of 25-40 cents/reading.5

Each electromechanical meter group must be sampled every 12 years. Depending on the size of the group, 1.5 to 3% of the meters in the group are replaced and taken back to the meter shop to be reverified. The cost of shop testing, the labour to install replacement and collect the meter ranges from $100 to $250 per meter, depending on the location in Canada. Added to this is the cost of maintaining a pool of replacement meters.

The volume of electronic meters in Canada has been low, due in some measure to

5 “Comparative Review of Meter Reading Costs:” by Thomas Adams, 1996 April 1, Pre-filed Testimony on Behalf of Energy Probe, Presented to the Ontario Energy Board Regarding E.B.R.O. 492.

regulatory policy. Current Measurement Canada policy requires that 100% all electronic meter be reverified every six years. Replacement and testing costs are the same as for electromechanical meters but the increase in sample size and recall frequency, means that the cost of reverification is up to 128 times that of electromechanical meters.6 With the life cycle cost so much higher in comparison to electromechanical meters, few Canadian utilities have adopted electronic meters in significant numbers.

Measurement Canada has recognized the need for change in policy and is actively considering the needs of consumers and industry in mapping out a strategy for change in regulatory policy. Results however may be some years off.

In the meantime, distributors that have deployed electronic meters have done so because they want to offer new rates, better information, or load control options to customers. This imperative will escalate with de-regulation.

Provincial Regulations

Retail metering rules in Ontario are established under the OEB’s Distribution System Code. Under those rules existing customers over 1 MW must have interval meters and new customers over 500 KW must have interval meters (Section 5.1.3 of the Code). Some Distribution companies have taken the initiative to bring Interval meters to a wider group of customers. Milton Hydro has fitted all customers over 100 KW with interval meters.

Experience in other jurisdictions suggests that a portion of the non-customer specific costs to utilities of interval metering should be shared with customers who do not themselves have interval meters. As discussed below, Florida Power & Light has demonstrated the use of interval metering to enhance reliability, monitor power quality, and improve the management of distribution systems for the benefit of all customers.

The wider benefits of interval metering are not recognized in the Distribution System Code. A customer that requests interval metering shall compensate a distributor for all sunk and incremental costs associated with that meter and the meter it replaces (section 5.1.5 of the Code). Under the Distribution System Code, the LDC determines the metering options customers have and the communication options that the meters must use.

Under Section 5.1.6 of the Code, a distributor is required to identify in its Conditions of Service the type of meters that are available to a customer, the process by which a customer may obtain such meters, and the types of charges that would be levied on a customer for each meter type.

6 Industry Initiative: Electricity Measurement Accuracy Program (E-MAP) Proposal, prepared by the CEA Task Group on Metering & Regulations, Canadian Electricity Association (CEA), July 2001, www.canelect.ca

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Ontario’s current Performance Based Rate-making (PBR) formula creates a disincentive for distribution companies to expand the range and quality of services offered to consumers. Under PBR, the rates distributors can charged are capped, creating an incentive to distributors to cut costs within the scope of existing service offerings. If interval metering is to develop in Ontario, the Ontario Energy Board will have to declare clear rules that give distributors assurances that their reasonable costs can be recovered.

Considerations for Introducing Interval Meters for Small Consumers

There are several arguments favouring a regulatory system designed so that customers voluntarily identify themselves for upgrading to interval meters, and bearing a portion of the incremental cost. Interval meters will not provide any benefits for small customers who have already signed contracts with marketers. Customers with naturally favourable seasonal loads will receive fewer benefits. For example, some retired residential customers spend some portion of the summer months at cottages and the winter months in warm climate regions, resulting in their local electricity usage being concentrated in periods of low seasonal electricity demand with a higher probability of relatively low prices and relatively low price volatility. For customers using very small amounts of electricity, the increase in fixed costs associated with interval meters is more difficult to recover from savings on the commodity cost of power.

On the other hand, if meter replacement is handled centrally, economies of scale might be achieved. A strategy combining voluntary upgrading for small customers hoping to benefit with utility-managed upgrading of metering for customer classes where benefits across the class can be demonstrated, might prove beneficial.

Customer choice in meters was recommended by the Ontario Market Design Committee. Under the existing Distribution System Code customers can only install meters approved and supplied by their local utility. Meters of the future may have energy management features built in.

Energy retailers might want to play a role in metering. Energy retailers might be interested in promoting meters that are suited for or compatible with controlling electricity usage for particular appliances.

Government and regulatory leadership on metering improvements is necessary. With very few customers currently metered with equipment fully able to accommodate the new electricity market, metering improvements are necessary for the full realization of the benefits of Ontario’s electricity restructuring. The net benefits of metering improvement may be modest on an individual household level but may be significant on a province-wide basis.

Posted in Power Generation in Ontario | 3 Comments

Public participation and due process missing from Port Hope nuclear waste project

Posted on April 11, 2002 by Other News Sources

Mark Mattson, Norm Rubin, Krystyn Tully
Comment on Environmental Assessment Draft Scope
April 11, 2002

 

 

Sharon Baillie-Malo
Uranium and Radioactive Waste Division
Natural Resources Canada
580 Booth Street
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0E4

submitted by fax: 613.947.4205

Re: FEAI #: 30619
Title: Draft Scope of the Environmental Assessment for the Port Hope Long-Term Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Project

 

Dear Madam,

This submission is made with respect to the above-noted request for public comments on the Draft Scope of the Environmental Assessment for the Port Hope Long-Term Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Project on behalf of Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe.

Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe are charitable organizations representing individuals in communities throughout Canada, and both are projects of Energy Probe Research Foundation. Lake Ontario Keeper works to protect Lake Ontario and the interests of the communities in its watershed through the enforcement of environmental laws. Energy Probe is a research-based consumer, environment and energy public-interest group with a long history of involvement in nuclear issues and radioactive contamination in the Port Hope and Port Granby region.

In response to the Draft Scope, Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe request that the following considerations be made:

 

1. That the Responsible Authorities request the Minister of Environment refer the EA to a review panel in accordance with Section 25(a) and (b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act;

 

2. That all restrictive pre-conditions be removed from the Draft Scope; and,

 

3. That the scope of the assessment be expanded to explore key issues of concern in the Port Hope region.

 

1. Request for referral to a review panel under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)

 

The description of the Port Hope Project Environmental Assessment (EA) found in the Draft Scope raises a number of concerns regarding the ability of the process to “achieve or maintain a healthy environment” one of its primary functions as stated in CEAA Section 4(b).

Factors which restrict the EA’s effectiveness include:

A. The EA is limited to the preparation of a screening report. This process is the lowest level of due process possible under CEAA.

B. Independent review and decision-making elements are absent. This is significant because the Port Granby Project funder (NRCan), project overseer (CNSC), regulators (NRCan, DFO, CNSC), proponent (LLRWMO), and Responsible Authorities who ensure a sound process and assess environmental impacts (CNSC, NRCan, DFO) are all representatives of the same body (the Federal government).

In our extensive experience in the assessment of the impacts of nuclear undertakings including those involving nuclear wastes independent panels and the public as a whole consistently take a rather different view of these impacts than officials of CNSC, governments, and nuclear utility companies.

Indeed, our most recent experience with an independent panel review of a nuclear undertaking the so-called “Seaborn Panel” review of the federal government’s concept for deep geological disposal of high- level radioactive waste showed that such panel reviews have the potential to make rather large steps away from nuclear-establishment’s “business as usual” approach and toward the kind of wisdom that we must develop to deal properly with nuclear materials.

The nature of the material in question (i.e., radioactive waste) and the gravity of the concern shared by members of the Port Hope community regarding its past, present, and future effects create a strong argument in favour of referring the EA to a review panel under Section 25(a) and (b) of CEAA.

We would also like to note that an Ontario hazardous waste siting project such as the Port Hope Project would ordinarily require a Certificate of Approval from the Ontario Ministry of Environment and be subject to a Part V hearing pursuant to the Ontario Environmental Protection Act (EPA). In this case, however, the Federal government has claimed jurisdiction over nuclear waste, thereby exempting itself from this process.

This exemption significantly reduces applicable standards for assessing and mitigating adverse environmental impacts of the project, since even the most stringent process for environmental review pursuant to the CEAA does not meet the lowest standards of Ontario’s EA requirements.

Section 3.3 of the Draft Scope notes that the Ontario Ministry of Environment (MOE) will not apply EPA requirements to the project but does not provide the opinion or reasons for that decision. This decision contradicts the Ontario government’s earlier position, as outlined in a 1994 letter by Minister Bud Wildman to Mark Mattson, lawyer for Energy Probe. Responding to questions about the Federal government’s intent to locate high-level nuclear waste in Ontario, Minister Wildman states:

We share your concerns about the limitations of the federal environmental assessment process . . . [T]he most rigorous examination of any proposal would be required in Ontario before any decisions are made.

Minister Wildman’s application of Ontario standards to radioactive waste is not without precedent traditionally, Ontario’s EPA also encompassed radioactive substances:

Waste disposal is traditionally a provincial concern. An argument could be made that the AECB’s jurisdiction extends to approving designs for waste disposal sites and giving licences to approved designs; but that construction and operation of the sites are within provincial jurisdiction. If so, s. 33a, b, and c of the EPA would apply a public hearing must be held where a hazardous waste site is to be established or extended. Hazardous is defined in Regulation 824 under this Act to include radioactive substances. Regulation 824 gives no standards for the management of radioactive waste sites. (Estrin, David and John Swaigen. Environment on Trial, (1978). Page 306, Footnote 99.)

There is precedent, therefore, for the province to assume a role in the disposal of radioactive waste and for such a project to be subject to standards higher than those in the Draft Scope for the EA screening. While the Ontario government has not yet declared its interest in the Port Hope Project, the potential impacts of the project, the concerns arising within the community, and the precedents set by previous radioactive waste projects should compel federal Responsible Authorities to adopt a framework more likely to reflect due process and fairness.

By invoking the most stringent level of due process under CEAA, the Port Hope Project EA is more likely to incorporate quasi-independence, public accountability, and transparency.

 

2. The impact of pre-conditions on the proposed Environmental Assessment (EA)

 

One of the primary functions of the EA is to “encourage responsible authorities to take actions that promote sustainable development and thereby achieve or maintain a healthy environment.” (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, Section 4(b)). A number of pre-conditions built into the Draft Scope, however, severely limits the potential for the Port Hope Project Environmental Assessment to satisfy this function.

Pre-conditions included in the Draft Scope limit the ability of the EA process to fully evaluate the impacts of the project. They also restrict the likelihood that the analysis conducted can be used to design the most environmentally, economically, and socially beneficial/appropriate project possible.

These pre-conditions include:

A. The lack of a proper review of alternatives to the project, or need; and,

B. The assessment methodology.

 

A. Lack of a proper review of alternatives, or need

 

Section 5.0 of the Draft Scope states that alternatives to the Port Hope Project will not be factors in the screening and defends this omission by reminding us that efforts over the course of the last thirty (30) years to find suitable alternatives have been unsuccessful. While a review of alternatives is not essential to the assessment of the potential physical impacts of the Port Hope Project itself, such a review is critical to the decision-making process by which such a project is approved.

In effect, the Port Hope Project as outlined in the Draft Scope is treated as a fait accompli and the EA as a mere formality. To protect community, environmental, and economic interests, the Draft Scope should be expanded to include criteria for assessing whether the Port Hope Project should proceed at all.

The Draft Scope document addresses the “Historical Context and Need for the Project” in section 6.2, beginning on p. 7. That section suggests that the need for the project flows from the failure of earlier processes specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Task Force to find a willing host community outside of Port Hope. But that history neither establishes the need for this project, nor does it suggest that this project is acceptable.

Briefly, that history is as follows: The federal government and its federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Limited, proposed to site a new radioactive waste disposal facility near Port Granby, and established an Environmental Assessment Panel to review several alternative sites. In response to intense political embarrassment, the federal government canceled the EA process entirely and established the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Process Task Force, to examine “less confrontational” ways to site such facilities. That Task Force provided specific process guidelines, based on relatively modern principles of voluntarism and informed consent. For example, those guidelines which were subsequently adopted by the Federal Government in the establishment of the subsequent Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Task Force ensured that no Town Council could accept a radioactive waste repository on behalf of its citizens without its citizens endorsing that acceptance in a referendum or similar process. After fourteen (14) Ontario communities expressed initial interest in entering the process as candidate host communities, thirteen (13) of the fourteen (14) withdrew from consideration, and one (Deep River) accepted on terms so unreasonably demanding that the Federal Government refused to conclude an agreement.

That history (a) committed Canada to modern and enlightened principles of voluntarism and informed consent and (b) established that no Ontario community was willing to voluntarily host these wastes without a level of compensation that the Federal Government was unwilling to provide. That history clearly does not establish that the citizens of Port Hope have volunteered or consented to site such a repository, but it does strongly suggest that the present contract between Port Hope and the federal government an agreement that has not been tested or endorsed by the citizens of Port Hope in a referendum or similar process cannot be considered a legitimate basis to proceed in a modern democracy like Canada.

In the absence of any legitimate evidence of voluntary and informed consent by this community to this facility legitimate as judged by the Federal Government’s own standard, as set out in the Task Force process it is absurd to argue (as the Draft Scope proposes) that that process proves the need, or the acceptability, of this process. And the decision to further deny the citizens of this community access to an independent EA review panel seriously compounds that affront.

Of course, it is entirely possible that the citizens of Port Hope would join their compatriots in the rest of Ontario in withholding their informed consent to these waste facilities. Such an outcome obviously points to the need to search harder for alternatives to this project whether by way of additional environmental protection or additional compensation or in other ways. By totally avoiding the discussion of alternatives to this process, this screening review gets us no closer to a legitimate solution to the problem.

 

B. Assessment methodology

 

By addressing only incremental harm arising from the Port Hope Project and not addressing the effects fifty (50) years of radioactive waste have had on the region, the EA will not objectively define “healthy environment” and is therefore restricted in its ability to achieve or maintain such a goal.

Furthermore, this approach relies on current conditions to provide a baseline for determining environmental impacts and governing the project’s course of action. Since the health of the citizens of Port Hope and their environment are questionable, and on the basis of active dispute between local citizens groups and the federal government, this baseline is insufficient.

The decision to leave the radioactive waste in the Port Hope community and the resulting suggestion that current environmental conditions are acceptable standards also curtails the ability of the Port Hope community to seek full redress for damages that may already have been inflicted on it by the siting of nuclear waste in the region.

By building these pre-conditions into the Draft Scope, the Federal government and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) – its designated representative for regulating the use of nuclear energy and materials – decided without full public consultation that the Port Hope community is the best permanent site for the radioactive waste without evidence to demonstrate the validity of such a decision.

Accordingly, the Environmental Assessment for the Port Hope Project can be of limited comfort to the community of Port Hope unless it takes into account a review of alternatives, the need for the project, and the historic impacts of nuclear waste in the region.

 

 

3. Scope of the assessment

 

The scope of the assessment proposed in the Draft Scope requires increased specificity in order to ensure that key issues important to the community of Port Hope are explored.

 

A. Environmental Effects of Radioactive Waste in Port Hope Harbour

 

The most complete and up-to-date public study of radioactive waste in the Port Hope Harbour is found in the Port Hope Harbour Remedial Action Plan Stage 1: Environmental Conditions and Problem Definitions, published in 1990. The RAP report was prepared by a Steering Committee and a RAP team, which included representation from Environment Canada, Environment Ontario, Health and Welfare Canada, and the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Office. (Pg. vii – viii)

The RAP report discusses the 90,000 cubic meters of sediments located in the Port Hope Harbour prior to some small remediation efforts during the 1990s. The sediments were found to be contaminated by uranium and thorium series radionuclides, as well as heavy metals and PCBs. The contamination was believed to be the result primarily of waste management practices associated with radium and uranium refinery operations in the town of Port Hope. (i-ii) Other studies have indicated that contamination is also discharging from the Harris Ponds (located on private property on Bedford Road in Port Hope) that drain into the Ganaraska River in Monkey Mountain waste site discharges.

 

Impact on fish

 

The 1990 RAP report found levels of radionuclides in Port Hope Turning Basin benthos and stated that radioactive contaminants in the sediments were also bioaccumulating in the benthic biota. A detailed bioassessment of sediment toxicity was not undertaken however. (p.65)

It is also significant to note that the RAP report recognized Port Hope Harbour as waters frequented by fish and cited 1984/1985 studies finding the presence of radionuclides in fish taken from the Turning Basin. (p. 66-68) The accompanying analysis in the RAP report, however, concludes that there is little impairment to potential beneficial users despite the presence of radionuclides.

Reasons for this conclusion include:

i. the main impairments to eating fish in the Harbour were caused by environmental conditions and sources not attributable to the harbour. (pg.ix)
ii. there had been no complaints regarding tainting of fish flavour. (pg. ix)
iii. conditions are not good for fish habitat within the Port Hope Harbour due to shallow depth and configuration resulting in high summer water temperatures, low dissolved oxygen and murky waters. (p. 66)

For the purposes of the Port Hope Project Environmental Assessment, the studies conducted in the 1990s regarding the impacts of contaminated harbour sediments on fish, fish habitat, fish consumption, and the benthic community need to be updated and expanded.

This process should include, but is not limited to:

i. The conclusions drawn by the RAP team should also be reassessed to reflect the objectives of the Environmental Assessment;
ii. New tests not conducted by the RAP team are performed to ensure that an accurate and
detailed understanding of the extent to which the Port Hope Harbour sediments are toxic to fish and the benthic community is achieved; and,
iii. Fisherman in the area should be solicited for complaints about fish tainting and fish consumption in order to assess the state of the problem and what remedial actions can and should be taken.

We would also be remiss if we did not point out that there seems to be contradictory evidence in the public domain with regards to the state of the Port Hope fisheries. The Ganaraska River and Port Hope Harbour region identified in the RAP report as places where only “some” fishing occurs (pg. ix) are in fact widely lauded throughout the sportfishing and tourism worlds:

“The fishing opportunities in the Port Hope area are truly outstanding The Ganaraska draws people from great distances to fish There is world class fishing for the Bow’s upstream.”

“Other popular areas include Port Hope’s legendary Ganaraska River.”

Even the Ganarask Region Conservation Authority a government agency recognizes the region as a popular place for sportsfishing

An accurate evaluation of the health of the fisheries in the area is needed in order to protect human health. The results of such an evaluation will also legitimize statements as to the risk and use impairment impacts of contamination in the Port Hope Harbour.

 

Wildlife/Migratory Birds

 

In the RAP document, the team members conclude that the impact of the harbour’s contaminated sediments on wildlife consumption and flavour is not relevant, as “hunting is not permitted in the area.” This type of logic should be discouraged for the purposes of the Port Hope Project Environmental Assessment, as it undermines any legitimate attempt to evaluate the environmental impacts of contamination in the region.

The most prevalent wildlife in the Port Hope Harbour other than fish are the migratory birds that fly into the area. Geese and ducks are found throughout the Turning Basin and West Slip, and many of these birds nest on the shores and banks of the Harbour. Because these birds are migratory (and therefore fly in both localized zones and over large areas), the fact that hunting is not permitted in the area is irrelevant. While hazardous waste management may not directly effect the local community in this case, managers of the hazardous material should not be permitted to thrust negative impacts, use impairments, and other associated risks on other regions.

 

Application of Environmental Laws

 

The Port Hope Project must take into account potential impacts on regions outside the local community and ensure that government standards – particularly Federal laws such as the Migratory Birds Act and the Fisheries Act – are enforced. These laws provide a clear set of standards by which to measure the performance of project managers.

Furthermore, continuing discharges from any waste site or industrial process discovered during the EA must be forced into compliance with the Fisheries and Migratory Birds Acts. If compliance does not result, charges against the offenders should be pursued.

 

B. Radioactive Contamination in Port Hope

 

There must be a full and complete assessment of all contaminated wastes in the Town of Port Hope, completed using the best available technology.

As recently as last summer, the Town of Port Hope unexpectedly uncovered radioactive waste in a town park. Similar surprise discoveries must not continue to occur. The EA process should conduct a complete and detailed evaluation of all contamination in town, identifying contaminated regions, informing property owners of suspected areas of contamination originating on their land, informing the general public of suspected areas of contamination located on publicly owned or accessible land, and instigate remediation of the problems.

The Ontario MOE soil study done in the Town of Port Hope in the 1980s should be updated to compare and contrast data, to determine whether or not a continuing problem exists, and to identify what actions, if any, are required to deal with contaminated soils in the town.

Finally, the contamination in the Harris Ponds and on adjacent property needs to be assessed and remediated. Environmental impacts of contamination originating from the Monkey Mountain waste site should be assessed.

Issues of property de-valuation, tax assessments, and re-sale values of property contaminated by radioactive or hazardous waste should also be addressed in the EA.

 

Beaches

 

While the 1990 RAP report states that “No beaches are located in the Area of Concern,” thereby dismissing the risk of potential health risks or use impairments there is a large, popular beach located just a few metres from the Port Hope Harbour. The Port Hope Project Environmental Assessment should include an evaluation of the historic, current, and potential effects of contaminated soil and sediment on this (and other) known public bathing areas.

 

C. Health study

 

The Port Hope Project EA should require that a full health study be conducted to ensure adequate measures are being taken to protect the community from hazardous waste disposed of in Port Hope. This study should be deemed a significant element in the assessment of cumulative harm. Of primary concern to Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe is that the Environmental Assessment for the Port Hope Project be fair and transparent and that it provide a legitimate opportunity for public participation. Our recommendations, as stated above, reflect a number of changes that should be made to the Draft Scope in order to ensure that the process fulfils these standards.

Yours truly,

Mark Mattson
Lakekeeper & Counsel
Lake Ontario Keeper		 Norman Rubin
Director, Nuclear Research
Energy Probe		 Krystyn Tully
Programs Director
Lake Ontario Keeper
Posted in Energy Probe News, Nuclear Safety | Leave a comment

Nuclear waste projects need due process, public participation: appeal to Environment Minister

Posted on April 11, 2002 by Other News Sources

Norm Rubin and Mark Mattson
Letter
April 11, 2002

April 11, 2002

Hon. David Anderson, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Environment
National Office
Ottawa ON, K1A 0H3

Submitted by email: david.anderson@ec.gc.ca

Dear Mr. Anderson,

We are writing to request that the Environmental Assessments for the Port Hope and Port Granby Long-Term Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Projects be referred to a review panel, according to Section 28(1)(b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. We believe that a single review panel to hear both Assessments may be preferable, on balance, to two separate panels.

Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe are charitable organizations representing individuals in communities throughout Canada, and both are projects of Energy Probe Research Foundation. Lake Ontario Keeper works to protect Lake Ontario and the interests of the communities in its watershed through the enforcement of environmental laws. Energy Probe is a research-based consumer, environment and energy public-interest group with a long history of involvement in nuclear issues and radioactive contamination in the Port Hope and Port Granby region.

We are concerned that the currently proposed screening processes are “self-assessments” which promise little independent or objective decision-making and inadequate opportunity for public consultation. Our extensive experience in the assessment of the impacts of nuclear undertakings including those involving nuclear wastes support this opinion.

These screenings are not acceptable processes by which to determine the effects of the radioactive waste projects on the Port Hope community and its environment. We therefore urge you to refer the matter to an independent review panel.

The attached documents, submitted in response to the Draft Scope of the Environmental Assessment for each of the two projects, outline our concerns in detail. Our argument in favour of a review panel can be found primarily in Section 1 of each submission.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Yours truly,

Mark Mattson
Lakekeeper & Counsel
Lake Ontario Keeper		 Norman Rubin
Director, Nuclear Research
Energy Probe
Posted in Nuclear Safety | Leave a comment

Nuclear waste project needs independence to protect community, environment: Port Granby EA comment

Posted on April 11, 2002 by Other News Sources

Norm Rubin, Mark Mattson, Krystyn Tully
11 Apr 2002

Re: FEAI #: 30619
Title: Draft Scope of the Environmental Assessment for the Port Granby Long-Term Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Project

Dear Madam,

This submission is made with respect to the above-noted request for public comments on the Draft Scope of the Environmental Assessment for the Port Granby Long-Term Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Project on behalf of Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe.

Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe are charitable organizations representing individuals in communities throughout Canada, and both are projects of Energy Probe Research Foundation. Lake Ontario Keeper works to protect Lake Ontario and the interests of the communities in its watershed through the enforcement of environmental laws. Energy Probe is a research-based consumer, environment and energy public-interest group with a long history of involvement in nuclear issues and radioactive contamination in the Port Hope and Port Granby region.

In response to the Draft Scope, Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe request that the following considerations be made:

1. That the Responsible Authorities request the Minister of Environment refer the EA to a review panel in accordance with Section 25(a) and (b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act;

2. That all restrictive pre-conditions be removed from the Draft Scope; and,

3. That the scope of the assessment be expanded to explore key issues of concern in the Port Granby region.

1. Request for referral to a review panel under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)

The description of the Port Granby Project Environmental Assessment (EA) found in the Draft Scope raises a number of concerns regarding the ability of the process to “achieve or maintain a healthy environment” one of its primary functions as stated in CEAA Section 4(b).

Factors which restrict the EA’s effectiveness include:

A. The EA is limited to the preparation of a screening report. This process is the lowest level of due process possible under CEAA.

B. Independent review and decision-making elements are absent. This is significant because the Port Granby Project funder (NRCan), project overseer (CNSC), regulators (NRCan, DFO, CNSC), proponent (LLRWMO), and Responsible Authorities who ensure a sound process and assess environmental impacts (CNSC, NRCan, DFO) are all representatives of the same body (the Federal government).

In our extensive experience in the assessment of the impacts of nuclear undertakings including those involving nuclear wastes independent panels and the public as a whole consistently take a rather different view of these impacts than officials of CNSC, governments, and nuclear utility companies.

Indeed, our most recent experience with an independent panel review of a nuclear undertaking the so-called “Seaborn Panel” review of the federal government’s concept for deep geological disposal of high- level radioactive waste showed that such panel reviews have the potential to make rather large steps away from nuclear-establishment’s “business as usual” approach and toward the kind of wisdom that we must develop to deal properly with nuclear materials.

The nature of the material in question (i.e., radioactive waste) and the gravity of the concern shared by members of the Port Granby community regarding its past, present, and future effects create a strong argument in favour of referring the EA to a review panel under Section 25(a) and (b) of CEAA.

We would also like to note that an Ontario hazardous waste siting project such as the Port Granby Project would ordinarily require a Certificate of Approval from the Ontario Ministry of Environment and be subject to a Part V hearing pursuant to the Ontario Environmental Protection Act (EPA). In this case, however, the Federal government has claimed jurisdiction over nuclear waste, thereby exempting itself from this process.

This exemption significantly reduces applicable standards for assessing and mitigating adverse environmental impacts of the project, since even the most stringent process for environmental review pursuant to the CEAA does not meet the lowest standards of Ontario’s EA requirements.

Section 3.3 of the Draft Scope notes that the Ontario Ministry of Environment (MOE) will not apply EPA requirements to the project but does not provide the opinion or reasons for that decision. This decision contradicts the Ontario government’s earlier position, as outlined in a 1994 letter by Minister Bud Wildman to Mark Mattson, lawyer for Energy Probe. Responding to questions about the Federal government’s intent to locate high-level nuclear waste in Ontario, Minister Wildman states:

We share your concerns about the limitations of the federal environmental assessment process . . . [T]he most rigorous examination of any proposal would be required in Ontario before any decisions are made.

Minister Wildman’s application of Ontario standards to radioactive waste is not without precedent traditionally, Ontario’s EPA also encompassed radioactive substances:

Waste disposal is traditionally a provincial concern. An argument could be made that the AECB’s jurisdiction extends to approving designs for waste disposal sites and giving licences to approved designs; but that construction and operation of the sites are within provincial jurisdiction. If so, s. 33a, b, and c of the EPA would apply a public hearing must be held where a hazardous waste site is to be established or extended. Hazardous is defined in Regulation 824 under this Act to include radioactive substances. Regulation 824 gives no standards for the management of radioactive waste sites. (Estrin, David and John Swaigen. Environment on Trial, (1978). Page 306, Footnote 99.)

There is precedent, therefore, for the province to assume a role in the disposal of radioactive waste and for such a project to be subject to standards higher than those in the Draft Scope for the EA screening. While the Ontario government has not yet declared its interest in the Port Granby Project, the potential impacts of the project, the concerns arising within the community, and the precedents set by previous radioactive waste projects should compel federal Responsible Authorities to adopt a framework more likely to reflect due process and fairness.

By invoking the most stringent level of due process under CEAA, the Port Granby Project EA is more likely to incorporate quasi-independence, public accountability, and transparency.

2. The impact of pre-conditions on the proposed Environmental Assessment (EA)

One of the primary functions of the EA is to “encourage responsible authorities to take actions that promote sustainable development and thereby achieve or maintain a healthy environment.” (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, Section 4(b)). A number of pre-conditions built into the Draft Scope, however, severely limits the potential for the Port Granby Project Environmental Assessment to satisfy this function.

Pre-conditions included in the Draft Scope limit the ability of the EA process to fully evaluate the impacts of the project. They also restrict the likelihood that the analysis conducted can be used to design the most environmentally, economically, and socially beneficial/appropriate project possible.

These pre-conditions include:

A. The lack of a proper review of alternatives to the project, or need; and,

B. The assessment methodology.

A. Lack of a proper review of alternatives, or need

Section 5.0 of the Draft Scope states that alternatives to the Port Granby Project will not be factors in the screening and defends this omission by reminding us that efforts over the course of the last thirty (30) years to find suitable alternatives have been unsuccessful. While a review of alternatives is not essential to the assessment of the potential physical impacts of the Port Granby Project itself, such a review is critical to the decision-making process by which such a project is approved.

In effect, the Port Granby Project as outlined in the Draft Scope is treated as a fait accompli and the EA as a mere formality. To protect community, environmental, and economic interests, the Draft Scope should be expanded to include criteria for assessing whether the Port Granby Project should proceed at all.

The Draft Scope document addresses the “Historical Context and Need for the Project” in section 6.2, beginning on p. 7. That section suggests that the need for the project flows from the failure of earlier processes specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Task Force to find a willing host community outside of Port Granby. But that history neither establishes the need for this project, nor does it suggest that this project is acceptable.

Briefly, that history is as follows: The federal government and its federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Limited, proposed to site a new radioactive waste disposal facility near Port Granby, and established an Environmental Assessment Panel to review several alternative sites. In response to intense political embarrassment, the federal government canceled the EA process entirely and established the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Process Task Force, to examine “less confrontational” ways to site such facilities. That Task Force provided specific process guidelines, based on relatively modern principles of voluntarism and informed consent. For example, those guidelines which were subsequently adopted by the Federal Government in the establishment of the subsequent Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Task Force ensured that no Town Council could accept a radioactive waste repository on behalf of its citizens without its citizens endorsing that acceptance in a referendum or similar process. After fourteen (14) Ontario communities expressed initial interest in entering the process as candidate host communities, thirteen (13) of the fourteen (14) withdrew from consideration, and one (Deep River) accepted on terms so unreasonably demanding that the Federal Government refused to conclude an agreement.

That history (a) committed Canada to modern and enlightened principles of voluntarism and informed consent and (b) established that no Ontario community was willing to voluntarily host these wastes without a level of compensation that the Federal Government was unwilling to provide. That history clearly does not establish that the citizens of Port Granby have volunteered or consented to site such a repository, but it does strongly suggest that the present contract between Port Granby and the federal government an agreement that has not been tested or endorsed by the citizens of Port Granby in a referendum or similar process cannot be considered a legitimate basis to proceed in a modern democracy like Canada.

In the absence of any legitimate evidence of voluntary and informed consent by this community to this facility legitimate as judged by the Federal Government’s own standard, as set out in the Task Force process it is absurd to argue (as the Draft Scope proposes) that that process proves the need, or the acceptability, of this process. And the decision to further deny the citizens of this community access to an independent EA review panel seriously compounds that affront.

Of course, it is entirely possible that the citizens of Port Granby would join their compatriots in the rest of Ontario in withholding their informed consent to these waste facilities. Such an outcome obviously points to the need to search harder for alternatives to this project whether by way of additional environmental protection or additional compensation or in other ways. By totally avoiding the discussion of alternatives to this process, this screening review gets us no closer to a legitimate solution to the problem.

B. Assessment methodology

By addressing only incremental harm arising from the Port Granby Project and not addressing the effects fifty (50) years of radioactive waste have had on the region, the EA will not objectively define “healthy environment” and is therefore restricted in its ability to achieve or maintain such a goal.

Furthermore, this approach relies on current conditions to provide a baseline for determining environmental impacts and governing the project’s course of action. Since the health of the citizens of Port Granby and their environment are questionable, and on the basis of active dispute between local citizens groups and the federal government, this baseline is insufficient.

The decision to leave the radioactive waste in the Port Granby community and the resulting suggestion that current environmental conditions are acceptable standards also curtails the ability of the Port Granby community to seek full redress for damages that may already have been inflicted on it by the siting of nuclear waste in the region.

By building these pre-conditions into the Draft Scope, the Federal government and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) – its designated representative for regulating the use of nuclear energy and materials – decided without full public consultation that the Port Granby community is the best permanent site for the radioactive waste without evidence to demonstrate the validity of such a decision.

Accordingly, the Environmental Assessment for the Port Granby Project can be of limited comfort to the community of Port Granby unless it takes into account a review of alternatives, the need for the project, and the historic impacts of nuclear waste in the region.

3. Scope of the assessment

The Port Granby Project EA must ensure that the extent of the problem is fully understood in order to best evaluate potential impacts and mitigation strategies. This process should include the update of past studies and reports and the conduction of new analyses.

Past and present circumstances should be examined in order to build on existing knowledge, reflect changes to standards, and to reflect CEAA requirements in Section 16(1)(a) that cumulative impacts be addressed.

A. Port Granby: Leaking radioactive hazardous waste site

This report, prepared by Lake Ontario Keeper in August 2001, identifies toxic substances discharging from the site and entering Lake Ontario. Furthermore, the report reveals the fact that 20% of the contaminated ground and surface water currently discharged by Cameco into the lake now escapes without treatment. Sample analysis further shows that even the treated effluent discharged by Cameco is toxic to fish.

B. Lake Ontario Keeper investigations

Over the course of the last year, Lake Ontario Keeper has regularly identified the presence of Migratory birds in the settling ponds, on the waste site and on the contaminated beach adjacent to the Port Granby facility. The EA should identify the impact of contaminated discharges on these birds.

C. Environmental Impact Assessment: The Port Granby Project

This 1977 report, prepared for Eldorado Nuclear Limited, identifies a number of environmental factors regarding fish and spawning areas at the Port Granby site, as well as Aquatic Biology Sampling Stations. All information from 1977 should be updated to 2002 for the purpose of determining continuing impacts from on-going pollution from the site and to assess the cumulative impacts of this proposed project. Of primary concern to Lake Ontario Keeper and Energy Probe is that the Environmental Assessment for the Port Hope Project be fair and transparent and that it provide a legitimate opportunity for public participation. Our recommendations, as stated above, reflect a number of changes that should be made to the Draft Scope in order to ensure that the process fulfils these standards.

Yours truly,

Mark Mattson
Lakekeeper & Counsel
Lake Ontario Keeper

Norman Rubin
Director, Nuclear Research
Energy Probe

Krystyn Tully
Programs Director
Lake Ontario Keeper
Comment on Environmental Assessment Draft Scope

Posted in Nuclear Safety | Leave a comment

Correspondence: Radiation increased the longevity of British radiologists

Posted on April 10, 2002 by energyprbe

The British Journal of Radiology
The British Journal of Radiology, 75
April 10, 2002

Radiation increased the longevity of British radiologists

The 100-year study of British radiologists is perhaps the most important article about the health effects of radiation on humans ever published. The continuity of follow-up in the study is the longest for any study of exposure to chronic radiation.

Click Here To View Full Article

Posted in Hormesis, LNT | Leave a comment

Correspondence: Radiation increased the longevity of British radiologists

Posted on April 10, 2002 by energyprbe

(Apr. 10,  2002) The 100-year study of British radiologists is perhaps the most important article about the health effects of radiation on humans ever published. The continuity of follow-up in the study is the longest for any study of exposure to chronic radiation.

Continue reading →

Posted in Hormesis, LNT | Leave a comment

Safety violations ‘a black spot’ for AECL

Posted on April 10, 2002 by Other News Sources

Gary Dimmock – with files from Joanne Laucius
Ottawa Citizen
April 10, 2002

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited has a “black spot” on its safety record after four workers were exposed to radiation from plutonium dust in 1999.

The Crown corporation pleaded guilty to six charges under the Canada Labour Code this week and was fined $24,000.

AECL agrees it failed to do things right on May 26, 1999, when it didn’t monitor radiation levels or warn workers about a “known and foreseeable” health risk as the tradesman, who weren’t wearing proper safety suits while repairing a ventilation system at a long-closed plutonium plant in Chalk River.

AECL also pleaded guilty to leaving the workers in a building after “unexpected radiological hazards occurred.”

The exposed workers showered until radiation levels were below measurable levels. The men still work at the plant.

The Ontario Court of Justice disposed of charges after joint submissions were made by AECL, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Human Resources Development Canada. Matters will not proceed to trial.

“This is definitely a black spot on our safety record and we’ve learned a lot from this,” said company spokeswoman Donna Roach.

“We have an excellent safety record and we are committed to protecting our workers from unanticipated exposures through stringent procedures and monitoring programs,” said company president Robert Van Adel.

“We have been open with our employees, our regulators, our neighbouring communities and the media about this incident from the beginning,” he said.

AECL had originally faced 22 charges laid by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Human Resources Development Canada. However, there was no evidence on 16 of the charges that there were any adverse effects to workers, the public or the environment.

“We were not happy that this happened. But it did, and we can’t change that fact. And we have taken full responsibility. And we said we’d get to the bottom of it and we did,” said Ms. Roach.

The company said the men were cutting away a component of the ventilation system when plutonium dust began falling from it. They showered twice, reducing contamination to less than detectable levels.

The company reported the accident to the nuclear safety board and later submitted a formal, written report about the events in Building 220, which was shut down in 1957.

The building was commissioned in 1950 to test plutonium for use in various reactors.

A 1994 government memorandum on Building 220 warned that decommissioning the building would present a number of risks.

“To a large extent, the facility was left as it was left in 1957,” the memo said. “It has been over 30 years since anyone worked at this site and there is little remaining operational experience of the contaminated systems. There appear to be gross discrepancies between the as-built drawings and the actual site.”

Atomic Energy Canada, which employs 3,700 people, designs and services CANDU power reactors. There are also three major generating facilities in Ontario, and two uranium refineries.

 

Norman Rubin, director of nuclear research at the energy industry watchdog Energy Probe, says a $24,000 fine probably isn’t enough to grab AECL’s attention. However, the public embarrassment will probably make the corporation notice, he said.

 

Of the hundreds of reportable incidents in nuclear power plants and facilities each year, far less than one a year result in charges, he said.

“I certainly hope the public embarrassment will help improve their practices.”

Posted in Nuclear Safety | Leave a comment

Direct Energy, NDP leader clash over quotes

Posted on April 5, 2002 by energyprbe

Paul Vieira
Financial Post
April 5, 2002

Photo credit: Carlo Allegri
HOWARD HAMPTON: “An apology from Direct Energy would be nice.”

Sales agents from Direct Energy Marketing Ltd., one of many firms aiming to capitalize on electricity deregulation in Ontario, are using quotes from Howard Hampton – one of deregulation’s fiercest opponents — to lure new customers.

“I want these unscrupulous companies to stop using my name to rip off consumers,” Mr. Hampton, leader of Ontario’s New Democratic Party, said yesterday. “And an apology from Direct Energy would be nice.”

But one industry observer who has debated Mr. Hampton on the issue was less sympathetic.

“He’s been hung out to dry on his own demagoguery,” said Tom Adams, executive director of industry watchdog Energy Probe, adding he believes the sales agents did nothing wrong in using Mr. Hampton’s statements. “It’s pretty precious.”

Mr. Hampton said Direct Energy representatives in Toronto and Sudbury, Ont., are going door to door with copies of newspaper articles in which he’s quoted predicting that hydro rates in Ontario will skyrocket if the province opens its $10-billion electricity market to competition, as planned, on May 1.

“Obviously, without [electricity deregulation], there would be no door-to-door marketers and consumers would not have to deal with their aggressive and often misleading tactics,” Mr. Hampton wrote in a letter to Direct Energy.

He added: “As long as consumers are to be subjected to these sales techniques, I request your assurances that the name Howard Hampton will not be used in any way to coerce new customers into signing with Direct Energy.”

A Direct Energy spokesman said it has received the letter and will respond to it as soon as possible.

The firm’s pitch is that it can provide customers with power over a certain period of time, such as three to five years, at a fixed price – thereby avoiding wild swings in electricity prices.

However, the firm has run into trouble over the sales tactics of some of its agents, who have in certain cases misrepresented who they are and the price they are offering. Agents have also been found to be forging signatures on contracts.

Mr. Hampton has been travelling across the province to talk about the pitfalls of opening Ontario’s power market. He has cited the debacles in California and Alberta, where rates skyrocketed, and predicted the same will happen in Ontario. One of his claims is that Ontarians will have to pay U.S. prices for its electricity.

However, Mr. Adams said prices for electricity in neighbouring U.S. jurisdictions are at or below Ontario prices. “I have tried to correct him several times, but he goes on. Now, he has been caught in his own trap.”

Posted in Natural Gas Utility Regulation and Commodity Deregulation | Leave a comment

NB Power failure darkens budget

Posted on April 2, 2002 by Other News Sources

Roger LeBlanc
Telegraph-Journal
April 2, 2002

Only two days after announcing a big budget surplus for 2001-02, the province may have to revise its numbers substantially thanks to a terrible year for NB Power.

In the legislature Tuesday, Finance Minister Peter Mesheau projected a surplus of $37 million for this fiscal year, with a further $70 million being transferred to the fiscal stabilization fund. But those numbers must have been inked before NB Power made its most recent estimates.

In New Brunswick budget documents, the government estimated a net income of about $30 million from NB Power, which was revised to $19 million for 2001-02. That’s likely to drop again, down to the break-even mark, warned Sharon MacFarlane, NB Power’s vice-president of finance and information services. And that could mean a much lower surplus for the province.

It was a rough year for the Crown corporation, she said, noting all the factors that sapped income levels including: the lowest river levels for hydro power since 1953, having to buy $35 million of replacement energy for hydro, unplanned outages at the Point Lepreau nuclear station and the big replacement energy costs there, a declining Canadian dollar, which raised fuel and American-held debt costs, and a decline in export prices last fall.

“All of those things are to a large degree beyond our control,” Ms. MacFarlane said Thursday. “For hydro flows, there’s nothing we can do. It provides 18 per cent of our in-province energy for free because there’s no-fuel cost for water. So when the hydro flows are low, it has a big impact on us.

“This fiscal year, we had budgeted a net income of $32 million from operations. We’ll know in a couple of weeks because this is the last day of the fiscal year, but we’ll likely come in right around break even,” she added. “In the past, the positives offset the negatives in large measure. In this current fiscal year it’s been mostly negative.”

Those same factors led to rate increases and could just as likely hurt the company again in 2002-03, even though the government is forecasting $28 million of net revenue. But a $28-million gain really isn’t much for a company that has $1.2 billion of revenues and $1.2 billion worth of costs, she stressed. Because variables such as natural gas, oil, and the American economy can be volatile, the utility aims to be plus or minus $50 million to $70 million each year. In the past few years, Ms. MacFarlane noted, the company has been able to stay within the break-even mark.

While breaking even is acceptable for NB Power, the province will have less cash to call a surplus, a spokeswoman for the Finance Department confirmed. If NB Power’s final tally for this fiscal year’s net revenues really do fall to zero, the impact could lead to the province having to lower payments to the net debt and that would bring the provincial surplus from $37 million to $18 million.

Liberal Finance critic Marcelle Mersereau said this points to her fear the 2001-02 surplus was due more to luck than managing smarter.

“The problem is, if you’re predicting a nearly $60-million shortfall in your revenue – forget the stabilization fund – that means you have a structural issue you haven’t solved. You’re going into the year knowing you’re spending more than you’re taking in,” she said from Bathurst. “They were lucky. That’s my worry.”

 

Posted in New Brunswick Power | Leave a comment

Hidden hydro tax skewers $137 million ‘windfall’

Posted on April 2, 2002 by energyprbe

Fred Vallance-Jones
The Hamilton Spectator
April 2, 2002

Hamilton electricity customers will pay what amounts to a hidden hydro tax for years to come to give city council $137 million to play with now. Councillors have been debating what to do with the “windfall” coming from municipally-owned Hamilton Hydro, and earlier this week came up with a plan to invest and spend.

It’s the culmination of a campaign promise by Mayor Bob Wade to create a community investment fund using Hydro cash. But what hasn’t been talked about much is where the money is really coming from.

In truth, this is no windfall.

Hydro will borrow the money to give to the city, and Hydro customers will pay the interest.

By next march, about $3.20 in every $100 in Hydro billings will go to cover the debt charges.

To understand why this is happening and why yet another surcharge is being added to hydro bills, one has to go back to the complicated financial arrangements put in place when the new Hamilton Hydro was created two years ago.

The Hamilton Transition Board was in the midst of establishing the new megacity, and one of its tasks was to combine the area hydro utilities into a new, profit-making company. A provincial law mandated the change.

The same law also allowed the utility to take on debt for the first time.

The new utility was born with $328 million in assets, built up over a hundred years by the old hydros. In what was effectively a paper transaction, $137 million of those assets were declared to be debt owed to the new city of Hamilton.

Under the arrangement, Hydro was to make payments on that debt, creating an annual revenue flow to the megacity of about $10 million.

Electricity customers were to cover the interest cost through higher hydro bills.

The arrangement attracted little attention at the time, but it was a sleight of hand way of giving the new city extra income without having to raise property taxes. In effect, it was a new tax on hydro customers.

What’s happening now is that the city and Hamilton Hydro have decided to change the arrangement.

In effect, the $137 million “debt” to the city will be paid off in a lump sum, and Hydro will in turn take on about the same amount of real debt in the private capital markets.

The city will lose it’s annual $10 million payments, but will gain a pot of money to use as it pleases.

Hydro customers will continue to pay their hydro tax, but instead of the money coming back to the city, it will go to cover interest owed to private money lenders.

For now, at least, the city plans to put $100 million of the money in the bank, effectively using borrowed money to invest.

The remaining $37 million will be spent on priority projects over the same period. Some councillors want to spend some of it to provide immediate tax relief.

Marvin Ryder, who chaired the transition board, says the board was always nervous about any arrangement that would give the city the cash in one lump sum.

“It took 100 or so odd years to build up that $137 million (of equity). You really want to think carefully before you spend it all.”

It was that concern that led the board to set up the original arrangement, with the paper debt and the annual $10 million payments. Since the principal would never be paid off, it was essentially a guaranteed, perpetual payment.

But the chief financial officer of Hamilton Utilities Corporation, the city-owned holding company that controls Hydro, says there are real advantages for the utility in moving its borrowing to the private markets.

“(It gives) the sort of financial flexibility to borrow large amounts of money to finance the growth of Hamilton Utilities Corporation,” John Basilio said.

The utility may need money to expand its other businesses, which include a fibre optics company and a community energy system, he added.

One thing that is absolutely clear, is that the complex financing of the new Hamilton Hydro is yet another factor that is driving up electricity rates in the new competitive market being established by the province.

By next March, customers will also pay about $2 of every $100 in hydro billings to cover the profit that Hamilton Hydro is now allowed to earn. Hydro has chosen to earn the maximum allowable profit of 9.88 per cent by next March.

Basilio says that move actually helps lower the utility’s cost of borrowing.

“It’s a delicate balancing act,” he said.

Customers will also pay $2.80 per $100 in billings to help pay off the multi-billion dollar debt of the old Ontario Hydro.

Other municipalities across Ontario are also making moves to cash in on the value long tied up in their formerly not-for-profit hydro utilities.

Lobby group Energy Probe estimated last year municipalities would suck as much as $7 billion out of their utilities, increasing average residential bills by $100 a year.

The City of Brampton went furthest of all, deciding to sell Brampton Hydro to the soon-to-be-privatized Hydro One for $260.2 million. Brampton put most of the proceeds into three special funds to generate interest to pay for infrastructure and other priority projects.

Neighbouring Burlington Hydro Inc. owes $40 million to the city. Mayor Rob MacIsaac says Burlington believes it can earn a better return by leaving the debt as is, rather than taking the money in a lump sum as Hamilton is doing.

As in Hamilton, Burlington Hydro customers cover the interest on the debt owed to the city.

MacIsaac says taking on debt helps maximize profits for the hydro utilities, something municipalities have little choice but to do.

He says Burlington studied the possibility of establishing the utility on a not for profit basis, but found it wasn’t practical.

“The rules (established by the province) are set up in such a way as to assume you are going to try to maximize your profit,” he said. “You have to earn a profit in the utility in order to renew the utility and so on.”

 

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